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all recorded history </Xa7 <* series of objective unique
events whose significance lies in their .i^ation
into distinctive patterns and not in ill -defined
formulas or generalised denominators.*
.Slno-ooviet scholar alien 3. whiting has pointed out
that there is nothing concerning the Fekinfe-Hoscow alliance
about which we are less informed than what actually transpires
at the highest level of exchange. «^ Qn the other hand, the
history and structure of the relationship between these two
world powers holds the key to one of the most important
terras in the equation of world politics on which the west
must base its predictions of the ultimate results of their
foreign policy alternatives. In the face of the dearth of
definitive material from Moscow and Peking, the feasible
access to the numerators, denominators, variables, and
constants of the Sino-3oviet "term" of the equation lies in
the empirical methodolo^ of framing hypotheses that reason-
ably encompass, or at least are not refuted by, the evidence
available at the moment. This is, of course, a pragmatic
1, a, L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (University of ChJ
Press, 1*52), p. "56.
2, Alien $, fchiti; >nflict Keaolutlon in the aino-ooviet
Alliance (paper at the~3rd International SovietologicaT'
Conference, Japan, September, l^bv).

process in which current hypotheses must be continually
iated as subsequent events lend new mean o sketchy
contemporary evidence, and as old material faecou.es inadvert-
ently available as the twists and turns of historic evolution
squeeze it forth and drop it into the hands of the west.
The distillation of the material available at present
requires the resolution of a seemingly endless chain of
incongruities. The history of CI ina in the decades before
the mainland victory of the Communists tells the story of
the rise of Mao Tse-tung in the face of continued opposition
by Joseph Stalin. 3 Documentary evidence of 3ino-3oviet
discord then goes into a relative eclipse from 1949 to 1^56,
when it emerges in an antithetical for$3: D^o Tse-tung
objects to the Khrushchevian defamation of Stalin. This
"father" of discontinuities appears to give birth to succes-
sive generations of similarly dlchotomous evidence as
research probes the history of almost any issue of common
interest to both countries.
External evidence of the "modern" dispute has pro-
gressed in steady crescendo from hints of dissatisfaction in
l$6o, t m iin-lai^ open affront of Premier Khrushchev
at the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the
3. Michael Lindsay, China and the Cold War (Melbourne
i
Melbourne UniversiiyTress, T§55), pi I6f. "...Mao Tse-
tung rose to leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in
competition with rivals preferred by the Comintern."
Professor Lindsay lived in the Communist areas of China
from 1^.41 to 1^45 and is personally acquainted with many of
the Peking leaders (see below).

Soviet Union in l>-6l, and at this writing ha© assumed pro-
portions which Harriaon Salisbury baa described as the moat
serioua break in the Communiat movement aince V. I. Lenin
left the Social Itemocratie party and formed the Bolsheviks
shortly after the turn of the century,
Coamuniat "totalistie" leadership must tread the
fine line of demanding a standard of orthodoxy that is
r porous enough to maintain allegiance, yet flexible enough
to accommodate the variant demands of dissimilar societies.
The exponential rate of Industrialisation's growth (and that
of its sociological by-product— the middle class psychology)
place dlver^in^; pressures on the decision makers of Moscow
and Peking at this stage of development. tallnism" Is
apparently symbolic of China's dissimilar policy needs.
Put In the form of a sweeping generalization, one of
the main themes of jino-soviet discord in recent years has
been a difference of perception of the "capitalist menace."
The point is argued In the cipher of Communist rhetoric
under the heading of "coexistence." The writings of political
philosophers usually encompass such a broad spectrum of
possible human activity that they can be interpreted in various
ways, and thus are the seed of theoretical debates over policy.
**• Hervi Xox>k li2?£.* January 14, lj62. Data concerning the 3ino-
3o"viet dispuTe is more plentiful since 1956, but is possiba
less pure as a result of the upsurge of Western interest,
Quincy Wright speaks of the "feedback" effect that plagues
the social scientist (people being evaluated become Influ-
enced by the generalisations made about them). <lncy
Wright, The Study of International delations (Hew York*
Appleton-Century -Crofts, :
, p. 116.) S possible
example} Chou uin-lai to M&zr snow in 1 j.:.- : "we are not
left win^ opportunists, as interpreted by the Western press."
(adgar 3now, "Red China's Leaders Talk Peace— On Their Terms,"
Look Ma&aalne, January 31, 19el.)

4Just as Rousseau has been called the common ancestor or Marx
and Jefferson, so Lenin is apparently the common ancestor
Khrushchev and Mao Tse-t n the point of coexistence.
Lenin has bean quoted as saying both "let the American
capitalists leave us alone, and we shall leave them alone,"*
and "frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and
the to ols states will be inevitable."" He is therefore
open to interpretation. Khrushchev's public definition ot
coexistence is doctrinaire:
The policy of peaceful coexistence is, then, as far as
its social content is concerned, a form of intense
economic, political and Ideological struggle between
the proletariat and the aggressive forces of imperialism
in the world arena,'
The current Communist interpretation of political coexistence,
however, may be paraphrased by saying that to "coexist* with
a country is to be adequately satisfied with the status quo
and current prognosis of development to forego the predict-
able need to further the advance or socialism on the battle-
field. Over-all gains are better optimized by activity short
of massive military violence. Therefore, to deny the possi-
bility of coexistence is to admit that the present prediction
indicates that over-all t,alns will probably be maximized I
eventual war.
The individual "situation estimates" of Russia and
Communist China have been transmitted under this code since
5. Moscow Radio (TassJ, April 22, 1955 (&5th ersary of
the birth of Lenin).
6. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Selected Works , Vol. VII (New York:
International Publishers So., 1j%JYT'p»
7. Kadio Peking, New China News Agency, January 20, l.)6l.

1952. Prom the start, Russian leaders have made it plain
that in their Judgment indications permit the prospect of
"coexistence" with all countries, including the United States.
The Chinese Communists apparently used the phrase with reluc-
tance at first, but finally settled on the 'five principles
of coexistence" which they formalised in 1954 with their
neighbors to the south. Depending on the immediate world
political situation, they have since followed Russia's lead
and made some involved and sweeping statements about the
concept and toward whom they direct it, but the full text
of their message contains qualifying remarks that always
exclude the United States, and usually all other non-
ftCommunist countries outside the Bandung group.
Limiting the discussion to the United states, Russia
believes the status quo is sufficiently satisfactory to
avoid the need of armed conflict, Communist China does not.
Ergo , China is less satisfied with the status quo with the
United States than Russia.
It is not difficult to find out what disturbs the
Chinese Communists about the status quo with the United
jites. All one must do is ask. In i960, Sdgar 3now spent
four months in mainland China. During that period he was
permitted to quote !4ao Tse-tung only in a one-paragraph
statement:
8. Bernard Ullman, "The Long Shadow of Mao Tse-tung," New
York Times, April 16, I90I.

6It is inconceivable that a peace pact can be concluded
without diplomatic relations between China and t
Unit ites. It is also inconceivable that there
can be diplomatic relations between Crina and the
United States without a settlement of the dispute
between the two countries in the Taiwan region.
Mr. snow's frequent conversations with Chou ian-iai often
returned to the same subjects
The invasion and occupation of Taiwan can only make
the United states the enemy of the Chinese people....
If the so-called "Taiwan clique" is to appear in the
United Nations, under whatever form and in whatever
name— be it the Chiang Kai-shek clique or some other
clique— we will definitely refuse to take part in the
United Nations and sit together with them, so as not
to create a situation of two Chinas".,.. If the
United States persists in its policy of agression
against China and does not settle the dispute between
China and the Taiwan region, how can there be a solu-
tion to Sino-U.S. relations?.... If the United
ites does not give up its policy of aggression and
the threat of war against C: ina, no solution is
possible.
The Chinese Communists are in disagreement with the
Russians, they differ with the Russians in their evaluation
of the status quo with the United states, and their main
dissatisfaction with the United States involves Taiwan. This
thesis examines the Taiwan issue as a possible source of
Sino-Soviet discord, from the roots of the controversy to
the present.
At first glance, it mi^ht appear that of all the
possible points of friction introduced by conflicting Moscow
and Pekin^ e,oals, the pressing forward of the boundaries of
International Communism into the Pacific area would be one
aim on which the two capitals would have been In continuous
9. Snow, loc. cit.
10. Ibid.

and complete agreement. 11 Particularly If one views the
Eurasian Communist heartland as a single unit under uncon-
tested monolithic control , >Mt Asian history of the past
thirteen years becomes merely the story of the United states 1
containment of a two-pronged attempt to include the whole
of Korea and the island of Taiwan into the Moscow-directed
orbit. On closer examination of the history of the Taiwan
issue, however, discontinuities of evidence appear and begin
to multiply. If there was a coordinated two-pronged plan
for the spread of Communism in Kast Asia in 1950, why did
they choose to strike first at Korea where the attack would
be an open affront to United Nations policy and the dangers
of mobilizing adverse world opinion were greater than those
to be expected in the case of an attack to Taiwan?12 Why
did Russia grow more and more non-committal as the Taiwan
Strait crisis of 1955 approached its climax? 'hy did Peki
take great pains to insure maximum United States opposition
her bombardment of ^uemoy in 1>3^? Has Russia's behavior
in the United Nations been rationally directed toward accu
lating a maximum of votes for Peking's admission?
11. The Russians have not publicly disagreed with the Chinese
Communists over Taiwan. This perhaps makes the issue even
more worthy of study. Zbigniew Brzejsinski notes that it
is unlikely that issues which had come under discussion at
the highest level would ever be made the subject of public
display. "In such a case the offense. ..would be far more
serious and a greater violation of the code of proletarian
internationalism..." (Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Problematics
of Sino -Soviet Bargaining (paper at the 3rd International
^vietological Conference, Japan, September, i960).
12, The development of the case presented herein does not
imply the assumption that President Tvuman's action at
the start of the Korean War was predictable. International

This investigation proceeds through the Taiwan issue
in historic sequence, framing eight hypotheses which "reason-
ably encompass ' the myriad of apparent inconsistencies of
evidence. The turn of events lends Itself to analysis in
>ee separate periods: the .Stalinist era ("socialism in
I Country"), the era tf . jviet policy transition (1953-
55) , and the modern Khruahchevian era, (aptly named by
Jan Triska the phase of "Socialism in One Region*)»3 xn the
first, .stalln nay be seen to have created Peking's Taiwan
dilemma by indirectly harnessing American public opinion to
"contain" Communist China's eastern coast. In the second,
Peking's attempt to settle the account was probably frus-
.ted by Moscow's last minute acknowledgement that the
sweep of history had forced International Communism aro
the corner of the point of maximum cohesion. In the third,
Mao Tse-tung served notice that the debt would stand, at
least for the foreseeable future. In short, the evidence can
be Interpreted to show that the Taiwan issue is not in an>
sense a simple goal of Communist expansion, free of a history
of intra-bloc complications. Khrushchev inherited a debt
politics, like a game of the playing field is usually
based on a plan of attack, but the outcome largely depends
upon the improvisations made by the participants as
multiple and unpredictable situations evolve. The
individual '3 "style of play" is indicative of his basic
plan of attack, otalin's style of play" did not indie
the disregard of mathematleal odds when an arbitrary
>ice was presented, and his adjustment to this and other
?ctures of history presents a study in his "usa&e" of
events that suggests important dominant motives.
13. Jan F. Triska, 'Socialism in One The New Leader ,
December 26, 1^60, p.

for which the Chinese ;>ld h. i.ble.
Communist policy in thi3 area must be framed against a back-
ed of Moscow-Peking intrigue at the highest level, If
Berlin is a "bone in Khrushchev's throat/' Taiwan is a "boil
on his buttock.
ch is the essence of the story the hypotheses imp-
Their formulation requires interpolation ox: evidence too
sketchy in places to qualify as 'proof, " but at least t.
explain documentary discontinuities which appear to refute
other popular interpretations, and are themselve openly
contradicted by currently available primary evidence.
Admittedly, it is doubtful that the trickle of reliable
documentation that continually escapes f. tot Communist
world will leave the configuration of the total story
unscathed, but it is submitted that the importance of analys-
ing Sino-soviet relationships obviates the luxu. eonfin;
intellectual effort to "proven facts." Moreover, although
the hypotheses present a continuum of logic that currently
appears credible, the invalidity of one does not negate the
value of the others. Taiwan is a useful vehicle af research
because it offers data on 3ino~Soviet re as "at the
critical point" where their structure rotates fro* *Hao
hates fttftilB*" to Mao loves Stalin." A stud;* ry
of the issue in this light also produces thought -provoking
background material for future United States' China policy
decisions.

In eraphaa-i the poiists made herein, It may appear
that the areas 01' -»let disagreement are hela to be
more efficacious than those of agreement, or that the Taiwan
issue is believed to be a dominating factor in their areas
of dispute. Neither is considered to be the case. The aim
is merely to give form to the Taiwan factor of the aino-
Soviet term in the international political equation of the
present. In order to accomplish this, the issue* s f< objec-
tive unique events" are arranged in what is hoped is a





MAO T3S-TUNG C0NQU&R3 Ml MAINLAND
The basic dilemma which post -revolution Russia was I
face in the Incorporation of China into Ue fold of Inter-
national Cofmnuniara was foretold in a debate between V. 1.
Lenin arid M. N. Hoy (of India) at the second Con-.ress of the
Third International in Moscow in the summer of lj20. The
problem under diacuaalon was, and remains, critical in
Communist tactics: how to proceed in the underdeveloped
areas where there is a conflict between the goals of social
revolution and those of national liberation. I4arxism eschews
both capitalism and imperialism, but usually the only force
that can defeat imperialism is controlled by the local
capitalists. When this complication is added to the Marxist
preoccupation with the idea of eventual salvation bei
vested in the proletarian "worker," in spite of the fact that
these areas are usually dominated by peasant farmers, the
need for tactical compromise Is indicated. Two basic approaches
are possible: in the debate of lj20, Lenin favored support
of the "bourgeois democratic" elements in the early stages,
at the expense of slighting the peasant base of buddi




through the masses and ,,raaa roots Commoniat parties, at
the expense of alienating some of the leaders .he national-
istic movement.* Neither position in this argument excluded
the utilization of some of the inroads of the other , and the
basic adjustment of Communist tactics Mas established! both
routes to Communism would be used simultaneously.
This compromise is a seedbed of intra-party conflicts
because the fine line of optimum technique requires continuous
adjustment as conditions change in the area of proposed
domination, and this must be set arbitrari. the respon-
sible leaders of the party helrarch,> . Communist cadres must
monitor the process at all levels as the bourgeois national-
istic revolution goes on simultaneously with the formation of
party cells which are ultimately to take control at t
critical moment. Ii Communist peasant leader finds his
efforts bein& compromised by too much Kremlin support of t
powerful landlord class, he feels he is a victim of "rightist
deviation"! if at this time his group is interfering with the
part} leadership* s manipulation of their Trojan Korse (the
national bourgeoisie), he is simultaneously bein& accused of
"leftist deviation." Hlght and left refer to an arbitrary
line established by the viewpoint of the observer.
This is one of the world's most complicated political
Maneuvers, and coordination without intra-party strife is
difficult, even if all participants are able to maintain an
1. Hobert C. North, Moscow and the Chinese Communist
a
(Stanford
University Press, J, p." 137

13
objective attitude, free of their own special interests. In
the evolution in China, Mao Tse-tung might be seen to have
developed a special interest in the efficacy of the peasantry.^
Stalin's special interest appears to have been Stalin, after
the death of Lenin, his major rival for leadership of the
world Communist movement was Trotsky. One nay analyse the
history of Stalin's career from many viewpoints, but one
common denominator that appears to apply in practically every
situation was his insistence on taking, a stand opposite
Trot3ky and his followers on all tactical questions. George
F. Kennan, who served three tours of duty in Moscow ua a
United States diplomat during Stalin's reign, counsels:
Do not be deceived as to which of these apprehensions
...the apprehension of danger to his personal position
or that of danger to the Soviet state— was the greatest.
Trotsky, and all that Trotsky represented, was Stalin's
real fear...
3
Reflections of the Stalin-Trotsky feud could be noted
almost from the outset of Russian relations with the Communist
movement in China. M. N. Roy, who was privy to most of the
intrigue of China policy within the Third International,
observed i MIf Trotsky said this, Stalin said that. M^ In the
ambivalent tactics of supporting both the national bourgeoisie
2. Kao Tse-tung: "To give credits where they are due, if we
allot ten points to the accomplishment of the democratic
revolution, then the achievements of the urban dwellers
and the military units rate only three points, while the
remaining seven points should go to the peasants in their
rural revolution." ( Ibid . , p. 171.)
3. George P. Kennan, Russia and the Wes t Under Lenin and
,lin (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1^607, p. 2!>2.
4. North, oj>. cit., p. 1<

14
and the Chinese Communist Party, Trotsky fa
the "left,'' i.e. , one whi. rjr assist to
the Communist peasant base, 8t*lia insisted on concentrat
first on assisting in the establishment of a str anti-
imperialist" national government. Trojan Horse taetius Hi
the Kuomintang Party were attempted forthwith.
Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese nationalistic
party, had been unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain aid
from the West. 5 Early in 1,23, he met with Ado! fe
(one-time head of the Russian peace d it Breat-
Litovsk), in a secret meeting in It was agreed
that members of the new-born C> ineae Communist Party would
be accepted as members of the Kuo , and that assist-
ance would be granted by the Soviet Union. Michael Borodin,
close frier Lenin, was dispatched to Canton as a Chinese
adviser. fo Chiang Kai-shek, brother-in-law of Sun Yat-sen
was sent to Moscow for study, in preparation for his post as
the commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy. Chou tn-lai
was installed as head of the political department of the
academy. 7 Mao Tse-tun** became the editor of a Kuominta
political periodical.^5 In 1926, following the death of Sun
Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek became the leader of the K ,ng
5. Claude A, Buss, The Far Hast (New York: The MacMillan
ny# 1955)* p. i5T7
6. Frana Borkenau, "China: Trial, iiiror, and Failure, '
Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy, ed, Arthur .. Adams
"T5. "CTHeatH>na "Company, 19oi), p. 77.
i op. cit,
. Ibid., p. I7c7
7. Next;. , g .
, p. J6,





Chiang immediately set about planning an armed sweep
to the north from Canton, to extend the areas of Kuominta
rule. While Borodin (who opposed this idea) was in north-
west China, Chiang's troops surrounded the houses of the
Hussian advisers and the decision was forced. 10 Stalin sent
word that the cadres should back Chiang, as two Kuomintan^
armies started north. (Thlanj ,§ ***iy headed for Shanghai and
the treaty portaj a so-called left-wing Kuomintang group
headed for the Wuhan porta, inland on the river. As Chiang
approached Shanghai, his Communist supporters within the city
anticipated his arrival by starting an insurrection. Chiang
waited at the gates until the ant i-Kuomintang forces had been
effectively destroyed, then entered and destroyed the
Communists. * Moscow thereupon acknowledged that Chiang
should be considered highly suspect, but Stalin insisted that
the Kuomintang could still be used as a suitable Instrument
of Soviet policy. He ordered support of the Wuhan group,
and this too led to disaster.
As a result of these lj21 incidents, the Chinese
Communist Party was decimated and forced to disperse, 12 It
was Mao Tse-tung, dismissed from the Central Committee




11. Kennan, o£. cit., p. 271.
. The Chinese Communiata now claim that the reverses of 1ydf
cost them four-fifths of their personnel. ,r onow,
Lecture in San Francisco, January 16, 1>62.)
13. North, o£. cit., p. 116.

uli ly salvaged the party as they re ped in south
China*
The break between Mao and Stalin was not overt. Politi-
cal affinity ot the Chinese Communist Party for Moscow was
14
continually stressed, but there is evidence that things
were never the sane after 1927 . ttProm this time on, Moscow
had, in Mao— though this had at times to be concealed— an ally,
but not a satellite. ttl^
Henceforth until Ijkj, with the possible exception
of the period between the start of hostilities against
Japanese troops in Manchuria in 1937 and the entry of the
United States into world War II, the dominant battle in China
was that fought between the Nationalist (Kuoraintang), and
Chinese Communist forces. 1^ During the war against the
Japanese, the Kremlin granted financial aid, not to the
Communists, but to Chiang Kai-shek. *7 Ml Yalta, Stalin
14. Mao Tse-tun£ in 1940: "...If China wants independence
she can never win it without the aid of the Socialist
state and the international proletariat. That is to M
she cannot attain It without the assistance of the Soviet
Union..." (Mao Tse-tung, On New Democracy (Peking?
Foreign Languages Press, 1^5*0T"p» 31.1
15. Kennan, og. cit., p. 26
16. The McCarran"Hearings revealed that after the Mew Fourth
army Incident of January, 1941 and more particularly
after the United States had entered the war. b >th
Communists and Nationalists devoted more attention to
fi&hting each other than to resisting the Japanese.
(North, o£. cit., p. 212.)
17. Ibid., p. 4. Stalin was not only giving material aid
f^ao^s enemies; he was recruiting in his ranks. In 2
the ruler of the Important resource-rich Sinkiang province,
Jhenis Shlh-ts'ai, with the knowledge of Mao Tse-tung,
became a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
(David J. Dallln, Soviet Foreign Policy After . iin





teed continued support of the Nationalists , - 4$,
the governments alin and Chla ai-shek negotiated a
ear agreement, containing man:/ commercial and territorial
provisions suggestive of Russian imperialistic motives.
Stalin appeared confident that his baekir the Nationalist-
bourgeoisie would continue to have tactical validity for some
time to come. James F. %rnes recalls a conversation he had
with Stalin in Moscow in December, 1-45:
I reminded him ^Stalin/ how he had declared at Potsdam
that Chiang Kai-shek's government was the only possible
government in China and that the Chinese Communists
were not real Communists at all. In response, he pointed
out that the Soviet Union had ft treaty recognizir
Chiang. , . . Stalin inquired about the strength of the
Communists in the Tientsin area.J7 • ••! replied that M&
Tse-tung, the Communist leader, ""claimed to have 600,0C
in that area.... Stalin laughed heartily and said all
Ineae were boasters who exaggerated the forces of
their opponents as well as their own.
The date of Stalin's acceptance of the idea of the
imminence of Mao's mainland victory is not known, but it
appears to have been plain to him in 1948. On February 10th
of that year, he told Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj:
It is true, we have also made mistakes. For instance,
after the war we invited the Chinese comrades to come
to Moscow and we discussed the situation in China. We
Id. Ibid
., p. 5. In April, ly45, Stalin told Ambassador
Hurley he considered Chiang Kai-shek "selfless" and "a
patriot." (U. 3. Department of State Publication 3573*
United States Relations with China (white paper on China),
.it.* IjHj, p. 95f) (Hereafter "referred to as White
Paper
.)
, James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1<*47), p. 22oV fnere are many recorded
instances of Stalin's chauvinism and racial prejudice.
Vladimir Dedljer remembers being hailed by Stalin as
aIin referred to Albanians as faithful dogs.
(Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1*53) > PP. 3C3, 37571"

told them bluntly that we considered the development
of the uprising in C;;ina had no proapec- I that the
Chinese comrades should seek a modus Vivendi with
Chiang Kai-shek, and dissolve tfreir army. ~^he Chinese
comrades agreed here with the views of t ;vlet
comrades, but went back to China and acted quite other-
wise. They mustered their forces, organized their armies
and now, as we see, they are beating the Chiang Kai-
shek army. Now, in the case of Cnina, we admit we were
wrong. 20
Russia continued to make the most of their alliance
with Chiang Kai-shek, nevertheless. A powerful Soviet army
still existed in Manchuria under Kao Kan ;
,
(a member of the
Chinese Communist party known to be almost completely
Kussia-oriented); the Japanese factories in Manchuria were
op
stripped and much of the machinery found its way to Russia.
In the fall of 1^48, Russia asked the Nationalists for an
extension of certain commercial rights, and negotiations
were conducted well into the year 1949; almost to the end
the Soviet representatives maintained a diplomatic behavior
toward the Chiang Kai-shek government that was a model of
correctness. 23 Contracts were signed regarding trade, oil,
and minin., rights. On May 11, i A9, practically on the eve
20. Ibid., p. 322.
iiallin, og. cit., p. 72.
Hen S. whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: The
MacMillan Co., I960), p.""^ "XIngerin nese Communist
complaints about this matter were contained in statetaents
released after the "Hundred Flowers" era of 1957.
(New York Times , June dk, 1-67.)
23. Russian consulates were closed In cities which came under
Communist domination. On February b^ , the Soviet
ambassador followed the Nationalist government to Canton
after the fall of Nanking. He was one of only four
ambassadors to take this step. (Henry Wei, China arid
viet Russia (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrahd So.,
1956), PT23T.)

of Mao Tse-tJ.iu,*s mainland victory, -Nationalist
trdlag Sinkian^ aii'Ilne rights was made.
It is dix"f icult to l«if|nt that the Chinese Communist
could view these last minute Russian efforts to gain National-
ist concessions as a valid support of the nationalist-
bourgeoisie in the world Communist cause. It must have
been as obvious to them as to others*^ that Stalin was
merely trying to erect as many precedents for Russian influ-
ence in China as possible.
In summary , it is possible to view the success of the
inese Communist revolution as a testimonial to the tactical
skill of Mao Tse-tung in the face of opposition by "friend"
and foe alike. It was he, and not the Kremlin who supplied
the military as well as ideological leadership. He codified
a dynamic procedure of multi-front revolution that established
him as a key contributor to Communist canon.^ His success
adds prestige, (and perhaps Kremlin resentment of his
audacity) to his views on Marxism expressed in l£4o:
...in applying Marxism to China, Chinese Communists
must fully and properly unite the universal truth of
Marxism with the specific practice of the Chinese
revolution; that id to say, the truth of Marxism must
24. _ttllin, op. cit., p. 71. "Jtalin was apparently still
deteralneu t
Communist, interests in China, and this ambition, which
he -.mtinued to press even after 1 tad a significant
influence ori Glno-Soviet reiatiu out the period
.baling rule.
. \m Doak Bamett, Communist China
si* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, TjoOT* P. W$7J
25. J , "The New .Strategy of International Communism,
. aerlcan Polii Science Review (June, 1955) j PP.

be Integrated with the characteristics of the nation
Jin it i . lonal form re it can be
.eful; it must not be applied subjectively as a mere
.rraula. Formula-Marxists are only fooling wit
Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there ia no , -
place for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution. **°
-iiin'3 contribution to the C .iiat'a mainland
vie to.: io means be completely discounted. He waa
titular head of International Communism, and it was
this force that rapidly brought to a conclusion a revolu-
tionary tent in Cnina that dated back to the T'ai P'l
rebelli^., nearly one hundred ^eurs before. The founders
of Communism had established tnat the criterion of success
Mb *u^esa| |M Willi IftJM Wilt fti ti.u SqpVMi 0MNMtffp«
Nevertheless, two other factors appear to have contributed
to h* -ivatlom egotism and Russia's imperialistic
werests. as one studies this M*i it la possible to
believe that Mao Tse-tun& could agree with George Kennan'3
observations if Stalin the mans
is was a man dominated.. .by an insatiable vanity
and love of power, coupled with the keenest sort of
j of his own inferiorit 3 a burning jealous^
for qualities in others which he did not possess..,.
At the same time, let us note, he was a man with tre
mt extraordinary talent for political ta > and
intrigue, a consummate actor, a dissimulator of genius,
a master not only oV timing but of what Boris Nikolayevaky
has called the art of ,!dc —of adually,
of measuring out what the traffic would bear on a
ieion.*7
26. Mao Tae-tung, On New Democracy, qp_. cit . , p.




MAINLhNa) VICTORY TO TH ,TH OF 3TALIN
The Chinese Jomauniat government was formally estab-
lished on October 1, 1^*49. Chiang Kai-shek's forces were
taking refuge on the big offshore island of Taiwan, and the
capital of Nationalist China was established in the city of
Taipei on December b>th. The problem of who represented
China" was being faced by every capital in the world, and
the issue cut across nearly everj- dilemma that was faci.
international relations. It was an issue in the cold war,
an issue in United Nations solidarity, an issue in inter-
national trade, and to some, it was a moral issue. The
U.3.S.H. severed relations with the Nationalists and recog-
nized the People's Hepublic of China government in Peking
on October 2nd. Prime Minister Nehru of India (who had
previously been called a "dre& of mankind" in the Chinese
Communist press) declared that his government intended to
recognize Peking. Burma and Pakistan followed suit.
The decision was more difficult for Britain. The
had many grievances with the Chinese Communists. Alt
British diplomatic and consular representatives had remained
in the wake of the Communist advance since 1948, many of
these officials had been subjected to abuse. The British
destroyer H.M.3. Amythest had been shelled and detained on
the Yangtze river in 1-4., On the other side of the balance,
however, were the future of Hon^ Kong, their *j,reat reliance
on Chinese mainland trade, and considerations of Commonwealth

attachments to India. In their view, the morals of the case
were not at issue; in Churchill's words, diplomatic recogni-
tion "is not to confer a compliment but to secure a convenience."
Britain granted diplomatic recognition to Peking on January 6,
1950-
The Communists * mainland victory precipitated formal
agreements with the U.S. 3.R. Mao Tse-tun^ met Stalin personally
for the fir3t and last time at a Moscow conference which opened
in December, 19*9« Their meeting lasted for nine weeks,
during which time Mao summoned his chief lieutenants, includ-
ing Foreign Minister Chou &n-lai, from China. The published
results indicate that a "balanced but temporary "3W compromise
resulted. The key agreement was a 30-year Treaty o£ Friend-
ship, alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Both Russia and
Communist China agreed that if either were "attacked b^ Japan
or any state allied with it, the other would "immediately
render military and other assistance by all means at its
disposal."^ Chinese concessions included agreeaenta for the
joint operation of the principal railways in Manchuria, joint
use of the naval base at Port Arthur, and the establishment
28, House oV Commons Debates (November 17, 19*19) « Vol. 46 v,
coT: 225"5 ::o7
. Mao Tse-tung on arrival in M scow, December 16, ly4 j "I
have come for several weeks. The length of my sojourn
here depends in part upon the amount of time which it will
take to solve the questions of interest to the People's
Republic of China. (Moscow Radio (soviet Home Service),
muary 2, 1950, Pravda article.)
Dallin, oj>. cit.
, p. }
31. Sin?-Soviet Treaty and Agreements (Peking: Foreign
ua&es~Tress, l^l), P. 5.

of lon^ term Joint stock companies. 3^ These "mixed companies"
were known to be a most irritating form or Russian subjuga-
tion of Chlna*s industrial potential. 33 The Chinese Communists
alt -eed to accept the status quo , i.e., soviet- ed
"independence" of Outer Mongolia. No documents have far
revealed any discussion of 1 a matters.
Ti.e Korean War started following the North KOM
attack on South Korea in the early morni RUM of June 2$,
United Nations gave military assistance to the
South Korean forces, and on June 27th the United States
Seventh Fleet took station in the Taiwan Strait, under
Presidential orders to prevent military attacks either towar
the island by Communist units, or toward the mainland by
Nationalist units. Chinese Communist forces entered North
Korea in oer, 1951. Armistice negotiations started in
June, U51, and hostilities ceased in July, 1953. Stalin
had died in March of the latter year.
The period of the Korean War has been described aa a
i point of 3ino-3oviet harmony, 34 and yet dialogues can
be more or less honestly constructed for this era that
reflect Chinese frustration in a manner similar to that during
the "aaat wind over the West Wind" controversy which marked
the sharp divergence of Moscow and Peking propaganda lines
32. Comments in the Yugoslavian press described this aa Stalin
reserving rights for Russia that Lenin had renounced.
evlew of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. I, No.
, December 2C," 1950* p. 4.)
33. tfallin, o£. cit. , pp. 198, 423. Whiting, China Crosses
the Yalu, 0£. cit ., p, 6.
34. G. "P. Hudson in The Sino
-
Soviet Dispute (New Y>rkJ
Frederick a. Praeger, 1961), p. X7^

following the orbit , five years later.
Stfclla (Oetoa** 4, 1^51):
...one of the types of atom bombs was recently tested
in our country. .. .The Soviet Union does not contemplate
ever attacking the United States or any other country... 35
Mao Tse-tung (October 23, 1951)* at the Chinese People 1 *
Political Consultative Conference:
...another extremely important fact is that the power
of the Soviet Union, our closest ally, has been great
I
strengthened. At such a time, if any otner imperialist
country' tries to tred the old path... can we not fully
predict the result? ^/Hesolutlon passed by CPPCQ7 The
Chinese people of all strata see that the American
imperialists are their most deadly enemy.-*
alia (in answer to a question regarding the inevitabili.
of war, February 16, 1^51)
*




Chou to«lal (February 25, 1*52):
According to authenticated data, American troops, since
January 28, 1^2^ have repeatedly employed., .bacteri
^gical weapons. 3^
35. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), October 6, 1^61.
36. Radio Peleins (NCM) , October 24, 1951.
37. Great Britain, Royal Institute of International Affairs,




referred to as Documents , 1^51 .
)
36. Germ warfare charges were merely one aspect of the "Hate
America" campaign that started in China about Januar
$2, China 'abandoned the theme of the American Govern-
ment vs. the American people and concentrated on linking
everything American to a new theme of American venality,
bestiality, and sinister intent ..." (The Hate Ameri
Campaign in Communist China (U. 3. Department of State
publication, 1 erm warfare charges apparently
required extensive preparation. Sporadic news items
covering supposed American "plans" preceded them. (Radio
Peking (NONA), March 7, 1951 J Chinese International
,>rvice, May 4, 1951.) A Chinese Communist woman let a

25
Uin (iiprll 1, 1j5*):
The peaceful coexistence of capitalism ana conuaunisra
is fully possible,
CI, -lui (May 5, )i
flhm Q Jtatea^/ lack of ^oud i has indeed
reached depths never before plumbed.^
ilia (i*sceraber *»4, 1952) i
1 still believe that war between the /United States
and the U. . . .&^7 cannot be considered inevitable, and
that our countries can continue to live in peace. 41
ou iin-lai (February 4, 1j53)*
The Chinese people love peace but do not fear war.
The Ideological debate continued, as well:
Chou iin-lai (October, 1951 ):
.. .intellectuals. . .are beginning to accept... the
.iidance oi
expression
U.3.3.H. Coaraiunlst Party spokesman Yevgeni Zhukov (November,
1951) i
. f Marxist Leninist theory and its crystallized
>n in China, the teachings oFHao Yse-tun&,43
It would be risky to view the Chinese revolution as a
hind of pattern for the popular-democratic revolution
in other Asian countries... 44
hint of the plans slip while in Bulgaria in August, 1951.
(Great Britain, Royal Institute of International Affairs,




. ) (aereafter referred to
3-» Facta 5n File; Weekly World News Digest , 1952 edition,
p. irr.~~
40. iiadio Peking (NCNA), May 6, 1952.
41 • Facts on File, op. <£it #i p. k
42. Bi 'v N£N.-i)7Tebruary 5, 1953-
43. Ibid., November 2, 1951 (italics Inserted).
44. i&iiin, o_£. cit
, p.

F THE CHIi. 0MMUNI3TS
Taiwan was incorporated the 6) ineae taf
16^ ju co fchft Ti ki
in 1895. President iioosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
aet Chian Kai-shek in Cairo , enroute to the Teheran confer-
ence with 3talin in 19^3. ihe Cairo Declaration m rafted,
in which it wa3 prota til territori stolen" fr
"China *' by Japan were to be returned as part of the pro-
visions 01' peace after teorld war II. Taiwan, and the major
islands Just to the west, the Pescadores, were specified,
,H. approved this action In the Potsdam Proclamation
of J. 4 lj* After the Japanese surz*ender in Au&uat 19^5 $
General MacArthur's General Order Number 1 directed that
Chiang Kai-shek should receive the surrender of the Japanese
forces on Taiwan. On October 23, 1945, the Chinese maent
General m under Genex-al C.en Yi was inaugurated at
Taipei. The transfer was thus completed, bat I legal
status o£ the island was to have been confirmed by a clause
in ti ese Peace Treaty. M§ M jf
^1 (signed by neither U.e Taipei, Peking, nor Moscow govern
-
ntntoy woafirmed Japan ! s renouncement of claim to the islands
bui >t specify the recipient.
tufta there are sever.. I descenda; _* the
abori pre-Chinese tribes on this island of about eleven
million population, the term "Taiwanese" refers to the descend-
ants »f the early Chinese settlers. The Taiwanese have strong

local roots, since even before the Japanese conquest in lc •.._.,
mainland China's political control over Taiwan was n
stringent. There was friction between the Taiwanese and
the malnlanders wh^> commenced arriving after World Mar II,
partly because of the inefficiency and corruption of the
administration of General Chen Yl. In February, lAl, major
riots were triggered by the killing of an old woman sellir
bootleg cigarettes. Fifty to seventy thousand mainland
troops were sent to quell the disturbance.^ jt has been
estimated that ten thousand Taiwanese were killed. 1*" Although
Chiang Kai-shek ultimately purged Chen Yi, he defended him
in a speech in Hanking at the time of the riots, and thus a
victory was scored for tfet Communist cadres on the island. 7
Although political conditions commenced to improve as Chen Yi's
successor took charge, the addition of over one million
civilian mainlanders and approximately six hundred thousand
Nationalist troops in 1,A>- placed great strain on the island's
economy. By 1^50, the United States had ceased military aid
to the Nationalists, and their outlook was bleak. With the
arrival of the Seventh Fleet in accordance with President
Truman's order of June 27, 1950* and later with the renewal
of United States' military assistance to the Nationalist
forces, and increased doles of non -military aid, their powers
45. George Kerr, 'Formosa: The March Massacres," Far Eastern
Survey , XVI, November 5* 1^47, p. 225.
46. Barnett, op. cit., p. 389. Robert F. Newman, Recognition
of Communist Cfilna ? (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1^61}
,
p. 57:
47. Kerr, op. cit., p. 266.

of self-defense and standard of liv: xined steadily,
thi ut the Korea , and after.
The C; inese had considered Taiwan the richest prise
of World War II,^ but even considering this, after the
arrival of the seventh Fleet, the public pronouncements of
the Peking leaders and the propaganda articles of their
periodicals so fanatically stressed the mainland government's
determination to take the island as to make the phenomenon
exceptional, even in Communist literature. The true intensity
of the incessant fulminations must be read in volume to be
fully appreciated. Aside from the outright vilification of
the United States, there was an obvious attempt to &ive the
threats credibility by staking Peking's reputation on them.
The Communists deliberately presented their revolution as
only partially completed, pending acquisition ot Taiwan.
An example of how the theme is made an integral part
of the entire Chinese Communist movement is offered by extracts
from an article by General Chu Te, Central Committee Politburo
member, and Commander in Chief of the Peopled Liberation
AMQf in 1951:
Armed with Marxism-Leninism and led by the great comrade
Mao Tse-tung, the Communist Party of China, following the
failure of the »24 - »27 revolution has on its own led
the Chinese people through ten years of cruel war ( '27-
'36) creating a people's revolutionary force and the
political and military lines adapted to the practical
conditions of the Chinese Revolutionary struggles'.
.
"7."
All these formed the solid foundation on which the
Chinese people defeated the Chiang reactionary Kuoraintc^
clique. ...,/ln 1948, Mao said/: "It ia the turnir- Lnt
from the growth to the extinction of Chiang's twe*
. Buss, o£. cit.
, p. 57

yt counterrevolutionary rule. It also is the
turning point frocs the growth to the extinction of more
than one hundreu years' rule of imperialism in Crina,
^hu Te again/ But the liberation war of the Chinese
people is not completely ended because, as already
mentioned, Taiwan Province, the territory of the Peopled
Republic ox* China, has not yet been liberated. In June
50, the American duressors announced their armed
control of our Taiwan at the same time they started their
brutal armed intervention against Korea. .. .Since the
American imperialists have not yet learned the lesson
they should have learned /In Korea/, the Chinese People
will certainly make any adventurer who follows the.
example of Chiang suffer the same inglorious fate.^'
Ceremonial devices perpetuated the issue. At the
closing of the Chinese People»s Political Consultative
Conference on November 1, 1951, Mao Tse-tun^ announced that
two chairs on the National Committee would be left vacant,
pending their occupancy by delegates from a conquered Taiwan. *^
On patriotic holidays, authorised lists of slogans were
circulated throughout the country in advance. Even while
the Korean War was in progress, Taiwan rated high on the
lists. The May Day slogan list for 1953 had 55 entries.
Number 1 was "Oppose American blockade and embargo," and
number 2 was "oppose American invasion of Taiwan. "^1
The stream was continuous; annual samples are provided.
Chou En-lai (1950):
Now, in the name of the Central Peoples 1 Government of
the Peoples' Republic of China I declare: i>espite
any military steps of obstruction taken by the Unit-
States Government, the Chinese people are irrevocably
determined to liberate Taiwan without fail752~
,
Radio Peking (NCNa), «?^e 28, 1951 (italics Inserted).
5C Ibid., November 2, 1931.
51. IBId. , April 21, 1><53.
Ibid., July 7, 1j5l (italics inserted).

Ch. .i {ly3'i)i
TIM /eople. . .will never up their sacred
Out Taiwan. 53
General Chu Te (1952)
I
oept Taiwan, all Chinese Terrl has been liberated
and our national defense la more and more consolidated. 5h
General Chu Te (1^63) J
The present situation is that altnou&h the Korean War
has ceased, American imperialism is still in occupation
of our territory Taiwan. 55
The issue was undoubtedly an excellent source of
patriotic stimulation when it was felt necessary to divert
attention from internal problems, but in view of the fact
that the chant continued, almost without regard for the
world political situation or the ebb and flow" of the
mainland economy, it appears doubtful that this is an
adequate explanation.
As the hypotheses which follow will indicate, it is
possible that the issue was being kept "alive" far another
audience as well, laiwan could be symbolic uf the last
Chinese wounds of that consummate actor, ot.il in, whose
"talent for political tactics and intrigue" had kept the*
from the United Nations at t imax of their mainland
victory; instigated a Korean War which ultimately imposed
United -States' military opposition to the completion of
China's revolution"; and repeatedly vetoed their opportunities
53. Ibid., 25, 1951.
54. Ibid., October 1,
55. Ibid., October 1, 1953.
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thdraw from the > ore jfllct as they were branded
as an aggressor by the United Nations* permanently sealed
from I aiwai tates policy
d eve. Pi firmly established In the eyes of much
of the world <*s incorrigible militarist!,
short, the "'Taiwan client" might have been a cry for internal
unity , ^n issue for "Hate America," and a complaint I
Hoscow a ill Stalinist "'dosage" whic; - tread I
fine line of keeping them in the Kremlin fold yet provided
for the "com. m%* of their eastern borders as well.
This sort of Stalinist rationale conforms to the results
of the research of some experts in the oln. .Let field,
notably that of the British authority Kdward Crunkahaw:
I suppose it is gene, taken for A In the
we3t that during all this period /that of the Berlin
blockade and the Korean WarJ7 Stalin was pursuing with
fanatical concentration of purpose a single almt
world domination. 1 question whether he ever held
his aim in view.... I am content to suggest that what
happened in Stalinist Russia from 1939 j the
conclusion of the nonaggression pact with Germany,
until the death of Stalin in 1953 is much better seen
as a continuation of the old Russian imperialist
dynamic, complicated and x»einforced by a distorted
Marxism, than as a calculated bid for world domination
or world revolution. .. .In China he built up Chiang
Kai-shek at the expense oi% Mao Tse-tongs in Yugoslavia
he repeatedly snubbed Tito, telling him that the Great
Alliance was a matter of life and death and that he
was not going to let it be imperiled fey Tito ! s revol -
tionar^ zeal.
. .
. 3ven after the war, Stalin was against
helping the Greek Communists, so ardently supported by
Tito, ana poured cold water on the aspirations of Mao
Tse-tung- in both cases for reasons of state,... It
should have been clear in 19*9 that he was seriously
concerned over the establishment of a Communist regime
in China. But even today too many people go about
nder: ,lf fearfully whether Mao Tae-tun u one
day "do a fit >blivious of the fact that by his
very act of seizing power In China he made himself a

Tito. He achieved, that is to say, a Communist revolu-
tion in China on his own initiative nis own
:s. The only kind of "revolution" Stalin trusted
was one he had made himself with hia own agents working
under his own detailed and strict directions,*
HYP0THfc3I$ I
Russia purposely spoiled Communist China's
chances for United Nations membership in 19
The peculiarity of Russian tactics within the United
Nations' chambers, the statements of individuals with
privileged information, and scholarly opinion are offered
in support of this hypothesis.
\. Facts
The People's Republic of China sent a telegram to the
United Nations on November IB, lj^j challenging, the creden-
tials of T. F. Tsiang, Nationalist China's representative.
On December 99, 1.4,,, the Soviet delegate in the security
Council made a statement in support of replacing the dele^te
from Taipei with the delegate from Peking. On January 10,
,s , though not on the agenda, the problem was the subject
of the first speech of the day by the Soviet delegate. He
offered a resolution to replace the Nationalist Chinese
delegate with a representative of the People's Republic of
China
.
56. Edward Crankahaw, "Russia's Imperial Design," Headings in
Russian Foreign Policy , ed. rtobert ,1. Goldwin {New York:
Oxford University Press, 1*69 )# PP. 714-13.
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Dr. T. F. Tu mi President of the Secure
Council for the month of January, 1950, He ordered the
/iet proposal printed and circulated and stated that a
special meeting would be called for the consideration of tt e
proposal. The Russian delegate then objected to this rul..
on tne ground that it was made b/ a person who didn't repre-
sent anybody. A vote was taken on the objection, and it
was defeated (all "aye" except Ku3sia who voted "no," and
India who abstained). The Russian delegate then stated
that he could not take part in the work of the Security
Council "until the Kuoraintang delegate is excluded from
•e«bership."57 The Russian delegate then left the chambers.
The soviet proposal was discussed by the remaining members
on the following day, January 11th. The Chinese delegate
{Dr. Tslang) announced that he would not preside over the
Council during the discussion of this motion, since it
directly concerned his government. Under the Provision.
Rules of Procedure, he sat as an ordinary member. On the
basis of this action, the Soviet delegate returned to the
session.^
During this, and subsequent meetings, the following
positions were established s The Soviet government wanted to
divorce the matter of individual country*s policies on
diplomatic recognition from the question of United Nations
57. United Nations, Journal of the security Council (New York,
30), p. 4.
58. Jjavid Brook, The U.N. and the China Dllemcia (New Y>rk:
Vantage Fress, l;j56J, p. 10.

34
representation 4 The United states had partially based their
opposition to the Soviet motion on the fact of their diplo-
matic recognition of Nationalist China.^ On a second point,
Russia took the same stand as nationalist China. They both
felt that the matter was a political question, and therefore
subject to a veto. T^e United States held that the question
was one of the correctness of credentials, and therefore
procedural, and therefore not subject to a veto. The
reason for the Soviet stand on this point is not clear. One
weak thread of reason mi&ht be associated with this other-
wise inexplicable decision. According to the rules, if the
matter were procedural, the Nationalist Chinese delegate
could sit through the hearings.
. In March, 1950, United Nations Secretary General Trygve
Lie effectively ruled in favor of R aaia on this point
by stating that diplomatic recognition and United
Nations membership were separate matters. (Wei, op. cit,
,
p. 283.)
60. Although international sympathy born of the exigencies
of the Korean War have since eliminated the requirement
of the United States to commit herself irrevocably on
this point, it might be assumed that a new position was
taken in 1953. On July 28th of that year, Secretary
of State Dulles told correspondents that the United
States was prepared to consider using the veto rather
than to buy Korean unification at the price of admitting
Communist China to the United Nations. During the
hearings before the senate Foreign Relations Committee
on the appointment of Dean Rusk as Secretary of State
in January, 1961, Mr, Rusk was asked to state his posi-
tion on this issue. He said that in his opinion, U.N,
admission should not be based merely on credentials (he
believed the veto was applicable). (U, 3., Senate,
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations , 87th
Con*;., January 12, I90I (U. S . Government Printing Office,
1^61).)

January 13, the . . Council voted on
the Soviet proposal. The United States votec tm% it,
clearly specifying that it was not to be considered a vet
The motion was defeated (6 "no," 3 "aye,'' 2 abstentions),
thia juncture, the Soviet de tm left the chambers, not
return until August i, 1950 « His voluntary absence deprived
him of taking advantage of British efforts to clear up the
matter of Chinese representation," or to veto United Nations
action at the start of the Korean War, His excuse for
departing was that his delegation "will not sit on the
Security Council as long as the representative of the
Kuomintanc group has not been excluded"
61. Britain abstained on votes regarding Chinese U.N. repre-
sentation from the time they recognized Peking in
January until the 19th of September, 1950. On
that date they voted for an Indian resolution to seat
Communist China in the General Assembly. (Motion defeated.)
They then voted for a Canadian compromise which referred
the subject to a special committee. The committee was
unable to render a decision, and they so informed the
General Assembly in October 1951. On June 6, 1951, when
the Better of Chinese representation on the Trusteeship
Council was introduced, they voted with the United
States in favor of Nationalist China for the first time.
Some historians consider the change of British policy
in June, 1951 & tacit compromise in Par East policy
I
* Quid pro quo for the dismissal of General MacArthur.
( Survey , 1051 , op. cit . , p. 35^.) £ach autumn for ten
years ( l95l-I_/6oJ* Britain voted with the United States
to keep the issue off the General Assembly agenda. In
December, 1961, the matter became an agenda item as an
"important question," which required two-thirds of the
vote for passage. The motion proposed to seat the Peki
government and to expel the Taipei government. Britain
voted for the measure, and thereby failed to vote with
the United States for the first time since 1^51. The
aotion was defeated. Even when casting the l>^6l vote,
the British delegate noted that the motion had no be..
on Security Council membership, and that his action did
not imply a desire to see Nationalist China removed from
the latter bod, . (New York Times , December 16, 106l.)
62. Journal of the security Council , op . cit., p. 10.

B » Opinions of Individuals with privileged Information
(1) Statement made in the House of Commons by Mr.
Bevin (Foreign Secretary) on the Chinese United Nations repre-
sentation question, May 2k 9 19501
I think Mao Tse-tun^ has been receiving advice from
Moscow. . .what is happening at this int is
the Chinese are attempting to raise side issues which
may be annoying an.'? bo a country of th.
character. To that we have no Intention of subraitti
... .1 think that the sponsors of the new C'r.inese
j
•
/ernaent have really created" the present "difficulty,
"r the first thing was that Ru5 7eor out because
at the immediate moment of recognition we were not
ready to admit I mm i- inese representative and we
had not completed our negotiations for the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations with the its eraraent
of China.... The question of the legal position was
bein L/ examined, and Russia walked out. Since then we
have been able to do nothing. The onus of keeping China
out of the U.N. is on Russia. .. .What it amounts to is
thaVThey are on strike. . ."".America, with all her feeli
with regard to China has in my view adopted a very fair
attitude. She says, "We will not vote for. We will
t veto.... If there are seven members Mho vote for,
then we will accept the decision...' Two of the
member; ;ia is keeping off the council by refuel
to function; one is herself. There are five already
and there is this s J.M. §j Russia
herself has placed herself in this rather embarx*assi
position. We have tried, ( frankly, to see if I
could get this cleared up by seeing whether seven votes
could be col leeted. °3
(2) In a House of Commons debate concerning the
Japanese Treaty of Peace bill on November 26, 1951 > the
Sinister of State, Mr. Kenneth Younger said that there had
been good ground for hope that the question of Chinese repre-
sentation in the United Nations would be settled even after
the Korean war had started, before Chinese Communist inter-
venUon.<*




Survey j 1951 j op . clt ., p. *k
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(3) Prime Minister Eden in the af Commons
(1955)l
No one knows better than the late &overnR»ent Mb used
the delay in the admission of the preset .nese rn-
ment to the United Nations. It was the act of aggression
by the Chinese Communist Government in Korea which unfor-
tunately held up the whole process of the admission of
China to the United Nations. "5
C- Scholarly views (considered representative
of a larger body of opinTon )
(1) Arnold Toynbee:
...on 6 January 1950 the new communist Chinese government
at Peking had been recognized by Great Britain on the
ground that it had now become the effective government
of China de facto , whereas the United States deprecated
Great Britain's action as precipitate and forebore to
follow suit, till American policy was overtaken by a
series of events in the Far East— first in the North
Korean attack of South Korea in June 1>50, and then the
Chinese intervention in the war in November— which
erected one further obstacle after another to an Ameri'
recognition of the communist Chinese regime. The conse-
quences were a complete breach between the United States
and China and a serious disagreement between the United
-ates and their West xairopean allies. 66
(2) Michael Lindsay:
British action in the United Nations during 1950 can
be fully explained by the tactical decision that it
was unwise to force a vote on the admission of the
Peking Government until the support had been lined up
to secure a favourable vote. By contrast, the Soviet
tactics of forcing the issue on every possible occasion
could be explained by a Soviet policy of preventing the
Peking Government from obtaining the U.N. seat unless
it could be presented as a concession extorted from a
hostile U.N. by Soviet pressure. Governments which might
have been ready to vote for China on the merits of the
case would not give a favourable vote when it appeared
to be yielding to Soviet threats. (This hypothesis
about Soviet motives could not be definitely proved or
65. London Times , January «?7, 1955.
66. Survey
,
TpTJ-lZpO , 0£. cit., p. 3.

disproved without access t it archives bv. ase
for doubti; >viet good faith is rather stronger than
the Chinese case for doubting British good faith. )67
(3) Henry Wei:
In prospects seemed bright foJP the admission
Communist C ina to the United Nations. prestige
of tne Nationalist Government was then <x\ <* low ebb
in consequence of the White Paper. ., .Under the circum-
.;ices, if the Soviet delegation had been more tactful,
it have succeeded in leading the Peking Government
into the United Nations. . ..Instead of escorting its
friend throu&h the main entrance whose doors might have
yielded to a few gentle knocks, it had chosen to shoot
its way in and thrust its friend through a narrow side
window, which, by the way, was closed.™
(4) Yugoslav analysts:
...the so-called Government *f Chiang Kai-shek has
obviously lost the ri<ght to apeak in the name .he
Chinese people.... In any case, in January 1950, there
could be no doubt that the real purpose behind the
Soviet action of leavin security Council was not
to gain entrance into the Security Council for the
Peking representative, but, on the contrary, to obstruct
this... 1
HYPOTHESIS II
Before the start of the Korean War precipitated
President Truman's order for the neutralizati
of the Taiwan strait, Communist China assumed that
she could proceed with the capture of Taiwan wit;
out United States opposition.
Two basic elements support this conjecture: (a)
Official and unofficial United states policy pronouncements
before June 27, 1950, gave Communist China every reason
67. Lindsay, o£. cit.
, p. 11.
Wei, 0£. cit., p. 263.
6j. Dushan Tlmotlyevich and ^ravko Pechar, "China 1
Kevlew of Interna tional ..x*s (Belgrade), I, No. 15,
December c 3.

believe her m t me< oltion.
(B) The lmunists were about ready to attack when
the Korean ar started.
• Mi* 1 £54 Taiwan policy
No attempt is made here to establish actual policy.
This was attempted during two years of domestic conflict
in the Bolted States, to nobody's satisfaction. Much of
the documentation herein originates in the transcript of
the United States Senate Joint Armed Services-Fore
S
Relations committee hearings following the recall of
General Ma-- or— printed under the title "Military
Situation in the Par East." The closest approach to a
definition of United States Taiwan policy before the out-
break o± the Korean War was incorporated in the tea time
of Secretary of State Achesons
First of all, it was understood that Formosa had
strategic importance so far as the United states
was concerned. .. ./But? in the existing condition,
and strength of the Armed Forces of the United
States, it was not possible to commit or promise
to commit any forces whatever, armed forces of
the United states, to the defense of Formosa. 70
This did not satisfy el^ht members of the Foreign Relations
committee who submitted a minority report, in part as follows:
The evidence before the committees indicates that
this policy has been neither firm nor continuous.
On the contrary, the policy has been obscured by
70. U. .
.
, Senate, Military Situation in the Far Kaat ;
Hearings Before the Committees on jCrmed services and
Forei as (U, S« Government
Frinting Office, 1^51), Part 3, p. 1671. (Hereafter
referred to as Military Situation.
)

nstant conflict within the state department, in
the pre- in public debate. There ha« been
.-id even today there is no LAltj o£ opinloii in
the Government on the subject of aid to the Republic
of China. 71
What the United states would actually have done in tne event
of a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan was thus "obscure''
to persona at a high level of the United States government.
The answer is believed to be unknowable, but the question
is academic for the substantiation of the hypothesis. It
is important to note that to the outside world, United
States position on this point was quite probably not
perceived as "obscure " at all. Outsiders had every reason
to believe that the United States would do nothin
...
.
The United States had publicly washed its hands of
affairs involving the Chinese civil war. On January 5, li;
President Chiang Kai-shek had asked for peace terras on the
continent. The United states. Great Britain, the soviet
Union, and France were asked to be mediators. All four
governments rejected the offer.' 2 United States non-military
aid to the Chinese Nationalists had been drastically
curtailed,'-* an(j military aid had been stopped. The details
of the United States' discouragement with the Nationalist
forces was published and distributed as the State Department
White Paper of August 5, In the introduction, secre-
tary of State A-heson had written:
71. Ibid., Part 5, p. 3593.
ei




; j proportion o£ the military supplies furnished
the C uiiti by the United ice VJ dav
ls... fallen into the hand- Chinese Communist
thi the military ineptitude of the Nationalist
leaders, their defections and surrenders, and tie
ibsence among their forces jC the will t Jit...
and now it la abundantly clear that we must face t
sit-ation as it exists in fact, tfe will not help the
Chinese or ourselves by basi >ur policy on wishf.l
thinking. 74
This assessment of the situation was amplified by Mr, Ache
in a public speech at the National Press Club in Washir
on January Id, 19501
Nobody, I think, sa e Nationalist Government fell
because it was confronted b^/ overwhelming; military
force which it could not resist, certainly no one in
his right nind suggest* that now... wot has happened
in my judgment is that the almost inexhaustible
patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended...
/Jfhe Communists were able to capitalize on the/
grossest incompetence ever experienced by any military
command. 73
Mr. Acheson also described a United States defense perimeter
extending from Japan through the Ryukyus to the Philippines.
These latter remarks are often referred to in tne United
.tea as having suddenly revealed a weakness in Far East
policy, but strangely enough, they got comparatively little
play in the Communist press. After all, they were merely
a repetition of a statement of General MacArthur made nearly
a year before:
Now the Pacific has become an Ant;lo~3axon lake and our
line of defense runs through the chain of islands
fringing the coast of Asia. It starts from the
Philippines and continues through the rtyukyu Arenipe
7^» White Paper , op. clt . , p. xv.
75. Iteparttsent'of otat e Bulletin , January 23, 19J0* P. li

I broad ma itIon,
It bends ta Aleutian Xi
. .
.76
On J y 3 j - na<* been wide Far £ast
cire. • B? release, 1 date line, which said
that the state Department had notified its attaches that
the loss of Taiwan island to the Communists was expected.
It quoted a classified State Department document of jjecember
23, (correctly) wnich said "the loss of the .nd is
widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and military
conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists
adds weight to the expectation. "77 There was considerable
76. New York Times, March 2, 19*9, This accumulation of
material does not imply that there was no United States
domestic concern about the future of Taiwan before the
>rean .-.ar. General MacArthur had become alarmed
mid -June, 1950. kt that time, it was revealed in the
Senate committee hearings, he held private discussions
with Secretary of Defense Johnson on this subject in
Tokyo. They came to fti 1 -eement 00 the importance of
Taiwan. (Military Situation , oj>. cit. , Part 4, p. 2590.)
what is noteworthy, however, la that neither General
MacArthur nor any other prominent officials had made
public statements about it before Korea, (purvey, ]
iffiO b op,* cit. , p. 3^6.) after the Seventh Fleet was
stationed in the Taiwan strait, General MacArthur's
feelings with regard to Taiwan became public. hiie he
was in Taiwan in early .vu&ust, , Chiang Kai-shek
issued a statement that inferred that he and the General
had agreed that the United states had a permanent interest
in the fate of the Nationalists. Mr. Averell Harriman
was sent to Japan from Washington to visit General !*lac-
i'thur, and on August ICth, the General Issued a state-
ment denying that his visit to Taiwan had had any politi-
cal object. On August 26th, General MacArthur sent a
telegram to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in which he said:
"Formosa in the hands of a hostile power could be compared
to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender.
The President ordered the statement withdrawn. It is
interesting to note the sensitivity of the Adminiatratl
to any hint of interest in Taiwan, except as it was
associated with the Korean War.
77. Military Situation, og. cit., Fart 3, P. 1675.

*3
discussion at the joint Ittee hearings in 1-61 about the
leak of this info. >n. Tne document was isaueu ,tate
itepartment personnel in the field as a precautionary measure,
to limit alarm and provide policy coverage should the attack
take place. It is difficult to believe that the Communist
attack was considered just another contingency, however.
Secretary of itate .-uheson testified that he had had studies
of the danger to Taiwan made in September and tober, ]
He stated that "These studies unanimously reported that the
fall would occur, and would occur probably in the year 19JJ0»
ither practical action taken by the Department of
*itate lent credence to an externally-perceived view that I
United states was "apparently prepared to see Formosa occupied
by the communists. ''79 Op Hay 24, Iyi>C, the American consul-
general in Taiwan advised his countrymen to leave the island,
unless they had essential ousiness there. v k% that point,
At
many Far feat scholars were convinced, leading Americans
1 1 n
were convinced, and even the Chinese Nationalists were
apparently convinced, °3 that the Chinese civil war had been
78. Ibid., Fart 3, p. 1672.
-
guryy , 3 , o£. cit., p. 3^5.
30. Ibid., p73fe7
81. Lindsay, o£. cit
., p. 37.
82. (Dwi&ht D. Eisenhower and Robert Taft), Trumbull Higglns,




63. Governor K. C. Wu (of Taiwan) spoke of the Korean War
and the revers ing of United otates policy. (New York Times ,
July 5, IJ50.1 Chiang Kai-shek's State of tbelfation
address, February 19, I->54: "Four years ago today our
Republic of China was practically written off in inter-




left to th. ~ces of Chiang Kai-shek <4ao Tse- . It
would seem that the Communists could quite logically take
the last stute.ivant on the auu^ia oy trie President or the
United otatea M January 5th, 1950* at face value:
I Unit obtain special
ri^hta or privileges or to establish military bases
on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any inten-
tion of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the
present sitv^ation. Tie Onltad ,>i;utea Government will
not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in
• civil conflict in China. .Similarly, the United
lutes ^overnioent will not provide mil aid or
advice to the Chinese forces in Formosa. ^4
It Id appear that Hi »"tnrm remembered this speed-
well. On the day following President 'iVuman'a order station-
ing the U.S. Navy in the otrait, he made one of his rare
references to specific contemporary events
:
Truman stated on January 5th of this year that America
uld refrain frou; interfering in Taiwan. Now he hi
self proved that hia statement was false and he has
torn to t»r.reds *2i the international agreements regard-
ing U.^. noninterference In the internal affairs of
China. 35
B. Hie credibility of the Chinese Communist
threat to f.3~1wan
~
b"erore ' the Korean War "
The taking of laiwan would have been a difficult feat
for Communist CMna in 1950j even without United States
involvement. It required an amphibious operation over 3
miles of open sea; this had to be accomplished without
04. department ;te Bulletin, January 16, 1950, p. 1
. iiadio fekln^ (NCh*0, June~3o, 1950, President Trum
speech is atill referred to; CI tember, IS
%ere it not for the fact that the U.3. ;. ovemment later
went back on its own statement. . .1 d the rengu
islands would have lon t; been liberated. (Kadio Peking
(NCNA), September 6, lj cj'C.)

4i>
equipaient would even ,te ti plexi a
modem Nav
.,
. jn the other hand, they weren't faced wiv
a Tarawa. In the aprl: *ian was a haven for
discouraged and demoralized Nationalist troops who I*led
from mainland and offshore island defeats to Join native
Taiwanese, many of whom were still sullen from the lj4j
Nationalist maaaacre. Taiwan was a fertile ground for sub-
versive activity; a token amphibious "landing 1* of assorted
naval vessels and motorized junks, well-timed with :,fifth
column ,! activity and a few paratroops could have been quite
effective. Taiwan was a Cr ineae Communist target of special
significance, and required special treatment, it was the
last stronghold of the ''remnant forces,' and its fall (along
with that of Tibet) would signal the completion of t
twenty year war. To falter at this point , however, would
threaten the loss of momentum just when they needed hi<
morale to solidify mainland gains. In making preparations,
ty were apparently proceeding with confidence, but
»» B y limitations were a concern, but United
States opposition was apparently not a factor connected with
these Taiwan aspirations.^
06. riao Tse-t "Weapons are an important factor
in war but not the decisive one) it is man and not
material that counts." (Mao Tse-tun 1 the Protracted
war (Peking; Foreign Languages Press, i'~5M, p. 50.
}~
87. Mao Tae-tung in 3 "we do not make a fight unless we
are sure of victory; we must on no account give fi&ht
without plan, without preparation rlthout certainty
of outcome." (Mao Tse-tung, Questions of Tactics in the
Present Anti -Japanese United ftront (geklnV,: "Foreign
es Press, \/y\) , p. 13~7)T~
88. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , op. cit
. , p. £2.
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General Su Yu addressed Third Field Army (February, 1950)
z
The liberation of the islands alon& the southeast coast,
especially Taiwan, is an extremely bi^ problem and will
involve the biggest campaign in the history of modern
Chinese warfare.... A considerable number of Chiang
Kai-shek land, sea, and air forces are concentrated
there. #9
Mao Tse-tung (March, 1950):
The financial condition of our country has begun to
improve. .. .However, in order to bring about a fundamental
turn for the better.. .considerable retrenchment in
military and administrative expenditures by the state
Is necessary. 90
Liu Shao-ehi (May Day address, 1950):
After Taiwan is liberated, the enemy's blockade and
bombing will naturally end, the country's military
expenditures can be greatly reduced, a great increase
in investment in economic construction can then be
made, and our country can move ahead on the road to
transitional economic reconstruction.
People's China editorial (May, 1950):
As comrade Liu Shao-chi points out in his May Da$ address,
the brilliant success of the amphibious operation, endi
in the liberation of Hainan, demonstrates the People's
Liberation Army's mastery of the art of sea borne landings.
The Chinese people are assured of the impending liberation
of Taiwan. The Hainan campaign was its prologue. 9*
ttao Tse-tung addresses the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China (June 6, 1^50):
Only Taiwan and Tibet still remain to be liberated and
this is still a serious task. . .on the condition that it
guarantees sufficient forces to liberate Taiwan and
Tibet, consolidate the national defenses and suppress
the counter-revolutionaries, the People's Liberation
Army, while retaining its main force, should demobilize
part of its troops in 1950.93
89. General Su Wu, "Liberation of Taiwan in Sight, " People's
China , February 16, 1950, p. 8.
90. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , o£. cit
. , p. 16.
91. Supplement, People's China ,~Hay 167 l§5o\
• People's China , flay 16, 1950 > p. **.
93. Radio Peking (NCNA), June 13, 1950.
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Although the date of the proposed attack waa never
announced, the cloae of the "Invasion" season comes with
the arrival of the typhoon season in the early autumn.^
Mainland preparations in the spring of indicated that
they intended to beat this deadline.
Throughout these months. Communist China carried out
her tremendous military build-up in the coastal provinces
of Cheklan& and Fukien. No less than 18 Communist
armies were concentrated in this area opposite Formosa
across the hundred-mile Strait. Preparations for
crossing the Strait were pushed at feverish speed; all
kinds of coastal craft were assembled, and training
for amphibious operations were intensive. Old airfields
were enlarged and new ones built to round out the plans
for the impending assault on the island stronghold. *5
It has been reported that a massive "frog man" training
program in preparation for the Taiwan assault was commenced
about the first of January, 1950 in the pools of southern
Chekian^ and northern Pukien. This program hit reverses
when an epidemic of schistosmiasis (Asiatic blood fluke)
swept the trainees. (The disease is contracted by contact
with organisms in fresh water lakes and rivers.) It has
been suggested that this epidemic served to delay the attack
94. In April, 1950, the Japanese Communist Party is reported
to have known of the coming attack in Korea, but to
have understood It was to have been scheduled for August.
Resolution of the Communist "Chlbu Conference": 'The
North Korean armies will carry out the southern cam-
paign for the unification of the country at the begin-
ning of the rainy season... our operations are scheduled,
until further notice, for August." (Rodger Swearingen
and Paul Lander, Red Flag in Japan (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Fress, 1952), p. 240.)
>5. Ping Chia-kuo, China : New Axe and New Outlook (New York:
xfred a. Knopf7~TJ56 ) , p. 13?.

on Taiwan. 9&
The Taipei press was reflecting a peak of anxiety
by mid-June, 195Q« On June 16th, a General in the Nationalist
Army warned the people of an impenu *ratroop invasion
which would accompany the amphibious assault.^' On June 19th,
reports were relayed from Saigon of some twenty landing craft
that were enroute from Shanghai to load units of General
Chen I's Third Field Army that waa massed on the coast.
Taipei Radio estimated that one million men were in position
with Chen I, and that they were delayed only until they
could arrange for ships.^ Peking's exhortations to units
stationed opposite the island paralleled those broadcast
prior to the earlier Hainan island invasion of April. -*-00 In
summary, there is an impressive array of evidence that
suggests that an attack was imminent. General Mac\rthur
testified later that his concurrence with Washington's deci-
sion to turn down Chiang Kai-shek's offer to send troops to
Korea in July, 19$0 was baaed on the continued threat to
Taiwan, even in the face of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, stationed
i>6. Frank A. Kierman, Jr,, The Fluke that Saved Formosa
(Cambridge, Mass.: Center For International Studies,
MIT, 1954), p. 13-.
, fladio Taipei (Radio Free China), June 16, 1^50,
98. Ibid ., June 19, 1^0.
99 • Ibid . , June j, l^C, This number wua probably exa,
aerated. iix-Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson testi-
fied at the joint committee hearings that United States
intelligence believed that between June 10th and June
24th, IS'50, the Communist forces maaaed on the strait
increased from more than 40*000 to about 156,00c.
(Military Situation , og. cit
.
, Part 3, p. 2621.) The
latter figure exceeda the manpower estimated to have
been available at the Strait during the 1958 offshore
island crisis (see below).
IOC. whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , op . cit., p. 22.

in the Strait:
/Xfter the orders to neutralize the Strait/ There was
a concentration of fled Chinese troops on the mainland
which threatened Formosa seriously. .. .There were the
Fourth and Third field armies which afterward showed
up in Korea.
I went down to Formosa. . .^July 31/ 19507* The week
before that, I had been receiving reports from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff expressing trepidation for the
safety of Formosa. 1^1
This hypothesis is offered in order to show that
Communist China could reasonably feel that the complications
of the Korean War and the resultant United States action
robbed them of their opportunity to invade Taiwan in the
summer of 1950. If it is assumed that President Truman's
102decision to intervene was unexpected, this contention
needs further defense in view of a possible Chinese Communist
1Cil * Military Situation , op . clt. , Part 1, pp. 22, 23.
102. Technically, the United States had decided to intervene
in Korea before the security Council called for the
military support of United Nations members. (Stephen
S. Goodspeed, The Nature and Function of International




p. 22"#7]~ General MacArthur was ordered to provide naval
and air support in Korea on the night of June 26thj the
security Council called for Korean military support after
a meeting on the morning of June 2?th; President Truman
made his previous orders public at noon that day.
(Harry S. Truman, Memoirs , Vol. II (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 336.) The idea of
accompanying action in Korea with "neutralization" of
the Taiwan Strait was part of the original recommenda-
tions of the State and Defense Departments submitted to
President Truman by Secretary of State Acheson during
the Sunday night meeting, June 25th, after the President 1 ,
urgent flight from Missouri. Afl soon as this facet of
possible Korean actions was mentioned, President Truman
interrupted Mr. Acheson's presentation and directed that
the Seventh Fleet be signalled immediately and started
on the way toward the Taiwan area. (Ibid., p. 333.)

afterthought : ,en without the Korean War, the United
states would have surprised us by preventing our Taiwan
landings as well.
In the early summer of 19$0j the situations in Korea
and Taiwan were entirely different. The United Nations as
a body had established a prior interest in prevent:
Communist aggression in Korea. There was a United Nations
Commission on station in South Korea, and in October, 1-4.)$
the General Assembly had charged it with the responslbilit.
of investigating matters which might lead to military action
at the 3bth parallel. w* Moreover, there is every reason
to believe that the United Nations aspect of tie Korean
attack weighed heavily on the United States* decision to
intervene there. *0* As the news of the North Korean attack
as reported in United States Ambassador Muccio's telegram
is traced from the State Department watch officer (Assistant
Secretary of State (Par Eastern Affairs) Dean Rusk), to
Secretary Acheson, to President Truman in Missouri, United
Nations action was immediately recommended at each step. 1
The catalytic effect of the mutual confidence of United
States and United Nations officials made the decision I
intervene in Korea easier.
103. Koy c,. Appleman, South to the Nakton^, North to the Y
(Washington, D. C.J Office of iei^6T~MiTitary
History, apartment of the Army, I961), p. 6.
K4. Truman, op_. cit
. , p. 336.
105. Time Magazine, December 26, p. -
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The United Nations would not have supported action
.inat the invasion of Taiwan. The strait "neutralisation"
was a unilateral action by the United States throughout the
Korean War; British Naval units never participated. During
the November 1950 Chinese Communist offensive in Korea,
General MacArthur requested the use of Chiang Kai-shek's
troops there. The Joint Chiefs ot Staff reply denied this
request because:
...it would disrupt the united position of the nations
associated with the United States in the United Nations
and leave the United States isolated. It may be who.
unacceptable to the Commonwealth countries to have their
forces employed with Nationalist China. . .!£•&
The United Nations aspect contributed to the United
states' decision on Korea. The United states might have
entered Korea unilaterally, although there would have been
less impetus. They might even have entered the Taiwan
otrait unilaterally in the absence of the Korean War, but
the impetus would have been even less. Thus, if the Chinese
Coamunists availed themselves of the Western literature on
the subject, they would have to conclude that the odds of
surprise U.S. action in Taiwan were considerably less than
in Korea.
What la more germane to the argument, however, is the
Chinese Jommunists 1 apparent assessment o£ the situation
iwnedlately after June 27 , 1950* At this stage there is much
106. Major General Charles a. Vllloughby and John Chamberlain,
Mac*rthur, 1^41-1^1 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book




evidence to indicate that they considered the seventh Fleet '^
presence in ti.e strait as purely a "corollary" of United
tes Korean action, as President Truman's announcement had
a^eci. , Moreover, at least while the North Koreans
appeared to be forcing the United Nations armies off the
peninsula, Peking 1 s deployment of their military forces
indicated that they expected to be able to go ahead wit
their Taiwan landings that same summer.
Had a N >rth Korean victory remained certain, albeit
delayed by a few weeks, there would be no reason to
withdraw forces positioned opposite Taiwan. The
context of the Seventh Fleet's orders gave credence
to the World Culture analysis linking a U.S. defeat
in Korea with a U.S. withdrawal from the Taiwan Strait.
In the event of a V.3, defeat and withdrawal, the inva-
sion might be
n




Before the Korean War the Chinese Communists did not
believe the United States would oppose their 1950 Taiwan
landings by surprise; after the start of the Korean War they
did not believe it. They probably still do not believe it.
In their eyes, only the complications In Korea prevented the
"completion o£ their revolution."
HYPOTHESIS III
soviet Russia instigated the Korean War.
A Korean Communist organisation, closely supervised
bj U e Communist Party of the soviet Union had existed since
the 1920 'a. Hundreds of Korean Communists had served in the
107. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , op. cit. , p. 65.
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aian tcrmy, others had served with the SovlWl ,ce
.-d the NKVD. .ifter World War II, many of these
Koreans returned to their gauntry with dual K. >rean
citizenship; they isaintalned close ties with Vladivostok
and Bowown durii I initial "liberation" of Njrth £
Man . the senior North Korean Amy officers had had exten-
sive experience on active duty with the Soviet
Commander in Chief, General Kim Il-3ung had served in Russia.
*
Chief of Staff and Chief of the Security Agency General Nam II
was a Soviet citizen w. . i fought the Germans at Stalingrad
as C.iief of Staff of a Aussian division, and had helped
liberate Warsaw. 1
In 1949, Korean soldiers were trained and equipped
in Liberia. Aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons, and naval mines
were supplied by the Russians at that time. 110 )n March 17i
jviet -Korean trade, technical assistance, and credit
agreeiaent was si^yied. Some sectors of the North Korc
economy (notably oil and shipping) came under direct Russian
control throu h joint -stuck companies. 11 In short, in the
summer of 1950* the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(North Korea) gave every appearance of being a full-fledged
Soviet satellite. 112
The history of the relationship between the Chinese
and the North Korean Communists was less amicable. Immediately
10b. Dallin, op_. cit
. , p. 6l.
109. Life Magazine , June 27, i960, p. IOC .
11C. illn, op. cit., p. 62.




er world War II, the North Korean Communist Party persis-
tently pureed and weeded out the anti-3oviet, pro-Chinese
cadres.**^ In early 1950, twelve thousand Korean troops
returned home from China. It has been reported that this
was part of the settlement of a Korean -Chinese dispute
concerning .Soviet -sponsored dam construction on the Ya^
River in 1948-1 ,4 , and was brought about by Russian good
offices. Communist C; Ina had asked that these troops be
returned as part of an early phase of their demobilisation
program in response to economic pressures on the mainland. ^
Although the Peking and Pyongyang governments exchanged
diplomatic recognition on December 25, 1949* the Chinese
ambassador didn't arrive at the North Korean capital until
August 13, 3,950* He stayed a few months, and then returned
to Peking, leaving a charge d'affaires. Not until 1955 did
an ambassador return. It's almost impossible to construct
a case for the idea of North Korea being a Chinese Communist
satellite in the summer of 195C ii ->
116
The North Korean attack was planned. Kven a ca
paign against South Korea required outside concurrence, if
only for logistical reasons. 1 ' There were rumors of an
113. Ibid ., p. 43.
ii5. roiar.
115. Dallin, op_. cit., p. 77.
116. North KoreanTorees which quickly occupied Seoul brought
police and politi ffleers who had prepared lists of
the names and current addresses of key "reactionaries,"
which they duly arrested. (Lindsa./, op_. cit
. , p. 33.)
117. whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 4^.

impending Korean attack in official circles of Moscow in the
summer of 1^4-j. fcclcal supplies were beln^ shipped to
.-ea, even thou&h they were in snort supply in Russia at
^t time."' ~ .ipril and May, 1930, lar&e Russian deliv-
eries oi' tanks, trucks, ana heavy artillery were arriving at
North Korean installations.
The best informed observers at the time of the attack
were unanimous in placing the blame on Russia and Russia
alone. " In July, 1950, Secretary u^* State . >ke
of the 38th parallel b< the iron ourtaln,
behind that curtain t .let Union established a Communist
regime."120 On October 2k t 1952, In the United Nations
General Assembly Secretary Acheson charged the Soviet Union
with feting the instigator of the trouble in Korea. i^-L Also
in the United Nations, United States Ambassador Warren
Austin stated his conviction that the influence of the Chinese
Communists compared to the Russians in starting the Korean War
was ''one to ninety-nine. ^ John Foster i>ullea, while a
consultant to the Secretary of state, made frequent references
to Russian instigation of the war. In July, 195G he said:
"The Communists of North Korea have struck hard with Russian
. Yuri A. Rastvorov, "Red Fraud and Intrigue in the Far
East, * Life Ma&azlne, joeeember 6, 1954. Rastv mm a
former Int Colonel of the HVD who defected to I
United States in January, i^34.
119. James Boston, New York Times , June 27, 1 50.
120. Departaant . ,.te Bulletin, July it, 1950* p. 5c
] . ibid ., 1 37~V
122. Buai M Far faast , op . clt., p. 65^.
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• ka, xn planes, and iiu3sian heavy artillery ,**23
ltorial opinion In Yu^jslavia in trie fall
not only blamed Russia for tie attack, but felt that one of
its main purposes was to establish hegemony over Communist
China in the Far East.
If the Soviet Government wished to assert itself as the
big Asiatic power and to make itself the arbiter in the
solution of Asiatic problems, then Worth Korea was a
stronghold in Asia on which Moscow could count one
hundred per cent in such an action.
.
.that would be a
step alon& the road of letting China know that there
were ^not/ "two centers," and that China should Join
the camp headed by M>scow.*24
HYFOTHiiSIS IV
Communist China entered the Korean war reluc-
tantly, either in response to a precelved
threat to her border or on orders from Russia,





(1) Notable irregularities existed in the Chinese
Communist pres3 coverage of the Korean War
during the first five weeks of the conflict.
Although from the very moment of President Truman's
announcement of his sending armed forces to Korea and the
Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, a continuous barrage of
protests were published in regard to the Taiwan aspect of the
123. Department of 3tate Bulletin, July 10, 1950« p. 49.
124. TimotiyevicFTanoT Pechar, op_. cit., p. 4. This was one
of the first periodicals £o deTect Russia's reluctance
to see Communist China admitted to the United Nations.
(New York Times , December 27, 1950, p. 9.)
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case, 125 the action in Korea was either Ignored j or belatedi
reported. No Peking newspaper reported the Korean War for
48 hours following the attack. The Peking People's aaily
carried a front page story on June 27th, but thereafter until
July 6th it was relegated to the back pages. From that time
on, until about the last of July there was always at least a
48 hour delay in reporting United States or United Nations
action in Korea. United states* action in the Taiwan
area was condemned promptly, and frequently
(2) Chinese Communist troop deployments during the
first weeks of the conflict indicated improvised
contingency planning.
Between mid-May and raid-July, the northeast CI ina
garrison was in the process of being strengthened by troops
from the Hainan invasion. They could have reached the Korean
area in force, long before the Chinese Jommunist intervention.
At about the time of the initial North Korean attack, approxi-
mately 30,000 troops from Chen I*s Third Field aero
moved from their station on the coast opposite Taiwan to the
Shantung area, roughly midway between Taiwan and Korea. This
appears to have been a reserve force, available for action
in any contingency.*2 ' & substantial body was kept opposite
Taiwan, at least until General MacA.rthur*s visit to Taiwan
125. Within 24 hours of tne Iruaan statement, Foreign Minister
Chou En-lai denounced the move as armed aggression
against the territory of China in total violation of the
United Nations Charter." (iiadlo Peking (NCNa), June 2
.)
126. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , op. cit. , pp. 53* 5
127. Ibid., p.~szr:

in eai .^ust.^ In summary, &1 : h there were eai
redeployments, they might be considered to have been of a
noriB&l precautionary nature.
(3) The Chinese Communist propaganda machinery was not
oriented toward Korea initial]
A routine propaganda campaign had been planned for
July 1-7 in connection with the Stockholm Peace Appeal. This
was modified to accentuate the recent developments by placing
it under the direction of a hurriedly established "Chinese
People's Committee for Resistance to United states Invasion
of Taiwan and Korea." Campaigns were thereafter conducted
under various headings, always starting with the word "Taiwan"
until about the time of the Chinese Communist intervention in
Korea. Then "Resist America, aid Korea" became the keynote. 12^
(4) The Chinese Communists apparently hadn't budgeted
for the Korean war.
Before the Korean War started, there was a notable
preoccupation with the need for concluding the Taiwan invasion
. The Nationalist Chinese defense Ministry estimated in
mid-August, 1: the troop strength off Taiwan had
remained relatively constant. (Radio Taipei (Kadlo Free
China), it IT, 1>!50, ) General MacArthur's testimony,
noted above, points out that the threat to Taiwan remained
long after the Korean War had started. The Taipei press
reported sporadic bombardment of 4uemoy island from ear
June through October *>, ly^C. (Radio Taipei (Kadio Free
China), October 7, is is perhaps less signifi-
cant than might be supposed; occasional shelling of this
Nationalist outpost has been more the rule than the
exception since 2 The longest lull in bombardment
since 1949 was 104 days, broken in December, 1961. In a
sample day in January, 1962, 143 shells were reported in
one night. ( New York Times , January 17* lj62,)
129. Whiting, Chlna~groa8es~€He~"Yalu , oj>. cit
. , p. 02.
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and getting on with domestic economic recovery in the quota-
tions already noted. This appeal did not stop on June 27th.
On July 16th, General Chen I tuld the Haat Ci ina Military
and administration Council that he shouldered the "aacred
responsibility" for liberating Taiwan, but felt that economic
recovery and postwar reconstruction should not be neglected, *
(5) The Chinese Communists issued warnings before
they entered the Korean Wax*.
As the United Nations forces approached the 3^th
parallel on their northward march in early October, 1950,
the pros and cons of carrying the attack into North Korea
were dominant Issues in tne world public eye. This was
discussed in the United Nations in the context of extending
the political &oals of tne war. The pertinent proposal was
an
H&ight Power Resolution" which would add the unification
of Korea to the previous aims of ending armed aggression and
the restoration of peace and security in the area.
On September 30th Chou £n~lai announced in a speech
widely carried la the press:
The C inese People absolutely will not tolerate foreign
aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing kneir
neighbors beln& aava&ely invaded by the imperialists. *31
On October 3rd, Chou £n-lai summoned Ambassador K. M,
Panikkar of India to a dramatic midnight meeting in Peking
and told him that if the United States or United Nations
forces crossed the 38th parallel, Communist China would send
troops to North Korea. This warning was promptly relayed to
130. ftadio Peking (NONA.), July 20, 19J0 (shanghai dateline,
July 19, 1;
131. Chou En-iai, I?The First Year of People 'a China," People's
China , October 16, 1950, p. 7.

the United states and United Nations. ^
The iii^ht Power Resolution was passed in the General
Assembly ctober 7th; at about the same time, the first
United .States :\ra\y units crossed the parallel. 1-^ During
this period, the feking press revealed numerous warnings,
but one or the most noteworthy was again enunciated by Chou
ian-lal* this >ctobu fchl
Now that the American forces are attempting to cross
the 3&th parallel , lar<, le
cannot stand idly by with regard to a serious
situation created by the invasion of Korea.. i3i*
132. Appleman, 0£. cit. , p. 756. Chou Kn-lai specifiea_
excluded South^Corean troops as a source of provocation.
South Korean units had already crossed the parallel on
tober 1st. (Whit China Crosses the Yaiu, 0£, clt«
,
p. 108.) This warning was' forwarded to the United
states forces in the Par East on Qc tober 4th. opleman,
op. cit., p. 75&.) "Whereas the threat was greatly
discounted in the United States, /lieutenant General
Walton H. Walker, United States Eighth Army Commander/
and his staff gave full weight to the words and to the
warning which came fron the Indian Ambassador in Peipi=
that Communist China was preparln,, to enter the war.
(S. L. \. Marshall, The Kiver and the Gauntlet (New York:
William Morrow and Co., 19537 p. 777"
133- 2om* references say the V. tates ..>ssed the
parallel a few hours before the resolution was passed
(Gordon 3, Turner and Kieh&rd D. Challenger, national
Security in_the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick
iC^er,' TjScYJ p. "3^1, IOM infer that .ed
afterward (Willoughby and Chamberlain, op_. cit., p. 37
from ti • proprl
on the part of United States military commanders in t:
field, the matter is irumaterial. The all iion
to cross the 36th parallel had long been made in Washing-
ton, and was transmit! - General Mac r on
.September 27th in the form re defining his mission
the destruction of the K V Korean armed forces
•
(Turner and Challenger, op_. cit
., p. 36.)
134. Sails Peking (Chinese International Service) (in
fetish), oer 11, ±$$0 (italics inserted).
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The first Chinese Communist troops crossed into North
Korea in force about jctober 13th. *35
In summary, repeated warnings were given; the terms
and timing of the warnings preceded the act upon which they
were conditional; they were received by the threatened
parties; they were reiterated after the conditional limits
had been exceeded. It would seem doubtful that Peking would
have bothered with warnings at all if they were merely
participat ins in a completely pre-planned, coordinated
maneuver.
(6) Inconsistencies in C inese Communist military
tactics in Korea during November 1950 suggest either
a pragmatic approach to their total involvement
in the war or that they were ill-equipped to fight.
On November 5th, after the United Nations forces had
engaged the Chinese in combat, General Macarthur made a
special report of their intervention to the United Nations,
On November 7th, the Communists publicly admitted that
Chinese "volunteers" were participating in the Korean War.
At this Juncture, the Chinese forces withdrew and a three
week period of relative disengagement existed until the
"Home by Christmas" United Nations offensive of November 2**-
26 was turned into a "new war" on November 27th by the
Chinese counterattack.
In explanation, it has been variously suggested that
the Cr.inese were making one last effort to avoid total
involvement, pending United Nations response to their
135. Appleman, o£. cit. , p. 765.

admitting to 'Volunteers,"1^ ^j^ t^ey were emplc
ing the "mobile war" maxims of Mao Tae-tung, 1^ that they
were waiting for the decimation of the pro-Soviet I
Korean troops, 1-^ or that they were hurriedly being; supplied
for a war for which they had not been prepared. ^ No
attempt is made here to pinpoint the most likely rea&
behind this incongruous withdrawal. The mere Tact of their
disengagement, however, speaks for a pragmatic operation
rather than a Ion nned maneuver.
Some facts retarding the lack of Soviet logistic
support of the Chinese Communist armies before this time are
considered pertinent. Allen 6. Whiting interviewed Chi
Communist prisoners of war. They left the impression that
there had been little preparation for their arrival in Korea.
None j£ the Chinese armies e vte
tober and November 1950 had been trained in using Russian
weapons, and the only known piece oC Soviet equipment
utilized by them at that stage was a sub-machine gun. They
relied on American and Japanese relics of World War II.
Captured documents told of the plight of an ill-clothed and
ill -equipped Chinese Communist Army before their November
offensive. 11*
136. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op . cit
. , p. 137.
137. Mao Tse-tun- in l[>3v: ^W Have always u .ted the
policy of "luring the enemy to penetrate deep" precisely
because this is the most effective policy fop a weak
army in strategic defense against a strong ara (Ma 1
Tse-tung, On the Protracted War , oj>. cit
.
, p. 110.)
*3* • - 'iew o£ International Affairs (Belgrade), 1, No. 13#
November 22, 3.
13y. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op . cit., p. l6l.
14c. Ibid., ppTTSS, 161, 1^3T~ *
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B. The case for Chinese C ist mtra on
the 5a 3F a£pr«.
their borders^
The first element in the appreciation o£ tfell
.cept requires the admission that from dome viewpoints,
there appeared to be inadequate justification for the
"neutralization" of the Taiwan Strait on the basis of the
Communist threat in Korea. That this was possible is perhaps
best evidenced by the fact that it was a view held in many
quarters among United States allies in isurope, particularly
in Great Britain. ^^ A second element lies in the realiza-
tion that the concept of the possibility of a Western
pincers movement against China was prevalent on the mainland
and that a myth of eventual American invasion antedated the
Korean War.
There is ample evidence that educated opinion in main-
land China was quick to appreciate the significance of the
141. "Just how a Chinese communist occupation of Formosa
could threaten the security of the United Kati; . j«s
in Korea. MM n^t clear in view of Its distance from the
theatre of war and of the complete air and naval suprem-
acy enjoyed at that time by the United Nations."
(survey, 194^-ly50 , o£. cit . , p. 350.)
142. Ibid.", p. 4yo. Before the war there had been publicity
of~a specific "General .^cArtriur-Kuoadntan^ plot ,: ;
"limited evidence from people who were in C ina durl;
tr:e period suggests that this official public it
largely believed even by educated Chinese opinion."
(Lindsay, China and the Cold War, op. cit., p. 38.)
Pawei Monat (Polish Military attache lnomnlat China
and North Korea during the Korean fear period— who
defected tft the United States in 1959): "The Chinese
were terrified of General MacArthur. They regarded him
as a brilliant and unpradictable an , For all they
knew, if they didn't stop him, he might attack across
s Yalu, just as he hud swept unexpectedly across the
38th parallel." (Pawel Monat "Hussiand in Korea j The
Hidden Bosses," Life Magazine , June 27, I960* P. 102.)
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new power situation which faced them, on. /eventh Fleet
took station in the Strait. A sophisticated article appeared
ln
^£?!M Culture as early as July, 1950, which offered the
conjecture that President Turman took action in the Taiwan
Strait to appease the Republican Part;/ and thus get support
for his Korean plans:
Before June 27th, the problem of llberati iwan
pitted the strength of t ^ple's Liberation fcrt
against the Chiang Kai-shek remnants, with the help
of the Ajearlean Lflperlalist* occupying the background
position. Since June 27, the problem of llberati
Taiwan pita the strength of the Peopled Liberation
rray against the American imperialists with the Kuomin-
tang bandit remnants moving into the background. i^3
Public speeches in the late summer of 1950 reflected
an increasingly defensive attitude.
Chou &i~iai at the 33rd session of the Centraj. Peopled
Government Council, (>iUguat 11, i^o) i
The U.3. aggressive circles have always be~ atlit
to the People's Kepublic of China. They have continuous-
.mpted to carry oat araed Interventl Ml to pose
tne threat of war against C. ina from three fronts s namely
UHMBj Korea, a;:u Indo-China. . . . fhe United States govern*
ment has seized control of the military, political, and
I affair* VC Taiwan, and turned Taiwan into a
U.3. colony as. well as a military base for attacking
our country.-^*
Vice Shair ma Gtou mal Conference of Combat
Heroes i ;oor 35, } ) i
We have to liberate all of China, including Tibet and
Formosa, and simultaneously, have to establish our
national defense forces to. protect us from aggression
and to defend the Orient. 145
143. World Culture. XXII, No. 1, I
144. Hadlo Pv "(NCNA), 3t 13, 1954. Mao Tse-tung in
"We will nless attacked} It attacked,
we will certainly counter-attack." (Mao Tse~tu




145. Radio Peking (NC&\), September 28, 195

Defensive preparations were being made on mainland
China. jn October 17th, a warning appeared in the press
concerning a scheduled test firing of the ,nai anti-
aircraft batteries. rromlnent leaders stressed defense
r
of their country at an? cost. On September 25, 1^6c, Aetll
Chief of .Staff of the People*s Liberation Ar..-*.. , General
Nieh Jun^-chen told Indian Ambassador Panikkarj
^hina cannot/ ait back with folded hands and let the
Americans come up to the ^/olno-Korean? border.... We
know what we are in for, but at all costs American
aggression has to be stopped. The Americans can bomb
us, they can destroy our industries, but they cannot
defeat us on land.... They may even drop atom bombs
on us. What then? They may kill a few million people.
Without sacrifice a nation's independence cannot be
upheld.
W
l the other hand, there were indications in 1952
that Peking was more anxious to push forward with their
Internal development programs than to continue the increas-
ingly pointless military stalemate. 1^ By this time, an,,
real threat to their bordera was clearly out of the question. 1^
It is admitted, that to most Western minds, the idea
of the aainland Chinese (before their entry Into the Korean
War) beln^ honestly afraid of their being Invaded by the
United states appears irrational. Nationality, however, is
146. Ibid., Jctober 17, 1 950.
147. whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. clt., p. 1C7.
. Howard L. Boorman, "The Slno-ooviet Alliances The
Political Impact, ' Moscow
-
Peking Axis, Council on
Foreign delations (New York! Rarper and Brothers, 1^<57),
P. 15.
14,. The dismissal of General MacArthur was probably prima
facie evidence of the fact that Washington would not
permit attacks across the Yalu, but of course both the
Moscow and Peking propaganda insisted that he was reai^





It is surprisingly difficult. . .to find processes in
human history which are truly mechanically latent
in the sense that they are quite if ident of any
image whicn a\d.y be held by tie people participating
in them.lt
C« The case for entry on the basis of
Russian orders
Until about the first of August, 1^50, the Chinese
Communists were apparently still thinking in terms of an
imminent assault on Taiwan, Their news stressed this point
continually, and the Korean issue was in the background. In
early July, Ambassador Panlkkar called on Mao Tse-tun^ and
after their conversation later reported to hi arnment
in New Delhi that the Chinese leader was treating Korea as
a "distant matter," and was concentrating on Taiwan's
future. ** An editorial in the Peking People '3 JPallff on
July 21st said that by
...actively preparing for the liberation of Taiwan,
we shall be giving efficient aid to the support
of Korea. 152
In early August, the emphasis was still on Taiwan, but a
more long-range view was indicated; a drawn out Korean War
was envisioned. World Culture commented!
A prolonged war of attrition will naturally increase
the difficulties of the Korean people but it will
increase the difficulties of the American imperialists
much more. 153
150. Kenneth E. Bouldint) , The Image (University of Michigan
Press, 1^56), p. 117.
151 • New York Times, July 15, -
152. Radio Fe'klnTTNCNA), July 22, 1950,
153. world Culture, XXII, No. 5, \% 5, 1950.

In a speech in • tgust, ciese Communist General
Jung Pei indicated a 3witch to range versus immediate
military plans:
The People's Liberation Army is making full preparation
for the battle to liberate Taiwan by building a powerful
Navy and Air Force...
W
As late as August 15th, the Korean War was still
described in the context of a foreign conflict. The
People's iaily editorial on the fifth annlver^ >f North
Korea's "liberation M said:
We joyously celebrate the victory that has been won
by the Korean people. . .nevertheless , the Korean
people must be fully aware that they still have many
difficulties ahead, and must prepare to meet and over-
come them. We believe the heroic Korean people have
all the necessary forces for overcoming any difficulties
.
1^p
A transition of propaganda themes started about mid-August,
however. 0;, August 20th, Chou En-lai sent a telegram to the
Secretary General of the United Nations in which he said;
Korea is China's neighbor. The Ci inese people cannot
but be concerned about the solution of the Korean
quest ion... i5o
Within a week, the Chinese Communist press had linked Korea's
problems with China.
The barbarous action of American imperialism and its
hangers-on in lnvadin^ Korea not only menaces peace in
Asia and the world in general but seriously threatens
the security of China in particular, .. .North Korea's
enemy is our enemy. North Korea's defense is our
defense. North Korea's victory is our victory. 157
154. Radio Peking, (NCfc ^at 4, I950 (italics inserted).
155. Ibid ., August 16, 1950 (italics Inserted).
156. IbTff. , August 21,
1^7. World Culture, XXII, No. 8, August 26, I

u3t, l a a very difficult month in h to
exactly pinpoint Communist trends. Many developments in
the United Nations ranks caused a flurry of comments that
tend to obscure bloc policy developments. General Macarthur^s
visit to Taiwan served to clarify the details of the United
States intentions in the strait. 1 3n leaving Taiwan in
early August he said:
...Taiwan, including the Pescadores islands, cannot
be subjected to armed attack.... It is my responsibility,
and I am determined to defend tt«*59
In about the second week of August, the arrival of United
States reinforcements in Korea caused a shift in the balance
of military power In ^outh Korea. c' On August 17th,
Ambassador Austin, United states representative in the United
Nations, indicated that the United states advocated forcifc
uniting Korea.
In spite of the diffusing effect of these develop-
ments, the Chinese Communist abrupt linking of their future
with the Korean War was plainly notable, and the timing
roughly coincided with rumors of a hi^h level 3ino-3oviet
conference. Pour Far Astern radio news sources (Karachi,
Taipei, Hong Kong, and Tokyo) reported the arrival of Vice
Premier Molotov in Peking:
156. He also apparently clarified the role of the Ct ineae
Nationalists, Their press indicated confusion about the
duration of the seventh Fleet's stay, U;elr rights with
regard to harassment, etc. before he arrived.
. Radio Peking (Chinese International Service), August 5>
1950,
160. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , op. cit., p. 71.
*l *» W 1—M.M llli-l I II I I III I — II I 111 1 - 1 ' I .1
.
- fmi I HMMM,
161. Ibid., p. bb.

Russian Kazan* x>ei ;ko, chief of fcl .let mission
in Tokyo shortly before the outbreak of the h
War was reported to be in Peking by Chinese newspapers
in Hon^ Kong,...i)erevyanko, Mao, Molotov, and a well
known Japanese communist are reporter ling abmt
usin^. Russian submarines and transport airplanes for
an invasion of Taiwan, Mao a&reed to delay, but was
displeased at his predicament. 1&2
On the laat day of September, the United states Far East
daily intelligence summary reported an alleged high-level
conference in fekino on August 14th, at which it had been
decided to provide 250,000 Chinese Communist troops for
service in Korea. -^3 a United States Department of Defense
release of December 15, 1-54 stated:
In August 195C.a Kremlin directive providing for this
Chinese Communist intervention was transmitted to
Pelplng from Moscow by Lieutenant General Kuzma Dere
yanko. On 14 August the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee approved the Kremlin action.*04
162. Radio Taipei (Voice of Free China), August 27* 19:
(Hon& Kong dateline). No confirmation of Molotov's trip
has been found. He might have been a logical emissa.
He had Communist prestige and was out of work at the
time, (His title of Vice Premier was largely honorary;
he haa been replaced as Foreign Minister after the
failure of the Berlin Blockade.) (Dallln, op. cit.,
p. J*) A&ence France Presse correspondent Fierre
Brlsard dismissed the report about Molotov as !1a fiction
of Rationalist propaganda from Taipei," but felt that
high level conferences were being conducted between the
Soviets, the Chinese Communists, and the North Koreans.
(Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op . cit ., p. Ib7.)
163. Appleman, 0£. cit., p. 75&T
164. hhitin^, China Crosses the Yalu , Q£. cit., p. lt>7. Yuri
a. Rastvorov ejt^Ueutenant woTonely mB who defected to
e United states in 19S>4 reported a conversation with
Colonel ryotr ahlbaev in March 1951 « Colonel iihibaev
had been in the Soviet ismbassy in Peking during August
1950 and said that it took a lot of argument to convince
Mao Tse-tua , that China had an interest in the Korean
War. "He said it was not a problem for the Chinese. But
Comrade Stalin continued to press him. ..the two of them
were firing stiffer and atiffer messages back and forth
between Peking and Moscow. Finally, after long argument

£• Finally , the case for reluc t
It is noteworthy that althoug) f©r t.
North Korean cause was advanced on the mainland tne
outset of the war, -^5 during the entire episode through
1953* only rarely did the China mainland press base their
allegiance on "comradely Communist brotherhooc In the
Chinese Communist press, Korea was a military theatre of
operations, not the home of the vanguard of International
Communism to the east. In addition, the Chinese Communists
gave every indication of viewing a prolonged war with
distaste, always qualifying the necessity for it with
166
remarks about the long-range benefits.
In summary, this hypothesis has heen defended by
evidence of a progression of apparently reluctant and pra
aatlc 171ilim* Communist moves. The exact details of the
story are not available 1 nor are they necessary to make the
hypothesis reasonable. The most logical sequence which can
they reached an agreement, but only after Stalin promised
China all kinds of aid." (Kastvorov, "Red Fraud and
Intrigue in the Par East," Life Magazine, o£. cit
.
) In
yj , the Chinese Communists published selected examples
of excesses by "anti-party" elements during the domestic
relaxation of the "Hundred Flowers" era. Among them
was a statement b^ General Lung-Ung, Vice Chairman of
the National Defense Committees "It is totally unfair
for the People»s Republic of China to pay all the




165. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 17$.
166. Whiting, ffilnaHJrossea the ^lu, o|>. cit., p. 129. Mao
Tse-tung in ±£47! "IvoIcTbaWIes of attrition, in which
the gains are not sufficient to make up the losses, or
in which sains merely balance losses..." (Mao Tee-tun
Turning F^int in China (New York: New Century Publishers,
1^4<5), p. 7. SriiTnai manuscript entitled Present Situa-




be constructed wit data a ole commences with the
Chinese C lists 1 normal precautionary7 redeployment
military forces following the United Nations * entry let
Korea. They initially retained forces in position
continue toward their primary ^oai of Taiwan, *hen United
States reinforcements turned the tide in Korea in early
august , 1 , was pressured by Kussia into makir
some sort of a commitment, probata indent on the United
states Army crossiri^ tne i>dth parallel. Troop movements
started a^ain in .September. l6? An effort was made to stop
the crossing of the parallel by warnings,*" Troops who
could have crossed the Yalu months before, as well as new
arrivals, then proceeded into North Korea, lo, ter the
time when they would have been most effective. -^ Once in
rta Korea j the ill -equipped Chinese Communist troops made
initial contact with the United Nations force . withdrew
for reasons unknown. They did not pass the "point of no
return" until late November, five months after the war
167. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu , og. cit
. , p.
168. The CommunTsts did not consider this crossing a fore-
gone conclusion, tea order to the North Korean Army
dated October l4th, 1 rom Kim II Sung, Commander in
Chief of the North Korean People *s Army stated in part:
"Other reasons that we have failed are that niany of us
felt that the thirty -eighth parallel would be as far as
the United States forces would attack..." (Appleman,
op. ci£.
, p. 765.)
169. Far East Command Intelligence ctober 2oth:
"...It would appear thftt the auspicious time for such
Chinese intervention has lon^ since passed; it is
difficult to believe that such a move, if planned, would
have been postponed to a time when remnant North Korean




A complete knowledge of the es of the Chinese
Communist leaders is not obtainable, but a combination of
Kussian influence and apprehension regardii Sir border
is indicate^.
As the North Koreans retreated, the iiuaaians undoubtedly
exerted strong pressure on the Chinese to step in to
prevent complete defeat. The Chinese themselves may
well have considered defeat of the North Korean regime
a threat to China's security. *71
HYPOTHESIS V
In January, 1^51, Soviet Hussla prevented Communist
China from accepting Korean peace terms that might
well have resulted in the eventual elimination to
two Pekl rievancea of present primary significances
United Kationa membership and the possession o£ Taiwan.
In December, 195Q* the Chinese Communists made their
sole appearance at the United Nations headquarters in New
York, in leaving town on December 16th, Peking's Ambassaa
Wu stated that Chinese troops would not withdraw from Korea
unless the United Nations troops withdrew, the United states
Navy left the Taiwan strait, and the Chinese People's
Republic was admitted to the United Nations. ^^ These condi-
tions were made formal in a telegram from Foreign Minister
Chou En-lal to the United Nations on December 22, 195
170. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, o£. cit., p. 117.
171. A. Doak Samett, "The Unite<Tl?Eates ancTCommuniat China,"
The United States and the Par gast , ed., William L.
•ftiorp, (New York: ""Columbia University Press, 1956),
p. 15C
172. London Tirea, December 18, 195
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. . .as a basis for negotiating far a peaceful settle-
ment of the Korean problem all for troops must be
withdrawn f* ^rea...the <*merica reaaion forces
must be withdrawn from Taiwan..*and the representatives
of the Peopled Republic hina tau©t obtain a legiti-
mate status in the United Nations. ..173
By early January, cease fire discussions in the
United Nations had polarized in the opposing views of Russia
and the United States. Endless arguments indicated that
Russia was not really serious about endin^ the war. 3ome
members, notably those of the British Commonwealth, were
hopeful, nevertheless. At the Prime Ministers* meeting in
London in early January they drafted a set of "Five Principles"
which they hoped would be agreeable to the Communists. The
United states privately approved this proposal;-^ it is
notable that the acceptance of the conditions of the
"Principles" still remains as the hl^h watermark of United
ites leniency in regard to Peking 1 s demands concerning
United illations membership and freedom of action in the
Taiwan strait, since the beginning of the Korean War. The
first four proposals had to do with the arrangements of the
cease fire; article 5 is quoted below:
As soon as agreement has been reached on a cease-fire
the General \aaembly shall set up an appropriate body
which shall Include representatives of the Governments
of the United Kingdom, the United State. .merica,
the Union of soviet Socialist Republics, and the
People's Republic of China with a view to the achieve-
ment of a settlement, in conformity with existing
173. Leland M. Goodrich, Korea, A. Study of U.S. Policy in the
United Natlona (New York: Council on Foreign ftelaCIons,
5&T7 p. Y
174. Ibid ., p. 161.
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international obligations ami the provisions of the
United Nations Charter, of Par Eastern problems, includ-
ing, am thera, those of Form id of representa-
tion of China in the United Nations. 175
At 3iOC P.M. on Thursday, January 21th, at a meeting
of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly,
Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada made the five conditions public.
Mr, Malik, the Soviet delegate, expressed chagrin because
"his delegation found itself in an unfavourable position
since, unlike some delegations, it had not been acquainted
with the principles prior to the meeting," 1 '" He thereupon
rejected the proposals out of hand because) (a) the Chinese
Communist government had not been represented in the
committee discussions, (b) the proposal contained no assurance
of the withdrawal of United States forces from Korea, and
(c) the proposals were in the nature of an ultimatum,''
Nevertheless, the proposals were submitted to Peki
for their consideration as a result of a majority rulin .
The Soviet press heartily applauded what were apparently
Mr. Malik's ad lib, excuses* no China mainland comment prior
to January 15th could be found. On the 16th, C! i-lai
sent a telegram to the United Nations declining the offer.
He repeated his conditions of December 22nd. Tire importance
of Chou iin-lai's belated reply can be appreciated only if one
175. Ibid ., p. 16
176. OnTted Nations, Official Record of the general Assembly
,
Fifth Session, First Committee, Summary ""Record of Meetings,




considers what was hanging in the balance: 1
(1) The matter of United states intentions vtgwrdll
the permanency of Seventh Fleet protection in the Taiwan
otrait. On August 31 , . President Truman announced
that it would not be necessary to keep the seventh Fleet in
the strait after the end oC the Korean War. He repeated
this intention in a broadcast on September 1, 1950 < More-
over, aa has been previously noted, there is reason to believe
that this policy had been anticipated on Mainland China.
Throughout 1950, the United States had insisted on connect-
ing the issues of Taiwan and Korea as part of the same problem,
Continual arguments in the United Nations occurred between
Russia and the United States over this point. Communist
China, with Russia's backing, had wanted to argue the cases
separately. In New York in late 1^50, Communist China's
Ambassador Wu was extremely indignant about a last minute
agenda change that linked United states "aggression" in
Taiwan (about which he had come from Peking to testify) wi
General MacArthur* s report of Chinese Communist entry into
the Korean War.
17b. "In accepting the "Five Principles" the United States
went a lon^ way toward accommodating j.ts position to
that of other members oi' the United Nations. In fact,
the Truman administration was subjected to strc.
criticism at home for so doing. It would seem that the
Peking government by falling to aceept these principles
as a basis for negotiation, missed a golden opportunlt
to achieve some of its political objectives... ' (Ooedrlch,
0£. Clt., p. 175.)
IJ?* New Ifork rimes , September 1, 1950.
18° • Itepartment of State Bulletin , September 11, 1950, p. 4Q7.
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mid-January* however, it would appear that there
was an obvious chance of the United States ing Its
position, considering the two theatres ox"* operation separate-
ly, continuing its seventh Fleet-Taiwan Strait patrol with
jr wii the Korean War, and moreover that this chance Mas
general knowledge. *** ^he policy change did not formally
coae about for several months, but perhaps it is not unreason-
able to assume that an astute politician (i.e., Stalin) could
have predicted the outcome, provided pressure was maintained
In Korea.
(Pronouncements of an official United states policy
change on this matter evolved as follows: On April 11,
51, President Truman removed General MacArthur from
all his commands. 1**2 The President immediately explained
. visit of 3enator Knowland to Taiwan in November was
reported by the Peking radio. He was quoted as saying
that the Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan would
Jeopardize the defense of the free world and be a threat
to the security of the United States. adio Pekir;
(NCbU), ^December 2, 1950.) A Peking press article made
mention of a remark reportedly made by United states
United Nations representative Cross in "January, 1951"
to the effect that the United States might reconsider
Jlr promise to leave Taiwan in the light of United
xtes security. (Ibid., February 8, 1951*) 'That
Communist occupation of Taiwan should be considered a
threat to United States security was an entirely differ-
ent concept than that held by the United States govern-
ment before the Korean war was confirmed by ex-Secretary
of state Acheaon in 1>^>8: ''Four times between 1 -.d
50 our highest military minorities concluded that
is proposition was not true and did not just!
American military action." ( New York Times, September 7,
.)
en fcirantin I correctness of Truman's views, hia
brutal treatment of a distinguished public servant was
a blunder of the first water. Z. ident mi&ht better
have shown the General the door rather than kicking hia
out of the fifth story window. Public opinion in
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his actio*. i televl. s the American people.
In reply to the i-residential a. o Policy Committee
the ^.ican Fartj Issued a statement, titer
points, It a»ikec. If Taiwan would be delivered up I
Peking. On April 13th, the Departmerv ite declared
that diplomatic recognition would be limited to the
Chinese Ma. .list government, that the United .States
would not diocuss the Japanese I freaty with Pek
a that the poll.. Neutralization" of Taiwan
remained unchanged. ^ On April 25th Mr. Acheson made
public an agreement between his government and that of
the Chinese Nationalists, .in exchange of notes had
taken place on January 30th and February 9th, 1951 that
provided for military aid for internal security arid
self-defense. 10^ on May 13th, Assistant secretary of
otate Bmmfl Husk made a speech before the China Institute
in Washington in which he said that the United states
would continue aid in support of the Nationalist Govern-
ment. l05 Finally, on June 2nd, the testimony of
secretary of ^tate Acheson at the MacArthur hearings
made the point absolutely clear and official: Taiwan
and Korea were considered two separate problems as far
America reacted hysterically in favor of the dethroned
idol, who returned to receive a hero's welcome.
(Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
People , Sixth edition (New YorkJ Appleton-Century^CroTts
,
Inc., lyjo), p. 823.)
• Survey , 1951, oj>. cit., p. 348.
184. Department TatiHBulletin, May 7, 19S>1 > P. 7^7.
185. Ibid., tfay ^,TE5T,"p7W7

as the United otatee government was cancernea.)
(2) The matter of Peking's le^, aitlon with regard
%9 Taiwan: The key to this dilemma, of course, revolved
about the arrangements of peace with Japan. A separate
Japanese peace with the West was a threat I -.wiunist
China's claims, l Hints of such a separate peace had been
in the international wind since 3 Further antagonism
of the United States was almost sure to complicate Peking's
problems; an article on this subject by Chou &n-lal was
printed in Pravda on February 14, Ij^l. 1
(3) The factor of Communist China's bad name should
the United Nations pass a resolution charging her with
aggression: That this was in the wind was certainly
secret on January 11, 3 . ^° The resolution was passed
February 1, 1^51.
Thus, it is possible in retrospect, to conceive that
by turning down the "Five Principles'' in January, 1J?1*
. MiliW , 0£, cit., Part 3* p* 1753.
.'. This thr materialized into one of the strongest
British -American arguments of the decade. Over British
objection, the United States insisted on excludin
.
Peking trim t:.e treat/. Later in a House of Commons
debate, the United states was charged with insist,
that Japan conclude a separate treaty with Taipei; this
insistence was held to be in violation of a prior United
xtes -British ai^reement. (Survey, 1952, o£. cit,,
pp, 356-357.) The legal status^of Taiwan Is still not
resolved.
188. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, op. cit., p. 37,
18^. Alberto FalcIoneXYT, ffusso -Chineae 'Relations after
Stalin's Death (1^53-1,-60), paper at the' 3rd International
3ovietolo&ical Conference, Japan, September, i960, p. 12,
19c. )n January 1, 1951* the Taipei Radio (in Japanese) spoke
of the 'prevalent rumor" that the United States was
planning to ask the United Nations for a resolution
branc otnmunlst China as an aggressor in Korea.

Communist China was knowir: . oeking the door behind her-
self. Farts or modifications of the three contingencies
might have befallen Peking even if they had accepted, thov
it would appear that the odds were against it. The important
points are two: first, by refusing the offer Communist
China completely removed the issues from the realm of
possible moderation, and second, she didn't have a choice,
Stalin gave her no option.
This argument requires ignoring the factor that is
traditionally cited as predominant in explanation of their
refusal j the Communists were on the march in Korea, and it
is unusual for a winner to accept a questionable peace.
This point is acknowledged, with reservations , The
1-1. It is possible to find other weaknesses in the position
that ascribes the refusal of the cease fire offer merely
to Communist military successes. In the first place,
the Communist offensive was about to come to an end. On
January 25th, the United Nations forces were pushi
northward again. Second are the cir inces surround-
ing still another cease fire offer submitted by the
ib~Asian states on January 24th. 'J he Yugoslav press
reported that the Arab -Asian offer was prompted by a
Chinese Communist appeal to Ambassador Panlkkar in
Pekin;;, probably without former clearance from Moscow.
The offer called for the conveni a seven nation
conference and required slightly more Western concession
than the "Five Principles." After its introduction in
the United Nations, the U.3.3.R. delayed without comment
for four days before finally voting for acceptance of
the proposal. % this time, it was possible to predict
at the United States would refuse it, which it did.
Secretary of State Acheaon had publicly said "the
Chinese Communists have no intention of phasing their
defiance of the United Nations" (department of State
Bulletin, January 29, 1j51, p. lo¥7T7~an'd both Houses
of the United States Congress had passed resolutions
for the United Mations 4 naming of Communist
China an aggressor (aurve t
. , p. 339).
The foregone conclusion of the United States refusal

exchange in the United Nations on January 11th is considered
jilj significant, | I point of view of
Pekir
an a post this episode it should be noted
that the turn of events did not e ormit Peking to hold
out. i conditions on which they based their refusal of
the "Five Principles" offer. As best can be determined with-
out access to the collets Communist press, demands for
^.nese Joamiunist United Nations membership and Tree access
to Taiwan disappeared from their statements as irrevocable
prerequisites to a Korean cease fire, In early Api
before the Soviet acceptance was noted by the Yugoslav
editorial: "It is. . .Interesting to note that in the
recent past, Moscow nas made use of every opportuni-
te a Stand ahead of China on al2 questions relati:
to China , while this time Moscow adopted the Chinese
stand without any clamour." (Review, of International
Affairs, II, No. 3, January 31* E5I, p. ~3'.T"
Jugoslav position on the Korean War was stated by
Foreign Minister aelj as follows: Against
the North Korean attack, United Na rvention,
Chinese Communist entr^' into the war, fch« United
were for Chinese Communist
membership in t nited .
)
articles which J be located in which the
United Nations and Taiwan demands aere clearly tied to
a Kor ease fire were broadcast in the press news
of the . Nftvon 2^th in the case of Coma .nina,
in thi let Home SOPVlfl /iprii 4th in the case
of BaoolO. Tbs ''twists and turns oi' historic evoiutic
must squeeze more data forth and "drop it into the hands
west" before the I Mwunlot policy
change can be reconstructed. Condi \ on the battle
line in Ko j not provide g ion for an
explanation. More promising is the fact that it occurred
Lms United States public announcements
started to indicate less less inclination to leave
the Tai.. .rait, regardless of the Korean War (see
above). The fact that It coincided with the dismissal
of Genera^ I that there war* later rumors




IVi) in the Far .it
time has Pt -d»
/The7 relationship between Peking bf ;
badly strained as Mao watched his crack troops bei
id white It mm .iin dec
to atart truce discueaion. 1
On June 23rd, Mr. Malik made a radio apeech in Hew York in
which he sate:
The Soviet peoplea believe that, as a first step,
isaions should be started between the belligerents
for a cease fire and an armistice providing for the.,
BUtual r forces free
Pekir teurree! La proposal. iwan and United
Nations raeobershlp were not mentioned. Armistice v. _a-
tiona *ere started immediately,
Conclu. may therefore be drawn that (a) Russia
wee calling the tune w^rS Ml fire neg (b)
their decisions dl Lways. wox*k out for the be. inese
Communist interests, anu (c) the Chinese were in a positi
to realise
Sino-3oviet .ions during the Korean conflict
lets « still a r . At times, Kuasian
&s . . i seesed p*
common communist fx t there were Instanesc in
i l*ati , it would appear,
befor jerlain,
•
-.* p« 3^3; MaeArthur ; I Uiatory
"(New i'Jrk: nu., 1^56), p. 3,;2), mi&hFTurther
..ate I n,
wee sharp* sti slatent
des&tnua s1 d abruptly in early Apr 1.
Rest* rov added; alin
:ered ti cut as long as possible."
*9*« United Nations Bulletin , XI, July 15, 1951* p. ^.

the ftusaiana failed to take complete advantage of
tactical opportunities favorable to them and made
only inconclusive gesturea toward advancing CI inese
interests. 1
HYPQTH££I3 VI
Stalin's death was the predominant factor
in the cessation of the Korean War,
This supposition is based on the striking difference
in the Soviet attitude toward Communist China before and
after Stalin's death and on an abrupt change of Communist
far Jsast foreign policy as soon as Kalenkov came to power
in March, 1953.
The record of dino-Soviet relations during the Korean
War period is rife with discontinuities. The aino-Soviet
agreements of February, lj$0 contained provision for "joint
tenancy" of Fort Arthur by both countries.-" Mi part of
• agreement, Russia was to vacate the port at the conclu-
sion of a treaty of peace with Japan— or on December 31*
52, whichever occurred first.
Chou j£n»lai and a party of diplomats flew to Moscow
in the autumn of 1952. i^' After discussions, Chou presented
. Boorman, gj>. cit., p. 14.
196. Charles B. Mclane, ^The Moscow-Peking Alliance: The
First Decade," Current History, December, 1959* P. 329.
197. Harrison Salisbury observed that the Chinese party was
treated in an extremely off-hand manner in Moscow. At
a Russian reception where Chou En-lai was being feted,
the other Oi inese were relegated to an outside room
where a very Junior Russian diplomat greeted them and
then vanished even before the toasts began, (Salisbury,
op. cit., p. 3C7.)

83
a note "polite to the point of hypocrisy ni^° in which the
Chinese government "requested" the Soviet government to agree
to postpone the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Chinese
seaport. Great care was taken to publish the fact that this
was a Chinese request, and not a Soviet inspired idea. 1
The "request" was approved by Russia, and the exchange of
notes was made part of the agreements of 1950. These notes
provided that Soviet troops would continue to occupy the
port until a peace treaty was concluded between the Communists
and Japan, regardless of the date. 200
Liu Shao-chi had gone with Chou En~lai, and remained
to represent Peking at the 19th Party Congress in October.
He stayed until mid-January, 1953. Liu Shao-chi was then an
important Communist theoretician, and a member of the Chinese
Politburo. Upon return after his long stay, he was met in
Peking at the airport by virtually the entire membership of
the Politburo, yet no announcement was ever made that would
give a hint of the purpose or results of his mission. HThQ
visit was, and remains, an enigma."
In the early 1^50's, the Chinese Communists were
facing financial trouble. They had had to pay the major
portion of the bill for the Korean War, 202 for which they
. Dallin, op_, cit., p. 193.
1^9. Boorman, op . cit . , p. 11.
20C. Radio Peking PICHA), September 16, 1952. Khrushchev and
Bulganin visited Peking after Stalin's death and signed
agreements calling for the departure of Soviet troops
even though a Communist-Japan peace treaty had not been
concluded (see below).
201. Boorman, op. cit
., p. 13.
202. Barnett, Communist China and Asia, oj>. cit ., p. 3^6.

had apparently not budgeted, and had announced the beginning
of their first Five Year Plan in early 1953 « Mot until
after the death of Stalin was the receipt of Soviet economic
aid announced; published details of the scope of the Plan
were accordingly delayed until the autumn of 1953.
It is very possible that Stalin was not enthusiastic
about the Chinese desire to shift their own efforts
and the Soviet aid away from the war in Korea, where
the fighting tied down a sizeable proportion or the
best's forces, to economic development in
China, where industrialization would in time probably
raise China's status within the Soviet Bloc-
Peking's displeasure with the Korean stalemate can
be deduced froa evidence other than financial need. By
-:, trie only major obstruction to the establishment oV a
truce agreement in the talks at Panmunjom was the prisoner
of war issue. In November of that year, the Indian govern
-
ment privately contacted Peking and Pyongyang and presented a
prisoner proposal. Prime Minister Nehru later told the
House of the People that "China's reaction. ..was not dis-
approval." The proposal was then made public, and intro-
duced at the United Nations. Soviet representative Vyshinsky,
presuming to speak for China and North Korea, rejected the
plan outright. Four days later, Chou &n-lai announced that
he would accept only the Soviet truce plan. China obviously
did not dare swerve from Russian policy, and that policy was
to keep fighting in Korea. No Chinese Communist relaxation
of pressure against the West was permitted. In the same year
I, Barnett, "The United States and Communist China," o£. cit.
2C4. Tallin, ofc. cit., p. 6

52, 1 ia'a Tito observed:
-titudes of Western powers toward the
Chinese revolution, since its very be^innln^, are
:aw China to subordinate itself to the Soviet
r^rei^n policy. .. .Tne Russians have masterfully taken
ac the Korean case ty pull China to their
side* 20?
Before staling death, action had been pending on
healthy prisoners of war, sick and wounded prisoners o£ war,
and on British civilians detained in Jl -rth Korea, After
his demise on March 5, 1953* almost immediately , "the
severe tension that had prevailed on the eve of Stalin's
death turned into its opposite." On March 15th, new
Chairman of the Council of Ministers Malenkov told the
Supreme Soviet:
At the present time there is no disputed or unresolved
question that cannot be settled peacefully by mituai
agreement of the interested countries. This applies
to our relations with all states, including the United
States of America. 20 '
On March 18th, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov contacted
Prime Minister Sden and promised "favorable consideration"
on the request for the release of the British subjects in
Korea. On March 28th, China and North Korea accepted a
February proposal of the United States concerning the
exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war. Four
days after returning from Stalin's funeral, Chou Jbxj-lai put
forward a new proposal for the consideration of the previously
205. Dedijer, 0£. cit., p. 434.
206. Dallin, o£. cit ., p. 12
. Moscow Kadio~TSaviet Home service), March 16, 1953.
llin, o£. cit., p. 126.

interrupted Panraun. healthy prisoners. Molotov
at tnd supported it. 2^-"* In essence, Chou's
proposal on prisoners was almost identical to a United Nations
proposal which the Communists had rejected only three months
before>
This is not to say that the problems were over at
Panmunjom. Arguments over the prisoner exchange and post-
war political conference continued until the armistice in
July, and afterward. The American delegate, Mr. Art Data*
finally left in disgust -ecember, 1953*2 I« spite of
the Communist -inspired diplomatic confusion, however, from
the time fbOtt ^n-lai returned from Stalin's funeral it was
obvious that Peking was determined to stop the war. Events
.it (t ir previous standards) would have been justifica-
tion for ceasing negotiations, didn't deter them.
• New y?rk Times, April 2, 1953 « "The first major inter
-
national SeveTopments of ,rly post -Stalin period
had not yet, as far as is known, provoked profound dis-
agreements tcong the Part *ders . Dn the question of
the urgent need to bring the Korean War to a close t
government acted with a rapidity that would not have been
possible otherwise." (flallin, oj>. cit., p. 219.)
210. Boorman, o$>. cit., p. 16. PawelMonaT, Polish Military
Attache to Peking during the Korean War period: "I
think it was the death of Stalin on Marc. 53, that
finally brought the war to an end." (Pawel Monat,
"Russians in Korea: The Hidden Bosses," Life Magazine
,
June 27, I960, p. 103.)
til. While the matter ot a political conference after the war
was under discussion at Faniaunjora in February, 1952, the
Chinese negotiators had proposed that the subject to be
jed be peaceful settlement in Korea "et cetera"
(i.e., Taiwan and U.N. membership). The United Nations
negotiators insisted that no matters should be . the
^sed agenda that L^ad to do with affairs "outside
The Chinese Communists reluctantly accepted this
provision two days later, (purvey, 1-j52, op . cit.,
P. 309.)

On Jane loth, under orders from President Rhee, South
Korean guards allowed a mass escape or approximately 00
prisoners from four main camps.2i2 On July 16th, more than
nationalist Cr inese from Taiwan and Quemoy attempt
to invade Tungshan Island, off the mainland coast. The
peace negotiations continued, and on July 27th, the Korean
Mar was over.
Khrushchev is reported to have said in Warsaw in 1956
that before his death, 3talin had strained Sino-Soviet rela-
tions almost to the breaking point. ^ The Korean War could
certainly be evaluated as a major focal point of tension.
To Mao Tse-tung, it Might well be remembered not only as a
214
cause of near financial ruination, but an episode in
which Communis"* China lost the territory they deemed most
vital. Peter Calvocoressi has written:
It is true that the Korean War started as a war between
Koreans and that the first foreign intervention took
the form of intervention by the United Nations in defense
of a rule of international behavior, but before many
months had passed a second foreign intervention— by
China— had converted the war into a 3ino-American one.
In which the principal combatants were more intent on
denying to one another a particular piece of territory
(Korea) than in upholding a general principle. .. .For
it was not Korea. . .but Formosa which the antagonists
deemed vital— the U. for reasons of defense, and
China for reasons of self-satisfaction. Korea settled
nothing between the B #S< . and China, because it made no
difference to the position of either in relation to
Formosa . 2i3
212 > ^wrvey * 1^33 > 2£. £*£•# p. 207.
213. Rew York Times, June 4, 1956,
>. Boorman, op. cit,, p. 17.
215. Survey , 1^, og. cit., p. 6.

CHAPTiaft III
THE £ 30VIKT POLICY TRANSITION
UNFINISHED 3U3IM, BOMB A RJ3GR&TTABL& SITUATION
The hypotheses advanced thus far depict a subordinate
Mao Tse-tung, obliged to sacrifice the attainment of his
most prized immediate goals as he aelflessly followed the
tactical signals of Stalin, who directed International
Communist strategy on the game board of world politics.
Although there was a deep-rooted idea si rivalry
between Mao and Stalin, stemming in part from Mao's insistence
on the uniqueness of China,
If any Chinese Communist, who Is part of the Chinese
people and their flesh and blood, talks about Marxism
without regard to the peculiarities of China, his
must be only academic, empty Marxism. /$Aa.o Tse-tun^
If Leninism were nothing more than an application of
Marxism to the special environment in Russia, Leninism
would be purely a one-nation ideology and nothing more than
that.... We know, however, that Leninism is an international
ideology with roots In the International developments as
a whole, ^Stalin/^
2.
The degree of personal emotional involvement of Mao Tse-
tung in the events of 1927*1933 is of course not known.
It is known that he lost two wives, a sister, and two
brothers in the revolution on the mainland, and a son in
Korea. (Ullmann, loc. cit.
)
Masamichi Inoki, Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's Ideology
(similarities and Differences), paper at the 3rd Inter-
national Sovie€oTo£IcaT Conference, Japan, September, 1,

ore is also a case for Mao Tae-tung's realization that
the success of Communism in China rested on his restraining
himself within the framework of International Communist
discipline. In , when Soviet aid was heavily favor
l
the Kuomintant,, Mao rationalised the situation by notir;
...the aid from the .Soviet Union is an absolutely
indespensable condition for China's final victory
in the war of resistance. Refuse So /let aid and the
resolution will fall.
3
He frequently referred to the leadership of 1 vlet
Union t
The ^reat peace camp, headed by the Soviet Union,
is invincible. /$&o Tse-tun£, 19517
On Stalin^ death, Mao confirmed his devotion to the cause
in a junior status?
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a part
personally reared by Lenin and Stalin, It is the
st advanced, the most experienced, and the most
theoretically cultivated party in the world. This
party has been and is our model both in the past and
at present and will still be our model in the future.
5
To believe all the previous hypotheses, one does not
have to assume that Stalin was operating as a power-mad
politician, trying to establish a perimeter of Western
containment around China, the future foe of Russia. It is
possible to assume this, to be sure, but it is also possible
to assume that he was doing what he felt was best for the
3. Mao Tse-tung, On New Ijemocracy , op. c i
t
. , p. 3
I. Moscow iUdio (soviet Kome service)*, February 10, 1^52.
£* «ao Tse-tunfc, The Greatest Friendship , Radio Peking (NCNh),
March lo, 1953. David Dallin notes, however, that "...in
no case was the exaltation of Stalin ^fter his death/
as hypocritical as it was in the case of China, and the
leadership of both governments was well aware of this."
(Tallin, 0£. cit. , p. I

Communist cause In the lon^ ran. He could have been restrain-
ing Cnina to make them more dependent on Moscow, and thereby
avoid an early split o£ the bloc. He could have been invol
ing a principle o? Lenin, by using the Taiwan issue as a
medium of spreading discontent within the non-communist world,
''necessarily, thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skill-
fully taking advantage of every, even the smallest 'rift*
among the enemies. ** He could alao nave oeen trying to delay
the emergence in international circles of a pugnacious and
somewhat embarrassing tit that would bring discredit to
aucxdiidta before she matured. gitalin could have perhaps
justii'Acu nis .actions on the basis of a combination of the
three. The point is, a case can be made for the idea that
before his death, Stalin could have given the Cninese an
"ideological ' rationale for his actions that would have
implied that they would be allowed to recover their losses
in due course.
6. The restrictions on western exports to Cnina, imposed at
the time of the Korean war ana retained largely in defer-
ence to American opinion, were more stringent than those
regarding exports to the Soviet Union, through which
China could get many oV the t$oods in question. The Soviet
Union thus acquired supplier status. ( Purvey , 19§5-1J3§*
op . cit., footnote, p. B.)
7. V. I. 'Lenin, Left Wing Communism, ;*n Ijuantlle rder
(Moscow: Foreign Languages" Publishing House, p7 1.
No issue in the early 1950's made so great a threat to
United States -British relations. Communist China's
rapprochement nith the "neutralist" ^roup was heavily
influenced by iouth Asian (particularly Nehru) sympathy
for i-ekln&'s Taiwan cause.
8. Prow an ideological article b# Chen Chia-kang in 1^50:
..our attitude toward the imperialist camp is one
hatred, not fear." (Radio Peking (NCNA), October 7, 1J50.)
Khrushchev, in \jok (speaking of J. F. Dulles, but the
remark could have had other significance): "Blind hatred




The Taiwan issue <aust certainly have been discussed
at length during the- Moscow visit of Chou Jin-lai and
t prolonged o -ao-chi. fcfter \mX
"requested 11 the extension o£ Soviet residence in Port Arthur,
his speeches made frequent reference to the personal greatness
of Stalin. In his farewell address at the Moscow airport he
stressed*
The talks. . .with the personal participation of Comrade
Stalin, were successfully ~concludec;
.
At his Soviet Army flay address to Russian troops at Dalren
in February, 2.993* ne closed by sayin
Long live the great Comrade Stalin, the most respected
and beloved friend of the Chinese people, the leader
and teacher of the toiling peoples throughout the
world, and the standard bearer of world peace. *0
This "loyalty * in the face of sacrifice was probably
partly sincere, and partly feigned, just as Staling motives
were probably to forward simultaneously World Communism, the
security of the U.3.S.K., and his personal power. To Stalin
these goals were not mutually exclusive; they were the
essence of what had started his pragmatic fight for power in
the early 1920's and with success had gained stature under
the concept of "Socialism in One Country." In his last >r
address, five months before his death, he expressed his view
of China's current position in the Communist order. From
the civil war of 1917 through World Viar II, Russia had stood
as the "shock brigade"; now they could devote their attention
. .Moscow Radio (soviet Home Service), September 23, 1952
(italics inserted),
fladio Peking (NCNA), February 23, 1952.

to other forms of advancement while the neophytes took over
this responsibility:
It was very hard to live up to this hor> le role. But
this time has passed. Now from China and Korea to
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, new "shock brigades" have
appeared in the form of the People*s iJemocraeies ; it
has become easier for our party to struggle, and the
work haB become merrier. **
km Jan F. Trlska has written:
To otalin, the Socialist "allies" of the Soviet Union
in Europe and Asia were indeed satellites orbiting
around and dependent upon the Soviet Union. Their
sole purpose was to serve the U.3.3.H., which by then
had highly developed socialism* in order to strengthen
it further. Under the old "socialism in one country M
slogan, this was a legitimate and proper view: To
milk their economies, to subordinate their politics
and to rearrange their social systems to fit their
new role was imperative for the satellites as long as
the Soviet "socialism in one country" precept was
valid. 12
11. Dallln, op. cit., p. 12. i*lr. iiallin concluded thai in
the heated discussion that took place abroad in those
days as to whether .Stalin wanted war or peace, both sides
were ri^ht: .Stalin wanted Korean-type limited and pro-
tracted wars with the United states, and peace for the
jviet Union assured. (Dallin, og, cit., p. 61.) When
the Chinese Communists entered the Korean »iar, Qeneral
MacArthur proposed bombing the supporting facilities in
China, limiting even this action to conventional weapons.
(MacArthur address to Philippine Congress in 196l, Time
Magazine, July 1^, 1961, p. 23.) Secretary of &tate
Acheson believed that if the United states dropped bombs
in Manchuria, Russia would enter the war. (Truman* op
.
cit., p. 3&7.) Implicit in Stalin's above statement and
Mr. Balling interpretation is the probability that
Mr. Acheson *s estimate of the situation was incorrect.
12. Triska, op_. cit., p. 11. Edward Crankshaw: "We shall
never know what the mature Stalin thought about Communism
in the secret corridors of his mind: all we know is that
publicly he used it, with perfect cynicism, as an instru-
ment of power— as the Czars had used Christianity j as
the early traders had used beads, bri&ht cloth, and fire-
water.'' (Crankshaw, "Russia's Imperial Design," Readings
in Russian Foreign Policy , op. cit
. , p. 712.)

In a sense, the event© or history overtook the
phi_ Lch had made Stalin successful. In his later
years, techno, al progress in atomic weapons was changi
the rules of profitable international struggle. *3 Moreover,
success of the post-war spread of jnism had introduced
new factors that made Stalinist tactics self-destr. in
the lon^ run. The great accumulation of satellite appendages
of such raw power and potential social pressure, continually
subjected to economic and political sacrifice, would in ti«e
produce first impoverished dependents, and possibly In due
time, mutinous reaction. In the womb of Stalin's social
order were throwing the seeds of its own destruction.
It was ultimately left to Niklta Khrushchev to readjust
the Communist bloc to contemporary reality. This was not
accomplished by the emergence of an all-seeing philosopher-
kin«s who suddenly proclaimed the new a e of 'socialism in One
Region." Although this thesis contends that as far as
Communist China was concerned, the "new Russia" was born in
January, 1953, the transition was (and still is belm;,)
sporadically accomplished by a torturous route under the
pragmatic pressure of events. History forced the major
reversals in the years between Stalin^ death and the meeting
13. Stalin was not oblivious to this, of course. He stressed
his version of a "coexistence. the year before
he died. Acknowledging a probloa is one thi
the habits o!l a lifetime of success is another. He is
said not to have considered atomic weapons in terms of
altering the course of history • (H. 3. Dinsrstein,




of the Twentieth Congress of February, 1956. At that affair,
Khrushchev merely documented his acknowledgement of the new
reality i in his later years, 3talin had become a crotchety
abrasion in the machinery of forward-looking International
Communism ; the nuclear age had indeed changed the institutional
rules of international struggle, total wars could no longer
realistically be considered inevitable (by Russia at least);
and he who would not acknowledge the rationality of turning
to parliamentary revolution was indeed adventuristic.*^
Communist China, as the following documentation will
indicate, was the loser on the Taiwan issue again as the
new age dawned. She certainly had hope, and perhaps even
a promise, that ultimately her time would come. In the mean-
time, she had grafted the successful completion of her
domestic revolutionary struggle to Taiwan, perhaps out of
frustration, and perhaps for emphasis. This view was not
wholeheartedly endorsed in the U.S.S.R.
Speech by Chang Kuo-chun (July 2, 1990)
I
We fully support the June 28th statement of our
Foreign Minister, Chou £fc-lai on the position of the
Chinese People 1 a Government of China. The statement
points out that the Chinese people must liberate
Taiwan and Tibet because these territories belong to
the Chinese people. *5
14. "...During the Korean War, Stalin's.. .well known persist-
ence was becoming sheer stubbornness; his earlier politi-
cal flexibility was giving way to political sclerosis."
(Dallin, 0£. clt, , p. 110.) Roderick MacFarquhar de-
scribes the major controversial points of Khrushchev^
speech as the defamation of Stalin, the denial of the
inevitability of war, and the acceptance of the introduc-
tion of socialism by parliamentary means. (MacFarquhar
in The Slno-Soviet Dispute , op. clt
. , pp. 39-40.) Stalin
never denied the Inevitability of capitalist vs.
capitalist wars.
15. Radio Peking (Chinese International Service), July 3> 195C
*
iet itew Times (Moscow) (J )l
llfewnfctlon of China, except Tor Tibet, is completed. 1"
-Icij. address ( ./ r 3c, ,•
:
m stru^le between the ople and tne permanent
Kuomintang reactionaries has not coat to an end.*?
Moscow Kadio (to southeast *aia) (November 21, 1950):
The Chinese people, who, guided by their glorious
communist Partj and their leader, Mao Cs**tuns# have
routed the Kuomintang and liberated the som
e imperialist enslavement ai xnese




Nevertheless, in the months after Stalin's death,
there must have been at least a flicker the
Russians would consider Taiwan a .iabie debt, hy the
tine tne check was presented at tie window, however , caution
was obviously the better part of honor, the company was under
new management, and the books were considered clear. 1 - China's
"unfinished business had become Kussia's "re&rettable situa-
tion. " That is where the taatter still si in
16. Dallin, op_. cit.
, p. 81.
17. iiadlo Fekin^tNCNn), October 3,
18. Moscow Radio (Soviet Far ^ast Service), November 21
j
1^. perhaps it is repeated experiences of this kind that
ntribute to wha j! Lindsay describes as a
deterioration of Peking's reasonableness. In 1055
he wrote that on such matters as coexistence it was
difficult to tell whether they were: (a) not sincere,
or (b) sincere, but disordered as tho
in 'a psychopathic state of emotional and intellect;
confusion which makes them incapat - actl
rationally..." (Lindsay, oj>. cit., p. 4.)

HWOTH&ilS VII
Communist China was Introduced to the new institu-
tional rules of the United otates-tJ. t. standoff
of the post-otalin period in a particularly painful
way. Taiwan was the issue , and in Chinese eyes,
Khrushchev could be seen as the villain.
Whether in deference to a prior commitment, or in an
effort to appease a wronged and growir ipatriot, Russian
encouragement and assistance helped China build on her
Korea-born reputation as a world military power to make
tremendous gains in international prestige between the
death of Stalin and the autumn of 195^.
Chou Sn-lal was permitted to march alongside the
Soviet leaders at Stalin's funeral; he was the only repre-
sentative from outside the U.i.5.R. borders to be so honored.
There was more subtle evidence of Russian deference to China.
On February 14, 195* Malenkov, Khrushchev, et al. , attended
a reception at the Chinese embassy in Moscow in honor of
their treaty anniversary. The Chinese Ambassador wasn't
even in town. Two weeks later, the same Russian assemblage
attended a banquet for the editor of the Peking People's
Daily ; the editor was not even a member of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
On the diplomatic level, Russian collaboration was
even snore pronounced. The 0*3 tried to persuade the
Western powers to invite a representative of Communist China
. McLane, 0£. cit
. , p. 329,

to a Foreign Ministers • conference held in Berlin in early
4. 21 This attempt Tailed, but at Berlin, Molotov again
tried to raise Peking's diplomatic stature by making tnam
an "inviting* power at a proposed Geneva Conference to be
held in the spring of 195** to discuss the twin Far Eastern
issues of the still unsettled Korean political problems, and
the mounting Southeast Asia crisis. 22 The United States
wanted to make them "invited," i.e., not a sponsor but as a
defendent, "to account tetore the bar of world opinion.
"
23
A compromise was worked out whereby the Berlin Conference
as a body sent them an invitation "without the implication
of diplomatic recognition." The implementation of the new
Russian attitude was indicated in a speech to the Supreme
jovlet by Chairman Kalenkov on April 26, 1954,
The fact that the inviolable friendship between the
Viet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and I
People's Democracies has become confirmed over a
tremendous part of the gloBe is exerting ^reat influence **
on the whole contemporary international state of affairs.
At Geneva, Chou isn-lal's prestige soared. In a flush
of self-confidence, he told the United States Secretary
iitate (whose plans for resolution of the Southeast Asia
crisis had gone awry) "It should be clear to the United states
delegate that...^/the U.S.7 cannot hope to achieve at the
conference table what it failed to achieve on the battlefield. !l2 -
. Jallin, o£. cit., p. 131.
22. Ibid
., p. 13
23- Ibid". , p. 1^3 (J. F. Dulles quoted).
24. Boorman, op. cit., p. 19 (italics inserted).
25. Moscow Hadio JISss), April 26, 1954.

In fact, there wa«s reason to believ ,t ttuaaia's inatten-
tion to detail, possibly due to a brewing internal power
struggle, was placing her in danger of losi ntrol of her
risin^ star.
China's role in the events of the period (all three of
the occasions mentioned by Mr. Dulles in his "brink of
war" interview were occasions of conflict China)
suggested another and perhaps more reliable distinguish-
ing mark of a great power than status at a conference:
that it is dangerous to other great powers .. .China was
treated with a quite conspicuous degree of respect by
the U.J.o.Ji. during the year. This was the case at
the Geneva Conference , where Mr. Chou *sn-lai appeared
to be by no means inferior to Mr. Molotov in the formu-
lation llcy— probably the moat important meeting of
the conference, a private talk between M. Mendes-France
and Mr. took place after Mr. Molotov had returned
to the U.o.S.h. for the recess... 20
Moreover, Chou En-lai used the recess at Geneva t
sake a sweeping trip through India, Burma, and North Vietnam.
On his return to Geneva he said:
The government of the People's Republic of China believes
that the nations of Asia should It among, themselves
with a view to assuming mutual obligations providing; for
joint measures to safeguard peace and security in Asla.^7
He had established ties with what became known as the
"neutralist" group that exist to this day, under the banner
of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." 2^
26* Survey , 1^4, op. cit . , p. 2, Chou hii-lai's growir.
assurance was obvious after his Geneva success. At a
Moscow banquet he was heard to make flippant remarks to
his Russian hosts as he chided them for not apeaki
Chinese. In speaking of the Hussians ' language deficiency
he reportedly told Mikoyan and Ka&anovich There's no
excuse for you people." ilisbury, oj>. cit., p. 307.)
Dallin, 0£. cit., p. 157 (italics inserteciyr
. The gradual shift of Chinese Communist policy toward
affiliation with the "neutrals'* is notable. In 1
Mao Tse-tung had denied that there could be a "third
road,* i.e., that ail must choose between "imperialism

I triumphant return to Peking, with
appropriate pro.. buildup by the Peking press and public
speeches I .nitaries, he launched a massive effort I
capture Taiwan.
People's Daily (July 23, 195*0:
The Chinese people once more declare to the whole world
that Taiwan is China* s territory and they are determined
to liberate it. They will never stop 11 their aim
is achieved.
People's Daily (July 25, 195%)
I
The Washin adventurists are aware of t ct that
the Chinese people have t to meet any
challenge . 30
General Chu Te's Army Day address (August 1, 1954)
t
As we ^reet this glorious anniversary this year, we
can never forget that an inseparable part of our sacred
territory, Taiwan, is not yet liberated. .. .The Chinese
people shall liberate Taiwan.... So long as the Chiar
brigands are not completely wiped out, so long as
Taiwan is not liberated, our task of liberating the
whole of China cannot be considered completed, 31
or socialism" ( !5one must lean to one side"). As early
as April, 1951, however, he offered India foodstuffs in
famine relief. This was followed by Chinese "goodwill
"
missions in October, 1951. (Survey, 1951 , op. £it,, p. 376.)
The origin ot the unexceptional sentiments of the Five
Principles" (which have ties with the ancient Buddhist
principle of Paneh Shila) was the preamble of an Indian-
Chinese agreement on trade signed by Chang Han-fu, Chou's
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the latter was at
Geneva. (Survey, 135ft, ?J>. Olt.j p. 244.) 3y the I96C3
ssia and China, appeared to be competing for favor among
the "neutrals," but at times China's new interest to the
south has possibly worked to Russia's advantage. Success
in this field night be seen to have provided Communist
China with a "sop" for their 1955 frustration over Taiwan
(see below).
. Radio Peking (NCHA), July 24, 19$4.
, Ibid., July 26, 195*#
31. IBTg., August i, 1954.

1<
Chou £n-lai*s address to the 33rci session of the Chinese
People's Government council (August 11, 1954):
The t now before us are
.
on the liberation of Taiwan so as to safeguard China's
-
sitorial inte ....The people of
China and the People's Libera tie< ,/ must redouble
their efforts in every field, heighten their diligence,
avoid the pi jert, overcotae all difficulties,
ancTst.. fulfilli mi
>rious task of liber. Taiwan.
3
2
; 3eptember 1st, a preliminary draft of the United
.tes -Nationalist China Mutual Defense Treaty was presented
in Taipei. 33 gggj portion of the eventual
between the two governments pledged the United States I
"act to meet I oimoon danger in h its
const it utional processes'* in si .iwan
or the r- ires. The agreerae
the ext. r of this "tr to such *Oth*r terri-
tories" fc be determined by mutual agreement. It
appeared that I or would still be open for the .onalist
forces, :ir known desire to attack the mainland, to
32. Ibid., August 13, 1954 (italics inserted).
33. Hans for this treaty were well known. It had been
osted by the Nationalists in £ J. 1chard
P. Stebbins, The United states in World Affairs , 19i?4
(New York s Harper and' Brothers, itJ5o"7, p. §787) a
remark bj President Eisenhower in July 1954 About its
preparation had bi -iy noted on mainland China. (Radio
Peking (MCWA), July 24, 1954,)
34. Taipei press excerpts:
3tateaent of Mae. Chiang Kai-shek, ml
MaeArthur's dismissal: ,5 I am slad to hear the Importance
ask at the Coma <-Pi>ly bases has been
realized. .. .T; inander on the spot knows better than
oae away from the field of conflict what must be done,
and when decisions must be made." (Radio Taipei (Sadlo
Free China), April 6, 1953.)
Haln 3hen .Daily News, March 17, 1954 I ie policy of

to
complicate matters considerably. 35 The Mutual Defense
Treaty in turn opened the possibilit 3ome embarrass!
treaty commitmenta Tor Russia. Russia was allied with main-
land Ci.ina against Japan or any ally thereof. The United
ates and Japan had signed a security Pact in 1951. It
looked as though the "two Chinas" had the makings of some
strong legal cases to involve their respective allies to the
resolution of their perfect hate. 3° The sophisticated equip-
ment required for amphibious warfare, given the currently
rejuvenated Nationalist China and the complication of t
Seventh Fleet, made each powerless to effectively strike
the other without naval assistance from their powerful friends
(United states and Russia). In September, 193^ > a continuous
retaliation stated by Mr. Dulles seems to be similar to
the old containment policy in essence. .. .We would like
to call Mr. Dulles* attention to the fact that the policy
of containment as advocated by the former Truman adminis-
tration should not be repeated. 1* (Ibid., March 18, 195*.)
President Chiang Kai-shek, January 1, 1935s "Again and
again I have told you that freedom can be won only at the
cost of our lives, and that our lost territory can be
recovered only at the price of flesh and blood. Whether
our country is to survive or perish, whether our counter-
attack is to succeed or fail, will depend on the degree
of our efforts and the firmness of our determination."
(Ibid., January 1, 1955*)
35. That the United 3tates was reluctant to have this happen
was clear. The "unleashing" of Chiang, which was one of
the first acts of the new President Eisenhower, when
accompanied by tdmlral Carney's announcement in Taipei
in December, 1^53 # tfcftt United States military aid would
not include landing craft, was, in fact, tacit admission
of the hopelessness of their mainland cause.
36. Their areas of conflict ranged all the way from war to
pin^ pong. "The all China Athletic Federation has
protested to the Table Tennis Federation of Asia against
Kuomlntang participation in the 2nd Asia Table Tennis
Championship." (Radio Peking (NCNA), September 11, 1933.)

102
bombardment of *ue;r>oy island was commenced. Chinese
Nationalist harassing raids increased in tempo. Jn .September
.h, Khrushchev and Bui^anln arrived in Pekir
It is known that during this visit, Russia made many
concessions to Peking. Khrushchev a&reed to withdraw Soviet
troops from Port Arthur by the end of the year, even though
Chou'a a-;reement with Stalin in 1952 provided for their stay
until both Communist countries had raade 'peace ! with Japan.
Russian rights regarding stock companies in oil, non-ferrous
metals, shipping, and civil airlines which had been estab-
lished by Mao Tse-tun&'s agreement with Stalin in 1950 were
abruptly terminated, even though they were to have existed
for 30 years. 37 ^1 vestiges of pro-Soviet "autonomous"
areas in Iflanchuria were terminated. ^ It may also be pre-
sumed that even the lino lovlot Joint declaration on peaceful
coexistence which was prepared during the visit reflected
Russian concessions, aven though this has been known as the
high water mark in agreement on 'coexistence" in this period,^
it contained qualifying phrases about peace in the Far Kast,
specifically regarding Taiwan. The details of undoubted
37. Whiting, Conflict Resolution In the Slno-Soviet Alliance,
ioc cit.
. Dallin, o£. cit., p. 43c.
3.. Kenzo Ki&a, The Binding and Disuniting Elements Between
China and the Soviet union,"" paper at the 3rd International
iotfietolofcical tfonTerence, Japan, September, 19
4c. "The soviet Union and the Chinese People *s Republic will
continue to build their relations with countries o£: Asia
and the Pacific, as well as other countries, on the basis
of...uiutuai nonaggresalon, ..and peaceful coexistence....
Direct acts of aggression committed by the United States
.uard the Chinese People *s Republic and the continued
occupation /of/ Taiwan...are incompatible with the tasks

1C
discussion about Russian military support in the Taiwan
Strait are not known. Slno-Soviet scholar Alberto Faicionelli
has written: "...the Chinese had asked Khrushchev for active,
effectual help, with all easily foreseeable consequences, in
the Formosa situation. Khrushchev had promised his help...
because failure to do so would have meant further and
irreparable loss of prestige for Russia... *
It is not considered necessary to go this far to make
the point. Documentation indicates little probability of
Khrushchev having refused help, and even this is significant
when one considers the fact that at the time of the Peking
visit, Khrushchev was already the de facto ruler of Russia
for all practical purposes. * The following is offered in
support of this supposition] it consists of evidence
continued Chinese Communist resolution and Russian confusion.
of maintaining peace in the Par East and lessening of
international tension." ( Documents 1954 , 0£. cit . , p. 322
(italics inserted).)
41. Faicionelli, loc. cit. David J. Dallin has written that
in 195^, Moscow "at first supported the anti-Formosa drive."
(Dallin, oj>. cit., p. 434.) Mr. DallinU passage is foot-
noted as Having been based on certain "D papers" (September
6, 1?56, file K). It is explained that this material will
not be made public until 1975 in deference to those behind
the Iron Curtain who provided it. Access was offered to
those with legitimate interest. i£fforts were made to obtain
this more definitive evidence of the nature of Khrushchev^
commitment to Peking's Taiwan drive. The correspondence
was broken off by Mr. Dallies death.
42. Arthur Dean, "United States Foreign Policy and Formosa,"
Foreign Affairs, April, 1955. Malenkov had not made a
single substantial speech or important statement since
April, 1954. (Dallin, op_. cit., p. 220.) After Stalin's
death, Soviet power had actually been shared by four mens
Malenkov (represent! /ernment bureaucracy), Beria
(the Secret Police), General Zhukov (the Soviet iirray), and
Khrushchev (the Communist Party). One by one, Beria, then
Malenkov, and finally <uhukov lost their status. (Salisbury,
o£. cit., p. 253.)

Pe; .-^esoluti m reflected In both action and
pronouncements. Amphibious excursions, aerial bombing, and
artillery bombardment were carried out .1. the Nationalist-
held offshore Islands with ever-increasing i'requer .d
intensity. Chinese Communist statements In no sense limited
the objective to the offshore islands, however. Warnings
were broadcast to Taiwan before, taring, and after Khrushchev's
visit:
Heturn to the warm embrace of the fatherland. . . .You
are now at the crossroads of death. 43
The wind and the waves in the Formosa Strait will be
unable to atop the advance of the victorious Libera-
tion Army, and the American hope of saving the Chiar
clique will fail. 44
...no'.* that the call for liberating Taiwan has been
sent, I would like to give yoa another chance to
choose.
.
.your path. It is not too late to realize
your past mistakes. . ..If you want to die for Chiang and
the United States, then you di^ your own graves....
The time i3 short, but we will wait for you until the
last minute. 45
Chou Sn-lai (December 8, 1954):
We swear to the whole world ; the Chinese people are
determined to liberate Taiwan. 4"
General Chen I (January 20, 1935— a few days after return!
from Europe )s
...we can defeat Chiang, not only on the Chinese main-
land but also on the sea. This will lead us to liberate
Taiwan. 47
43. tfadio Peking, August 31, 1*54 (in Mandarin to Taiwan).
44. Ibid. , September 2, 195* (in Mandarin to Taiwan).
45. Ibia., October 3 34 (In Mandarin to Taiwan).
46. ibid., December 8, 1^54 (Italics inserted).
47. Ibid., January 2C, 1955.

Russian statements from the summer of 1954 until
January ljcjb defy generalisation. Their attitude toward
China is reflected in the samples below i
Khrushchev on arrival at Fekin^, (.September 30, 195*)
l
After the ^reat October Socialist Revolution, the
ople's revolution is the
most outstanding event in world history. .. .may the
unbreakable I dshlp and close cooperation between
the People*s Republic of China and the peoples of the
Jjviet Union be still, further consolidated and
developed day by day. '
Anniversary speeches in Peking (October 1, l;/54):
^"losing remark of C ji-lai/j The Chinese people
will certainly liberate Taiwan. /Ehrushche (reviewed
history of U.J. aid to Chiang, dated Sino-Soviet
mdahip from _ uea recent financial aid of
viets, praised Chinese efforts in Korea)J The United
3tate3 is trying by every possible means to prevent the
Chinese people from completely restoring the territorial
inte^ri ir oothopland, to obstruct the Chinese
people from liberating Taiwan which is legally an
inalienable pai i..,.The desire of thO Govern-
ment of the Peopled Republic of China and the 600 million
^nese people to liberate Taiwan, a part of
Chinese territory is dear and entirely understandable to
to Soviet Union. Tne Soviet people deeply sympathise
with the noble cause of the great Chinese People. .. .The
Chinese People's Republic has already stepped forward
in the international arena M .eat power.... Tne part
played by the Chinese People's republic at the Geneva






Khrushchev after returning .cow from China (tfovember,
1954):
This improvement in oino-ooviet relations was not brought
about by the establishment of a so-called new doctrine
but by the actual results created by the changes in the
balance., of power... of both the U.S. and Communist
China. Jl
4b. When Clement Attiee and his labor Party group stopped in
Moscow on their way to China in the summer of 1954,
"Molotov begged them i please, do not try to embroil us
with the Chinese in Poking." (Dallin, op_. cit
. , p. 424.)
*9. Radio Peking (NCN.-O, October 1, 1^54.
50. Ibid .
51. Masao Onoe, £ study of Factors Binding the ; .R. and

.Statement of the U.£i.3.H. Ministry of Foreign Aiv
(December 15, 1^54):
The government of the U.S.5.K. states tnat it shares
the position formulated in the statement by the Chinese
People's Kepublic Foreign Minister Chou on December i
that the American-Chiang treaty ie an interference in
the internal affairs o£ China, an attempt on her terri-
rial Integrit tees in danger the seeurit
China and peace in asia. The Government of the 0. ,R.
fully supports the demands of the C; inese People's
Republic Government for the withdr- /tcaerlcan troops
from Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Formosa
Straits, and for the cessation of the aggressive actions
a i. the Chinese People's Republic. The Soviet
people understand the demands of the Chinese people's
public and the determination of the Chinese people
9 liberate Formosa. . . .Tne soviet government declares
that the responsibility for the consequences of the
aggressive treaty of Mutual Security concluded between
the U.S. and the Chiang clique rests entirely with the
vemment o£ the United States. J*
Crlses were dieting in on Moscow £rom the wee
well as the e«uat. The rearmamen'. west Germany, their
primary international preoccupation,53 appeared imminent.
After the Uo. tlantie Treaty ization's plana for
the iiurop«;an - >ae Community had been dashed by the French
Parliament, the more pre ng Western Kuropean Union
arrangement had been proposed by Prime Minister Kden in
September, lj$k. iaat German leader Grotewohl reported that
during Krushchev's visit to Peking, the Soviet leader had
been assured X>y Mao Tse-tun^ that Chinese Communist troops
id be made available to t atre #5*
rate, at a Moscow conference on German problems in November,
>«nuniet China, paper at 3rd International Sovietelogi-
. i"~Conference , Japan, September, ll>c
$8, . .dio (.. t Service), December 15, 195^«
53. On January 3, 1955, Cnairman Ma. >v identified German
rearmament as his number one problem. (Oallin, oj>. cit .,
P. 136.)
5^. Ibid., p. lo2.

7an exchange between Bulganin and the Peking representative
indicated that Communist China considered herself committed
to Europe. 55 December quotations from Peking authorities
tied tre German and Taiwan problem together as though to
extract a quid pro quo.-'* In his New Year message of 195$ *
Chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet Supreme Voroshilov
Rnowled&ed this gesture
t
The peoples of the Soviet Union and of the European
People's Democratic countries were pleased and gratified
to receive the Chinese representative's declaration
that the Chinese people support with all their strength
the European people's struggle for the defense of
European peace and security.
. .
.</and In regard to Par
East problems/ The Chinese people are not alone. They
are always insured with the complete and unconditional
support of the Soviet people who are prepared to pass
all their experience on in order to speed up the build-
ing of socialist C;;ina.57
The Kremlin was a museum of problems on New Year's
Day; three other dilemmas were on the horizon.
(a) Fathoming United States Par i%ast intentions:
The contents of the Nationalist China-United States Mutual
Defense Treaty were known, but the agreement had not been
ratified. Supplementary agreements covering the scope of
United states commitment outside the "treaty area," and the
freedom of maneuver of Chiang Kai-shek were ruasored to exist,
but their contents were not known. The truth of the matter
was that on December JO, lj5b, Secretary of State Dulles
had obtained the signature of Nationalist Foreign Minister
55. New York Times , December 1, Ij^b.
56. Radio Peking (NCNA), December 6, 1^4 (speech by Chou
En-lai).
57. Ibid., January 2, 1>55.
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Yen on diplomatic notes which would insure the United states
a reasonable maximum of protection against Nationalist adven-
tures toward the mainland froca either the "treaty" or oi
shore areas. The "use of force' 1 from either area would be
a matter of joint agreement, "the inherent right of self
defense," excepted. -^ The notes would become effective upon
United .states ratification of the treaty, and thus would
form a "package" of agreements that would have warmed the
cockles of the heart of Machiavelli (the United States would
retain a maximum freedom of maneuver with a minimum chance
of involuntary involvement, under the circumstances). In
the meantime, however, the United States could count on the
Nationalists abiding by the contents of the notes, on pain
of non -ratification of the treaty; at the same time Washington
could present the image of being in danger of losing control
of the situation. In this interim period, the United states
was therefore in a position of maximum bargaining strength
and flexibility. 59
5b1 . The contents of the Dulles-Yeh notes were officially made
public on February 7> 1955 • Speculation concerning agree-
raents in addition to the Mutual Defense Treaty had pre-
dated their existence (New York Times, November 6, ly$k) .
bogus version appearedHXn a Japanese newspaper on
January 9, 195^. (fladio Peking (NCNA), January 10, 1955.)
The wording, though not the meaning, of the bogus version
closely paralleled the text as eventually published. The
timing of the development of the crisis was such that it
might have been advantageous for Moscow to be assured of
Washington's good faith in restricting mainland activity.
5.*. Dr. Thomas C. 3chelling in The Strategy of Conflict ex-
plains the widely misunderstood art of "brinkmanship":
"The brink is not... the sharp edge of a cliff where one
can stand firmly, look down, and decide whether or not
to plunge. .. .Brinkmanship Involves getting onto the slope
where one may fall in spite of his own best efforts to
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(b) Problems of the Nuclear a&ei In the apri
A, Malenkov had stated that he considered that the Soviet
Union had nuclear deterrent capability vis a vis the United
-ites, i.e., that United States 1 fear provided Soviet
iamanity from attack. In the 1954-1935 era, Khrushchev was
fsCi
one of the most notable opponents of this view. On June 15,
1954, Khrushchev ^ave a speech in Prague in which he claimed
that the Russians had created the hydrogen bomb before the
United States. His speech, as heard by those present, was
save himself, dru his adversary with him. Brinkman-
ship is thus the deliberate creation of a recognizable
risk of war, a risk that one does not completely control.
...It means harassing and intimidating an adversary by
exposing him to a shared risk. .. .Some kind of commitment,
or at least appearance of commitment, must lie behind
the threat and be successfully communicated to the
threatened party.... For example, maneuvers that shift
the final decision beyond recall to another party whose
incentive structure would provide an ex po3t motive for
fulfillment..
.
.The mutual -defense agreement with the
Nationalist government of China is probably to be viewed
partly as a means of shifting the decision for response
to someone whose resolution would be less doubtft
(Thomas C. Schellin&, The strategy of Conflict (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, ljo'c), pp. 124, 12
142, 199.)
. Herbert 3. Dinerstein, "Nuclear Power— The Great .Deterrent,"
Readin&a in Soviet Foreign Policy , ed. Arthur S« Adams
(Boston: D. C. Heath and Coaipany, 1^61), p. 3t>6j Dinerstein,
War and the Soviet Union, op. cit
. , p. 18; Donald
2agoria, "The IjST Conference and the Sino-Soviet Dispute,"
Chin ^.rterly, July-September, 1961.
6l. This claim apparently may be correct, in a sense. The
argument revolves around what Is a bomb. American scien-
tists have disclosed that the first United States hydrogen
test in lj^2 involved a device that required extensive and
bulky refrigeration equipment to keep the heavy hydrogen
in a liquid state, whereas the first Soviet test in August,
1^53 utilized lithium deuteride as a solid. The first
U.S. test utilizing this obvious improvement (from a
portability standpoint) was reported to be in August, 195^»
3. Harvey Sacks (University of California) and David
^lpser (Harvard) intimate that there was in fact a period
when Russia held the key to the hydrogen balance. ("Com-
munication Between Social and Lentists,"
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a plea for more arms and a more aggressive attitude toward
United states. Many of his remarks were eradicated in
the Pravda eop^ of the speech, and "We really carry out a
peace-loving policy in the interests of the masses," was
substituted/' Ml specific details of the strategic
disagreement, and how closely they were involved with the
internal itussian policy struggle are not known, but this
consideration complicated decision making. At any rate, it
has been said that the Taiwan issue was heavily debated in
.Russia during January 1955, on the basis of nuclear weapons. -*
(c) The Kussian domestic leadership upheaval, which
was possibly accelerated by the culmination of all the above
complications.
The moment of truth in the Taiwan Strait was approach-
ing. °5 AS the United States was amassing a naval force in
the seaward area consisting of 5 aircraft carriers, 3 heavy
cruisers, and some 49 -odd destroyers, the spearhead o£
Science, Vol. 134, No. 3^77, August IB, 1961, p. 509.)
62. Harry -Schwartz in the New York Times, June 25, 1£)54;
Dallin, 0£. cit., p. 22T7
63. Alice Langlev Hsieh, "Communist China and Nuclear Warfare,"
The China Quarterly , April -June, 19& .
64. ''It may well be said that, like Irotsky, Malenkov fell
by reason of the Chinese situation, in spite of havi.
been no more to blame for Mao's autonomism than Trotsky
was for Chiang's defection." (Palcioneili, loc. cit
.
)
65. In earl./ January, 1995* United Hat ions secretary
General Hammarsk^old made an unprecedented trip iking
to talk tc ujn-lai. Haoirau had requested the
nTerence on the basis of United states -Communis t China
prisoner dlfficulties, but Chou'a reply indicated that
that matter was not negotiable. Taiwan was the issue of
the moment, and it was conceivably a prime consideration
of the trip.
66. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), Februax^y 1, 1955.
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Co—unlit activity centered on the Nationalist -held Tachen
isi . roup, to the north of Taiwan. On Januar th, a
ibined amphibious force of approximately . ized
./iks and aircraft foiled the surrender of 2,000 National-
ists on YiKin&shan Island, about eight miles distant from
the main iachen island. The United States' "flexible
response H was the accrediting of their threat by the so-called
"Formosa Kesolutlon. " The Congress publicly confirmed the
Presidents authority to employ U. 3. armed forces "as he
deems necessary for the specific purpose >ecurin^ and
prote^ Formosa and the Pescadores including protection
of "related positi ^7
January 26th (the date on which the United States
Senate passed the Formosa Resolution), the British Government
contacted the Kremlin, advised them that they considered it
dangerous to proceed on t .sumption that the United States
would not defend even the offshore island**, and requested
the Soviet government to restrain Peking.^ At this critical
o, the U.o.o. . . >ined Great Britain in trying to
halt the buildup of events in the Taiwan Strait. * Their
attempted United Nations action was diplomatically unproduc-
tive in the literal sense, but it served to confirm Russia's
disavowal of responsibility for Communist China's military
ventures in the Pacific.'*^ Moreover on January 2>th, in an
67. A. C. Mezerik, International Heview Service, Vol. IV,
No. 47, October
68. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), January 28, 1>55.
69. Suryey_,
-ffi5-3->56, '£• tit., p. .
70. ¥he United Nations evolution was rather complicated, and
did not work out to be an open affront of Peking by
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interview with William ft. Hearst Jr. and Kingsbury Smith,
Molotov gave public tacit approval of a pending United States
plan to evacuate the islands of the Tachen group still in
Nationalist hands. '*
Within a week, the United States State .Department
announced that orders had been Issued to the Seventh Fleet
to remove 80*000 Nationalist civilians and 10,000 troops
from the Tachens.' 2 Communist aircraft were bombing the
islands as the U.S. Naval units entered the area.'^ The
Navy announced that "any attack on the Tachens now will be
construed by the United states as interference with the
mission of the Seventh Fleet and such interference could
prompt United States retaliation."' The Chinese Communist
Moscow. Russia introduced resolutions in the security
Council asking for condemnation of the United States and
for the invitation of a Peking representative to discuss
the motion. New Zealand introduced a resolution provid-
ing for a cease fire. It became known that Communist
China would not discuss a cease fire under any circum-
stances (they hold it to imply interference in China's
domestic affairs), and would not discuss any issue in
a United Nations session at which the Chinese Nationalist
representative was present. Russia thereupon Introduced
a resolution that would bar the Taipei representative
(which was defeated), abstained on another (not their
own) to invite the Peking representative to New York
(which was passed); the invitation was sent, but was
turned down in Peking. ( Year Book of the United Nations,
1955 (New York: ColumbiaHSnTversity Press, 195o.T~^
71. Molotov said he couldn*t imagine why Peking would object
to the evacuation, since they were trying to dislodge
the Nationalists themselves. When asked if he would
make a formal request to the Chinese Communist government
on this point, he answered: "Does the Government of the
United States ask us to do it?" (Moscow Radio (Soviet
Home service), January 30, 1955.)
72. Survey, 1^55 -1,>56 , 2£. clt., p. 95,
73. Ibid ., PrBT
74. New York Times , February 7, 1j*55.
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forces stood down as the evacuation commenced.'-5 The Peki
reaction was documented in the next issue of the official
Party newspaper, the People's Daily i
This criminal act is an infringement upon China's
sovereignty and an intervention in China's internal
affairs iT"
The inevitable had happened; Communist cohesion had
had to give ground under the pressures of a more complicated
age. The tactics of the old regime had delayed Peking's
acquisition of Taiwan. Mao Tse-tung had sacrificed be&rudg-
ingly with the hope o£ recovering his loss under the more
predictable code of "old school" honor in due course, but
the institutional rules of the modern era prevented compensa-
tion. Taiwan claims had been caught out of step in both
phases
•
On February 8, 1955* Malenkov announced his resigna-
tion as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.'* Professor
Falcionelil writes:
...the military had decided to take action. . .against
Malenkov because, among other reasons, they knew they
were now in an adventure which could turn Into a general
war. By removing Malenkov they avoided greater risks
and at the same time secured Khrushchev's gratitude
since they helped him to lay on another "responsible" Q
the burden of his obligations contracted with Felping.^
75. "Fight when we can win and run away when we cannot— this
is the popular interpretation of our mobile warfare today."
selected quotations of Mao Tse-tung, New York Times, June
4, 1961.
76. Radio Peking (NCNA), February 5, 1955.
77. T
^
me Magazine reported that this forthcoming event was
widely rumored in Moscow at the time of Hearst and Smith's
interview with Molotov. It accused them of having a
"built-in capacity for missing the point." (Time Magazine,
June 30, 19&* P. *8.)
78. Falcionelli, o£. clt
. Later in February, perhaps to salve
the wound, Molotov made a point of referring to the "great"

114
This climax did not brln^ the it crisis of 1935
to an abrupt end. By March, their continuing bombardme
of the offshore islands prompted Mr. xXillea to remark that
they seemed "dizzy with success. They entertain a verv
exaggerated sense of their own power. , the same
month, Kao Kang, the old pro-Soviet commander in Manchuria
in the days Just before the mainland victory, was purged."
A symbolism has been suggested.
After giving Mr. Dulles credit for threatening nuclear
reprisal, Chou j&i-lai left his forces at "general quarters"
and departed for the Bandung conference. There, in his open-
ing speech, he devoted primary emphasis to condemn he
United States policy in the Taiwan area. This brought on
immediate criticism, especially from the Philippine and
Thailand representatives who felt that the Asian-African
conference was not the place to air grievances not common to
the group. Four days later, after consultations with the
Chinese people— an honor otherwise reserved for the
-eat soviet people." (Harold H. Fishsr, "Post-Stalin
Policy in Asia," Headings in Soviet Foreign Policy , op .
cit., p. 340.)
.
New York Times , March 22, 1955. ftao Tse-tung in 19*10!
"We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without




, op. cit,, p. 13.)
80. Kao Kang committed suicide onl&ch 31, 1 (iJallin,
op, cit., p. 43C
)
. Falciorielli, loc . cit. If purges are symbolic ot Mac's
psychosis regarding Taiwan it is perhaps notable that a
mainland purge was reported in the Taipei press in
March, 1951. This closely followed the unsuccessful
efforts to work out a Korean settlement before Communist
China was named an aggressor by the United Nations and
was at about the time the U.S. Seventh Fleet mission in
the Strait became permanent.
.
Radio Pekin- (NCNA), March 12, 1955.
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various delegations, Chou evidenced a marked mellowing. He
announced that he desired to "enter into negotiations... to
discuss the question of relaxing tension... in the Taiwan
area.'*^3 After he returned to China, the military activities
in the strait were slowly decreased.
Both Ba In and Khrushchev had occasion to speak in
Warsaw in the spring oC 1955. Bulganin made brief reference
to Taiwan:
It is quite clear that having taken refuge on Taiwan,
the Chiang clique would never had dared to start its
gangster-like actions had it not had the support from
a strong benefactor in the person of the United states
government. , .the Government of the Soviet Union, on
its part, fully supports the attitude of the Chinese
People's Republic in the Taiwan question and those
steps which People 1 ! China is undertaking to strengthen
peace in that area,"5
Khrushchev gave a 30-page speech on foreign affairs— not a
word on Taiwan.
According to an item in U.S. News and World Report , ?
Khrushchev is reported to have made a remark to President
83« Survey , 1955 -1956 , 0£. clt., p. 12.
84. Mao Tse-tung in 1940 : ^We should stop at the proper
moment and brin& that particular fight to a close."
(Mao Tse-tung, Questions of Tactics .. ., op . clt ., p. 13.)
85. Moscow Radio (Tass), May IT, 1955 (italics inserted).
8o. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), April 21, 1955. Later
at the same Warsaw conference, Chinese Communist repre-
sentative General Peng Te-hual removed any doubt that
may have remained regarding Peking*s commitment to
Russia's military problems: "If the peace of Europe is
disturbed, if the imperialist aggressors launch war
against the peaceable European states, our government
and our heroic 600 million people will, shoulder to
shoulder with the government and peoples of our fraternal
countries, fight the aggressor until final victory is won."
(Radio Warsaw (Polish Home Service), May 12, 1955.)
67. U.S. Hews and World Report , June 19, 1961, p. 34.
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Kennedy at Vienna in the summer of 1961 that would appear
to be a rather unusual thin^ to say, in view of the fact
that Communist China has been obviously powerless to cope with
the seventh Fleet without Russian assistance since soon after
the start of the Korean War. Khrushchev reportedly said:
"If I were Mao Tse-tung, I would have taken Formosa long agv-
If the hypotheses thus far advanced are correct, perhaps
the eavesdropper misunderstood. What Khrushchev should have
•aid was, "I wish Mao Tse-tung had taken Formosa lon^ ago,"
followed, perhaps by an aside in sotto voice, "in about May
or June, 1990, to be exact." If Peking's humor regardi:
Taiwan has not Improved by the time they get nuclear weapons,






To examine a subject 30 pockmarked with voids of
reliable information at critical Junctures and so rife with
discontinuities as Slno-Soviet relations, one must attempt
to retain some sort of an image of Kussian and Chinese
national purposes and trends against which he can check his
necessary conjecture for reasonableness. This becomes more
and more difficult the closer one gets to the present, and
the more involved the Moscow-Peking relations become with
each passing year. For the three and a half year period
from the spring of 1955 to the autumn of 1958, Russia offers
a wore stable image than China. Beginning in January, 1953,
Moscow's leadership appeared to modify other policies, in
addition to their retrenchment on issues that threatened
war with the United otates. Domestically, they were ^iv:
way to social pressure and placing primary emphasis on
economic growth) in bloc policy, "socialism in one region"
was becoming the keynote. In broad perspective, therefore,
Russia can be seen to have pursued a constant conservative
drift. 1
1. Khrushchev^ frantic and ultimately successful efforts




China Is not so easy to catalog, even In terms
such oversimplified generalization. It is helpful if one
applies two concepts to Chinese analysis. The first is their
apparent ethnocentrism and patience with the historic process,
An anecdote of Richard Harris, Par East expert for the London
Times describes this succinctly. He writes of an occasion
in China in early 3 when he overheard some Chinese
enlisted soldiers casually discussing the situation of a
divided country in a civil war, drawing frequent comparisons
with a similar condition which persisted in China during
the Sung dynasty, when he spoke to them in their native
tongue they were hard pressed to identify his nationality,
thinking o£ a third western nation only with difficulty .
In reflecting, he surmised that he would expect almost any
British soldier to remember the names of at least twenty
foreign countries, but doubted that he would find him compar-
ing inflation in Britain during the 1950* s with the inflation
pduring the Wars of the Roses.
The second concept which must be kept in mind by the
Western analyist is what the French statesman Sdgar F&ure
watershed point in June, 1957 when he executed the
unprecedented coup of inv 5 Central Committee support
to over-ride the Presidiu r*aditionalists Malenkov,
Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov were dismissed from
the Central Committee as an anti-party" group. (Dallin,
op . clt.
, p. 453.) In a sense, Khrushchev came to power
as a "leftist," and is making his reputation as a
"rightist" j 3talin*s progression was roughly the reverse.
Richard harris, "Cnina and the World," International
Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 2, April, 1959.
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has called the "undulatory mechanics" of Chinese Communism.
There Is a certain dichotomy in the ordinary dialectic of
Marxism (the union of opposites), to which one must accustom
himself, but the Chinese Communists go beyond this. They are
le to think of contraries as being entirely compatible. "^
This is not to say that the undulatory mechanics deals in
thoughts that do not have meaning* or that the weaning are
not often profound. It merely means that the Westerner must
occasionally shift mental gears to get the message. These
two points are mentioned not to reiterate the cliche about
the "strange Oriental," but because they both bear on the
analysis that follows later.
With due respect for the difficulty of generalizing
Chinese political tendencies during the three and a half year
period vis a vis Russia, they appear to have made a random
excursion from a position to the dogmatic" side of Moscow,
overshooting to the "revisionist" side, then abruptly return-
ing to "dogmatic." This oscillation was either a valiant
attempt to conform to Moscow's conservative drift, in spite
of the difference in their revolutionary and economic
maturity, or was a premeditated arabesque of maneuver about
the Russian datum in application of undulatory mechanics.
As shown above, in the case of the Taiwan issue, the
2ig zag of Chinese tactics to a more soft line occurred
dramatically under the moderating influence of the "neutral"
3. iidgar Paure, The Jerpent and the Tortoise (New York:
St. Martln»s Press, 19$b), p. Til.
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Afro-Asians at the Bandung Conference during the waning days
of the 1 trait crisis. The Peking Ministry of Fore.i
Affairs had described the crash of an airplane enroute to
the conference as murder engineered by secret agents of ti
United States. Four days later, Chou Sn-lai told the
conference "The Chinese people are friendly to the American
people. The Chinese people do not want to have a war with
the United states of america," and offered to negotiate the
Taiwan issued The United States ultimately accepted this
offer, and on the 1st of August, 1955* talks commenced at
the ambassadorial level in Geneva. These consultations
continued there until December, 1957. The impasse of
"negotiating" the Taiwan issue can be appreciated by notii
the continuously presented Chinese "position," still bei
reiterated by Chou £n-lai three years later:
The Sino-Ameriean dispute in the Taiwan straits area
and the Chinese '3 internal raatter of liberating
their own territory are two matters entirely different
in nature. The United states has all &3 ried to
infuse these two matters so as to cover up its aggres-
sion and intervention in China. This is not to be
all owed.
6
inuring the preparations for the talks and the consulta-
tions thes»elves, the Chinese Communists relaxed their
4. Kadlo Peking (flCKA), April 12, 1955,
§• Survey >6, ojg.. tit . , p. 13.
o. Radio Peking (KCNA), September 6, 1958, ,ence of
policy positions from i itset is indicated by t
following statements! Chou Sn-lai, June 88, 1956* "The
Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. This is
the unshakable common will of 6oC million Chinese people."
President Eisenhower, July 7, 1956: "Let there be no
misapprehension about our steadfastness in continuing to
support the Republic of China (Bamett, "U.S. and




military pressure on the coast. From the aprln^ of 1955
to the late summer of 1958 the ,hore islanu
of Quemo aittent— sometimes briefly intense— artil-
lery shelling, but never ao intense ov prolonged as to auggeat
the intention to dislodge the garrison. There was evidence
of long range plana, nevertheless. Seven jet airstrips were
being constructed within 150 miles of Taiwan, and a railroad
network connecting this military complex with Shanghai was
being completed.'
Commencing in mid-1955 external evidence indicated
an increasingly "soft" line in all phases of Chinese Communist
foreign and domestic policy. This seemed to coincide with
the good fortune of increasingly amicable relations with the
"neutrals," and domestic economic success. By January, 1956,
mainland China was reporting herself to be a year ahead of
schedule in the first five year plan. Mao Tse-tung f s
speeches increasingly encouraged the relaxation of internal
pressure, and in February, 1957 he urged his people to "let
a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought
contend." By the spring of i>57> he was predicting no more
wars for fifteen years.*
7. Wash Times * ril 12 j6 (testi-
mony of Assistant 3ecreTary of~3tate (Far Astern Affairs)
Robertson before the JWaoo >a&aittee)
.
8. Radio Peking (NCNA), January 1, 195*5 U^opl^ Dall£
article). The mosl ;oific -Ct.lhese economic
development of this period was the agreement signed on
April 7, 1^>56, during the visit 0/ uiuoU*a Hlkoyan to
Peking, which provided for the construction of 55 indus-
trial units in addition to 156 already in construction,
at a cost of 2.5 billion rubles." (Dallin, og. clt.,
p. 435.)
New York Times , June 13 and 16, 1957.
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China appeared to be trying to outdo Khrushchev in
domestic "contention" when the balloon burst in the early
summer of 1957. The free expression of opinion had taken
an intolerable form from a particularly embarrassing group
of Chinese citizens— the intelligentsia and the students.
Many of the latter had spent most of their politically-
conscious lives under the Communist regime. By early June,
riots were threatened; lc* Mao Tse-tung made one last attempt
1
1
to be "reasonable" in his People's Paily article of June 8th,
and soon thereafter released a modified version of his




Flagrant violators of "socialist principles" were
exposed, and the domestic line started a "aa&" to the "hard"
side. 1^ As wight be expected of their "undulatory mechanics,"
no new policy was Inferred. A report by the Secretary
-
General of the Chinese Communist Party dated October 20, 1^57
was devoted to the Hundred Flowers ("rectification") campaign
10. Radio Peking (NCNA), Hay 31, June 8, 1957 (Ko Pel-chi
articles, People 's Daily ).
11. Ibid ., June if, 1957 ("Vmat is it For?", in People's i&lly ).
12. Mao Tse-tung, On the Current Handling of Contradictions
Among the People (Peking i Foreign languages Press
,
"
13. Professor Ko pei-chl of People's University had made a
speech in which he suggested that it would be an act of
patriotism to kill all the Communists and overthrow the
government. (Cleveland Plain Dealer , June 23, 1957.)
Victor Zorza reported a public meeting at which a speaker
had said "the masses wish to kick out or even to kill the
communists." It reminded him of what was being said in
Hungary and Poland before their uprisings the year before.
(Manchester Guardian (England), June 13, 1,-57.)

3of the early spring, and regarded the "campaign against the
right-wing as forming a second stage of the rectification
campaign itself." 1 **
Though the break was more ragged, intra-bloc policy
patterned after the Russian conservative drift also appeared
to ultimately frustrate the Chinese, A prelude to trouble
was offered by the see reaction to Khrushchev's speech
exposing Stalin's excesses at the Twentieth Congress in
February, 1956, The fact that it was a surprise move
embarrassed the Chinese,^ 1% contrasted notably with a
Mao Tae-tung speech read at the same Congress, Secondly, it
may be presumed that sudden emphasis of the Ills of the
"cult of personality' 5 offended the Chinese Communists, They
had been under the sole leadership of Mao Tse-tung for o^er
twenty years, and moreover, he had been one of the most impor-
tant contributors to Communist theory since Lenin, They must
have felt that they were about to inherit the advantages of
being the compatriots of the successor of Stalin in the apos-
tolic chain of World Communist leadership. Mainland editorials
didnH cover Khrushchev * s remarks about Stalin at first,^
and when they later discussed it, editorial comment was
heavily laced with qualifying expressions stressing his
14. Paure, ojp. cit., p. Ill,
15. Edward CranEshaw, San Francisco Chronicle , December 12,
11/61. (The Chinese admitted that it had been a surprise,)
16. Radio Peking (NCNa), March 30, 1957. (People's Daily





accomplishments in spite of his methods. Symbolically, the
Stalinist issue was later discussed in Communist China under
the heading of "great power chauvinism" rather than the
"cult of personal!
Nineteen -oix was the year aropean
uprisings, and the Chinese Communists took an active interest
18
in these events. Their original position was that of
support ^ the principle oV polycentrism of the Communist
bloc, stressing local loyalty to the national Communist
parties* In Poland, where the Polish armed forces remained
under the control of the local Communist Party, Peking is
said to have restrained Khrushchev from intervening. In
Hungary, where the armed forces slipped from Communist
control, Peking is said to have pressed for Russian military
intervention when Moscow was hesitating, "Hie Chinese atti-
tudes were opposite in the two cases, but each was judged by
a consistent principle. ^ later, they registered apparent
disgust with the whole chain of events. In November, 1956,
the Chinese Communist press implicitly blamed Russian policy
for both uprisings,^ and the events were thereafter alluded
17 • People '
s
JJally of April, 19$6i "Some consider that
J. V. otalln was entirely wron^,. This is a serious
error. J. V. 3taiin was an outstanding Marxist-Lenin1st,
but a Marxist Leninist who did commit serious mistakes and
did not perceive them,.." On May Pay, 1956, a large
portrait of Stalin was displayed in the main square in
Pekii (Dallin, o£. cit., p. 438.)
18. G. F. Hudson notes s "fhe line which Peking took on this
upheaval in Eastern iiurope was, however, less important
than the fact that it took a line at all." (Hudson in
The Slno-Sovlet Dispute, op . cit., p. 3.)





to by remarks loaded with innuendo.
9) or re karj up^ .ihed by Nagy's
gang in October, 1957 has taught the Hungarian people,
id the people of other xlist countries.. .many
iaportant lessons .^^
From a position of "out -thawing the Russian thaw*
(acting as mediator and moderator of bloc disputes in support
of the Leninist principle of national equality which had been
resurrected at the Twentieth Party Congress), ^ Communist
China swung through the "dead center" of Russian policy and
on to an even more rigorous demand for national subserviency
21. Peking's pointed interest in the £ast European uprisin
is given added significance by the poignant analysis of
the post-Stalin history of Hungary by Paul Kecskemet!
.
The case demonstrated the problems of quasi -monolithic
totalistie leadership in capsule fom« Iha basic principle
invoked is that often the great danger of revolt comes
not in the 'oppression, " but in the "decompression" cycle
of Party policy fluctuations. The relief of pressure
must be accompanied by extremely close monitoring of the
existing "historic conditions." The latter are very sensl-
%i national differences sad the eiroXl I is particu-
larly demanding on a "bloc" basis. Although the sinusoidal
oscillations of .soviet policy during the uneasy period
transition from Stalin to Khrushchev rule were restrained
to the limits of positive stability within Russian society,
as these were mimicked in &ast Europe they appeared in
the nature of ad hoc improvisations and were not synchro-
nised organically with local conditions. Instability
resulted a ionics were hit in some areas. (Paul
Kecskemeti, "Decompression in Hungary," Readings in Russian
ireign Policy , eg. cit., pp. 387-601*) ""Itiie problem is~
analogous to trying to play several game fish on a common
reel. Judicious relaxation of tension on the soviet "fish"
may produce dangerous slack in the Hungarian (or Chinese)
line. To make matters worse in this instance, that great
/ersight in Communist canon— the lack of provision for
constitutional succession of command— made eoordinat:.
even more difficult as various would-be fishermen were
wrestling to see who would finally hold the pole.





to central bloc leadership. They professed to favor the
unitary rather than confederate command structure. After
cancelling a trip to Poland in the summer of 1^57, Mao Tae-
tong is said to have personally demanded a revision of a
declaration of the conference of Communist parties in Moscow
in November, 1^57 to a form that so stringently specified
Moscow's authority that Yugoslavia would not sign it. 2^
The trend of Moscow's rapprochement with Belgrade initiated
in 1955 was thereby interrupted. Thereafter the symbolic
pronouncements regarding, Yugoslavian ''revisionism'1 grew
farther and farther apart. By 1958, though the Hussian
articles disapproved of revisionists policies in a doctri-
naire manner, on July 4th, Soviet writer Pavlov wrote a
piece complimenting the "heroic deeds of the Yugoslavian
Communists" during World War II in honor of the Yugoslav
national "Fighters' Day" holiday. 2^ In contrast, the People »
s
Dally of the previous week had described Tito and his
"plight 1 ' as follows?
A dwarf Kerensky in a muddy pond can try as desperately
as he may to spit at a giant on a lofty mountain, but
he will find his spittle falling on his own face.
2^» Jj-^H** P* 362. Mao Tae-tung at the 1957 Moscow Conference:
""The socialist force has surpassed the Imperialist force.
~r socialist camp should have a leader, and this is the
Soviet Union. The enemy also has a leader, and this is
America. If there is no leader, the strength will be
weakened." (Allen S. whitlns, 'The Developing Partner-
ships China and the Soviet Union," Readings in Soviet
Porei&n Policy , ed. Arthur £. Adacns Pfoston, D.~C7 Heath
and Company, l>6l), p. 379.) The year before, criticism
of Yugoslav statements on the Hungary uprising had been
•ore moderate in the People's Daily than those in Pravda .
(Ibid., p. 377.)
25. Moscow Kadio (Soviet Home Service), July 4, 1956.
26. Kadio Peking, (NCNA), June 26, ISfii . .t the Party Congress

127
It is therefore seen that by late Ijyi, both in
domestic and intra -bloc policies , the Chinese Communists
had completed their "excursion" to the right and either
through dissatisfaction with the trend of events in the
"socialism in one region, * or through the emergence of
leftist influence in their leadership, began to hide behind
the shield of dogma, following what Michael Lindsay calls
"Stalinist fundamentalism.
"
In foreign policy, a similar Chinese attitude was
reflected in their encouragement of a more confident asser-
tion of bloc power via a vis the West. The technical success
of Russia's "Sputnik" in the fall of 1^57 was to the Soviet
leaders but a sign of a weaponry standoff with the West at
parity, but on N vember 17, 1957 -^ao Tse-tung heralded the
event as proof of the ascendency of the "aast wind over the
West wind."2?
Meanwhile, particularly after Sputnik, Khrushchev
played up the theme of "coexistence" to the hilt; he stressed
his decision to reduce the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact
and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania, a wrote
letters to President Eisenhower proposing an expansion of
Soviet-American trade
>J
and an agreement against surprise
attack, 3° professed unilateral suspension of nuclear tests,
^
two years before, Chinese Communist ideological authority
Liu Shao-chi had spoken approvingly of the Yugoslav
detente
.
27. Zagoria, "The 1957 Conference.../' op. clt., p. 372.
28. Moscow Hadlo (Soviet Home Service), July 12, 1
. Ibid., June 7, 1958.
30. IBT5. (Tass), July 7, 1958#
31. ISXcf . (Soviet Home Service), June 11, Vj$6.

and in general ushered in the era of his technological
success under his slogan of "leas guns, more butter. "32
Primary Russian emphasis, however, was placed on repeated
calls for a "summit" conference of the United States, Britain,
France, and the U.s.s.H. These began at about the turn of
the new year of 195o.^3
It was primarily in the context of summit talks that
Khrhshchev met the Middle oast crisis of the summer of 195&.
Unrest in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, and the consequent threat
of Communist capitalisation on threatened revolutionary activ-
ities, particularly in Syria, caused the United States and
British military units in the Mediterranean area to go on
alert in June. The revolution occurred in Iraq on July 14th,
and this was followed by the landing; of the U.S. Marines in
Lebanon and British troops in Jordan. Communist press reaction
was laced with invectives, but Khrushchev's primary proposal
was for a conference of the big four plus India and the
Secretary General of the United Nations.
32. Ibid . (Tass), June 11, 1958.
33. Khrushchev forwarded prospective agenda items; China's
Problems were not mentioned. ( Ibid . (Tass), June 16,
195B.) The Chinese press favorably supported the
conference, nevertheless, and berated the three western
powers for using "obstructionist" tactics. (Radio
Peking (NCNA), June 22, 1958 (People's Dally).)
34. It is true that in a letter to President Eisenhower,
Khrushchev reminded him that "The Soviet Union too
possesses atomic and hydrogen bombs, an air force, and
a nav^, plus ballistic missiles of all types, including
intercontinental ones," but the focus of even this
letter was on a proposition for a conference, (ftoscow




His first offer proposed the site of Geneva, and a
convening date less than a week away. 35 Prime Minister
Nehru, in accepting the invitation pointedly specified
that he interpreted the invitation to mean that the confer-
ence was to be concerned only with the Middle &ast, and that
was not the "summit " conference of which Khrushchev had
talked since the first of the year. 36 This remark was not
acknowledged, and the Moscow press continued to refer to
the new offer as a "summit* conference thereafter. 3? After
an exchange of letters with the proposed participants
Khrushchev altered his proposal, presumably to better
accommodate their desires, to hold the conference within
the framework of the United Nations Security Council. He
continued to stress the importance of India's participation
even ,h they were not sitting with the Security Council
at that time .3° on July 28th Khrhshchev made his third
summit offer in nine days,39 repeating the request for the
five powers, and left on the next day for a three day
secret meeting with Mao Tse-tung in Peking.
Everything would seem to come out correctly in the
plot thus far advanced (and would concur with the traditional
explanation of the conference), if it were found that as a
result of this meeting, Khrushchev's offers for a summit
parley abruptly came to a halt as a consequence of pressure
35. Moscow Radio (Tass), July 19, 1953.
36. Ibid. (Soviet Home Service), July 21, 195
37. IbTd" . (Soviet Near Kast Service), July 23, 1958* Ibid ,
(Soviet Home Service), July 28, l>5b.
38. Ibid. (Soviet Near x&st Service), July 23, 195
T5I5 (Soviet Home Service), July 29, 1958.
wferlaffcuC
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from Mao, A review of the press for this period shows that v
this was not the case. The Chinese Conicauniats had followed
the summit proposal developments through the invitation of
India and modification to have the meeting in the Security
Council with a high measure of endorsement , and had continued
refer to the proposition as a "summit" conference throt
out. After returning from Peking, Khrushchev wrote
another letter to President Eisenhower in which he stressed
his continued desire i^or a conference.
...the question of convening a conference of the heads
of ywwUHl »l tne five powers...has not seen settled
in a positive way....We are await -our acceptance .
of mUf proposal on a summit conference at any tirae...^*
Moreover, ifttf the $ao-Khrushchev meeting tne Peking press
aontj.il uou to support tbt idea.
,-ession or ihe United states and Britain in
the Middle &ast and their attempts to delay the fi
power summit conference have aroused condemns! .jrfand
protest amona tho~peopie all over the country. 42
For several days the press releases in both countries
practically dared the West to accept the proposal as reiter-
ated by Khrushchev 5 on August 7th, a Tass release made fun
of a report in an Italian paper which spoke of a sudden
change of summit policy after the Peking meeting, 3 ?niS
point has not been labored to show that Hao Tse-tung was
not offended at the idea of sponsoring a conference in t
Security Council before a representative of Nationalist
40. Radio Peking (NCNA), July 4, Jul./ 25, July 3 36.
41. Moscow Radio (Tass), August 5, 195
42. Radio Peking NONA), August 5j 1956 (italics inserted)
43. Moscow Radio (Tass), August 7* X.

China, where the A3ian big power candidate was India. On
the contrary, it la iard to imagine that thia wasn't a
grievance. The point is, that apparently thia was one agenda
item of the Khrushchev-Mao talks that was not settled in
favor of China, A certain amount of cover-up would be
expected if Mao had received this concession, but this
could have been scored with a fraction of the publicity
the issue got for the week following the conference. More-
over, the offer was left open, to be accepted by the West
any time they wanted to call the Communists * hand. Althou
the ?ekin^ meeting was undoubtedly called for an urgent
4«Spurpose, probably because of Chinese pressure, v it appears
doubtful that the "summit conference" element of this pressure
was relieved.
44. A London correspondent for the Itew Chir. *M
quoted in a London newspaper on July 22nd in an article
which expressed strong reservations about tie pitfalls"
of the Security Council scheme. apparently was just
late in getting the word. Thia leak was a statistical
exception.
45. A few v;riter3 have suogeated that Khrushchev c^Ied the
conference in an effort to get Chinese assistance in
creating a diversionar jldent to overcome Russia's
embarrassment by the Western show of force in the Middle
.Sast. It is difx^icult to Interpret the Communist or
•eutralist" press as reflecting a propaganda loss by
Moscow. The Middle \ situation came to the attention
of a special session of the United Nations General
Assembly (which was endorsed by botn in,. .nd
Chinese Communist news media); the ruling resolution was
sponsored by ten Arab states, and called i'or t. icua-
tion of Western troop3. In a letter to President
jenhower, Khrushchev was later to M ". . .^aiwan is
not another Lebanon/ whj. recently fallen victim to
a foreign intervention unanimously condemned by the
latest Emergens jsion of the United Nations General




There were evidences of other sources of possible
Chinese pressure in addition to the summit conference issue.
Things had not been working out well in Far Eastern politics
for Peking. Their troop withdrawals from Korea in 1953 were
46producing few of the anticipated political advantages.
They had curtailed trade and cultural relations with Tokyo
before the Japanese elections in an effort to bring politi-
cal pressure to bear, yet their "opponent' K:shi had won. {
Their Middle Sast policies had apparently been less passive
than Moscow's. The respective statements of the governments
after the Western landings may be contrasted.
U.S.S.R.
:
The Soviet Government urges the United States Government
to discontinue its armed intervention in the Internal
affairs of the Arab countries and to withdraw its troops
from lAbanon immediately, .. .The Soviet Government...
reserves the right to take the necessary measures^
dictated by the interests of peace and security.*3
China t
...the United states government, in a sudden rage and
panic, has brazenly launched armed intervention against
Lebanon.. .the 6cc million Chinese people will give
all out support to the Arab people's just stru^&le.
Should the United states not withdraw immediately its
force of aggression from Lebanon, it will surely eat
the fruit of its own actions.^
"All out support" was the recurrent theme in the
China mainland press. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister
46. New York Times , February 20, 1958.
47. U. S., Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations , 86th Congress, Testimony on the ^uFuaF"
Security Act of 1^59* May **# 195'^, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1959,
48. Moscow Radio (Tass), July 16, 1956 (italics inserted).
49. Hadio Peking (NCNa), July 16, 1958 (italics Inserted).
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Chen I said that If the United states and Britain did not
"cease their aggress ion , "the 600 million Ci inese people,.
,
will not look on with folded arms. G. P. Hudson has
reported that Communist China offered to send "volunteer
to Lebanon. 51 The London Times ' Richard Harris has written,
"I personally suspect that had the Chinese been in the
position the Russians were in, the very first American
Marine landlnc in Beruit would have produced some C: inese
landing in Syria fik Demonstrations were staged in Peking
on a scale without parallel in Moscow. Peking Mayor Pe>
Chen spoke to nearly a million people in Tien An Men Square,
repeating that the "east wind prevails over the west wind"
as paraders carried banners with captions reading "British
Troops Out of Jordan," and "U.S. Troops Out of Lebanon."^
In the parades described above, a third set of banners
were carried. The^ proclaimed "U.S. Forces Out of Taiwan/'
In China's complete Middle East propaganda campaign, the
issues of Lebanon and Taiwan had been tied together and
depicted as a coordinated American pincers movement against
the Eurasian Communist bloc; the ominous fate of the United
States was continually predicted.
The United States aggressors poke their snake heads all
over the world ... every act of aggression will take the
aggressors a step nearer their own graves . This is the
dialectics of historical development.^
Ibid., July 22, 1958.
51. G. F. Hudson, r,Mao, Marx, and Moscow, ' Foreign Affairs ,
July, 1959* P. 5i
52. Harris, op. cit.
5?. Radio PekihKlChinese Home Service), July 17, 195"
• Ibid. (NCNA), September Ik, (Ked Flag article).g
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The evidence therefore seems to bear out the ooserva-
ns of A. M. Halperai "During 195&, the Chinese both in
actions and demands for action , and in their evident dis-
satisfaction with Khrushchev's relative moderation, made it
clear that they wanted a world-wide Communist policy exploit-
ing the bloc's initiative. "^> It seems reasonable to assume
that it was at the Khrushchev-Mao meeting in late July that
this dissatisfaction was made clear. Khrushchev probably
wouldn*t have come to Peking unless he was prepared to make
at least some concessions. Hie innocuous joint communique
issued on August 3rd, after the conference, reflected little
but a balance of give and take. The idea of a conference of
the "big powers" was mentioned} this is scored as a "take"
for Russia, as has been noted. The only possible concession
to China notable in the communique was the statement that
revisionism was "the chief danger of the communist movement."^
The propaganda heat for Taiwan was on in Ctina at the time of
the visit, and when late in August the bombardment of Q .eraoy
suddenly increased to five times the normal expenditure, it
is reasonable to believe that Mao Tse-tung was commencing
a tactical maneuver tailored to the limits of a commitment
extracted from his ally, Khrushchev.
55 A. M. Halpem, "The Foreign Policy Uses of the
Chinese Revolutionary Model," China Quarterly, July-
iSeptesaber, 3




The weight of the literature on the Taiwan Strait
crisis o. ould probably challenge the tonnage of the
Communis t projectiles that dropped on Quemoy. It had a
complicated plot, political implications ciiarged with etaotion,
and waa a good vehicle for "think pieces" on military strategy
under the threat of nuclear weapons. The purpose here is to
try to fit its many discontinuities into a hypothesis that
would explain the C: ir.eee Communist intentions in the light
of Sino-Soviet relations over the Taiwan issue developed
thus far.
In view of the almost continuous trickle of bombard-
ment, counter bombardment , sporadic air battles, aj\d ti
stream of editorial insults between the Chinese Nationalist
forces on Taiwan and the offshore islands and the Communists
on the mainland, it is almost Impossible to pinpoint the
date when buildups for a given Taiwan "crisis'* begin, or when
the episode can be considered closed. As far back as July
17th, 1958* Nationalist Chief of Staff General M«Bg Shu-min^
cancelled all military leave on Taiwan because of reported
troop concentrations and the arrival of long-range guns in
the mainland area opposite Quemoy. At about the same time the
United States Seventh Fleet in the Pacific waa alerted as a
result of international tension over Lebanon. Both sides
reported evidences of mounting tension and military buildups
thereafter.57
57 • Although through June and July the Soviet press touched
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By mid-August, the Nationalists were reported to have
troops on Quemoy and Matsu, the rest of their forces
(includ bout 300 jet fighter airplanes) on Taiwan, 58
The Communists had an estimated 128,000 troops opposite the
offshore islands, -^ 800 to 500 heavy gun positions fr
which they could cover all of Quemoy, a fleet of torpedo and
motor £;un boats, ° a reported 17 Soviet M and H type coastal
and large submarines equipped with snorkles (believed to
6lhave been assembled in the ttamghftl area), and a sizeable
percentage of their ] j>oviet~bullt jets which were staged
at the new airfields in the immediate vicinity. Neither aide
had a significant number of modern amphibious warships. The
drama began on August 23rd when 55#000 Communist artillery
rounds rained on Quemoy and its approaches
.
2
the Taiwan issue only in a w&v^ casual and routine manner,
by mi t was "mat iie papers." It it be
significant that on August 7th, five days after Khrushchev's
return from Pekin • Soviet newspaper Sovetaky Plot
said that the United States and Nationalist* forces were
preparing to attack the Chinese mainland,
58. New York Times , September 7» 1958.
** ?S- £ Tlmaf Hera.: optember 3> 1958. This
Is Tower the ITomraunia't buildup in the sane
area in June, , before the Korean War, (Figures from
testimony of r«x-secretary of Defense Louis Johnson,
Rilltary^ S^uation, o£. cit
.
, Part 3, p. 2621,) The 1958
crisis was a journalist's field day, and the proportionate
press coverages of the two eras were completely reverse
60, Hanson W, Baldwin, rroapect for Quemoy, New York Times ,
•pteraber 14, .
6*U New York Times, August 24, 1958.
62. London ^Tlmea, ..x, Zj, Ij'jo. Ail artillery ammunition
>ed throughout the crisis was of Soviet make. (Testimony
of Assistant Secretary or state Hobertsonj U.S., senate,
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign h
^Hl®* &6th
Congress, tJ.3. Government Printing Office^ , p. 390.)
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In easence, the framework of the conflict was t\
which evolved during the l.;5^-1^55 crisis. The Republic of
China-United atate^ Mutual Ifetenae Treaty had been ratified
in February, 1^55* and its provisions, aa well as those
the Dullea-Yeh diplomatic notes were in full effect. It
may be recalled that the various treaty arrangements provided
the issue with a plot within a plot. The ouster plot concerned
the Chinese antagonism over the island of SfclMM and its
traditionally appurtenant islands, the Pescadores. Thia waa
the "treaty area" which the United States was pledged to
defend. The Taipei government claimed sovereignty over the
mainland, as well as these Islands. The Peking government
iraed sovereignty over an identical expanse. riussia was
publically pledged merely to "immediately render military
and other assistance by all means at its disposal 7 ' if its
ally, the People's Republic of China, were "attacked by
Japan, or any state allied with it."63 In , as in 1955*
both Russia and the United States had protected themselves
from involuntary involvement in the Chinese dispute by
limiting their material support to items basically defensive
in nature, kach had about the same measure of control of
the situation re&arriin fi Taiwan and the Pescadores. The
United otates 1 treaty commitment waa more stringent, but it
had almost complete control of the material resources of the
smaller area o£ Taiwan. Russia probably had less control
over conventional bombs, delivery aircraft, or ad hoc
63. Sing-Soviet Treaty and A^eementa, log cit.
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aephiblous transportation he mainland forces due to the
diverse requirements and continental size o£ mainland China,
had a convenient hed&e in the ''Japanese" clause of their
treaty agreements. The roaster plot, therefore, could be
said to encompass a etrlcal standoff, with a
a.inimurn chance of United otates-rtussia involuntary involvement,
considering the level of CI inese technolo.^y at the time.
The "inner" plot concerned the offshore islands of
Queooy and Matsu, These were under de facto control of
Nationalist C ina and were by now the site of the garrison
of one-third of her troops. Whereas before lyhj Taiwan and
the Pescadores had a measure of historic precedent as an
entity separate from mainland China, the offshore islands
had continuously been territory of the continental govern-
ment until the Communist mainland victory. The Chinese
Communist government had never controlled them; they marked
the rear salient of Chiang Kai-shek's retreat. The National-
ist China claim of de jure sovereignty rested on the same
ground as the claim for X$ of the entire China
mainland.
,h the United states was not responsible for
the defense of these islands, the "Formosa Resolution*' of
the Congress in January, 1^55 had made it clear to the world
that an attac see islands mi&ht be construed by the
United 3tate3 as part of an attack on the "treaty area," and
that in fact certain types of preparations on the mainland
itself might likewise be so construed. In this context the
President, as Coawander in Chief, could of course exercise
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due military prudence Dy ordering the opposition of such
attacks or buildups by protecting the off&hore isla-a^., or
even destroy liij_ the offensive capability of the Coaftuniat
forces in the staging areas oC the mainland itself.
The fact that ohiang Kai-shek had stationed a heavy
percentage of his cosibat forces on these islands in effect
exerted pressure on the United States toward defining an
attack on them as a threat to Taiwan, if only because 1 's
defensive strength was reduced by a like percentage. Tension
was added b> the fact that the offshore islands' proximity
to the coast made it feasible for the Communists to attempt
an invasion in masses of small craft, without the need of
Hussion participation. Still more insidious consequences
could be envisioned if one took cognizance of the mass of
supporting evidence and subscribed to the opinions of ex-
Fresiident Truman, ex-Secretary of State ncheson, and others,
which held that Chiang Kai-shek exerted a constant bias toward
the escalation of tension and spreading the conflict to the
mainland. ^ This latter bias had been partially accounted for
64. President Txuman speaks of the Korean War eras "...all
of Chiang's actions suggested that... he hoped to gat us
Involved on China's mainland." (Truman, o£. cit
. , p. 402.)
Secretary icheson speaks of the offshore islands in
"Two intentions are pretty clear. One, Chiang Kai-shek's
to embroil the United States with his enemies; the other,
the Communist intention to drive the United States into
conflict over an issue so unimportant as to lose us the
support of all our friends../' (New York Times , September
7, 1;5&.) Scholarly opinion representative of a large
body of materials "Generalissimo Chiang wanted not
merely a successful defense of the offshore islands, but
an enlargement of the war, drawing the United states into
it." (Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglios Chiang Kai-shek
and the United States," Western Politica l Quarterly,
December, 195. » P. 10&5.")
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the diplomatic a- j previously obtained by
Secretary mt Stat* .Dulles, but Nationalist action in "the
inherent rlgfet ->f self-defense" naturally had to be excepted
from the requirement of prior joint agreement . Under the
conditions of the physical location of the offshore Islands ,®5
and tne nature of the Communist threat, considerations of
offense and defense have a tendency to m
The "inner plot' 1 was thus a delicate balance. The
Nationalists and Communists exchanged artillery volleys.
Chiang Kai-shek could exert pressure to the west only at
the risk of finding himself without United States support.
Mao Tae-tung could exert pressure to the east only at the
risk of finding himself under attack by the United States
while ausoia dodged behind the escape clause of "Japan."
The United states had much to lose if it committed
itself either way on the offshore matter. when the Chinese
Coiamunlsts dropped a match into this tinder box of intrigue,
Frees Secretary James Kagerty said in plain language what
diplomats would have to say more delicately:
The Chinese Communists have been trying to find out
£or years what we night do If they tried to take over
Matsu and Quemo^ on the wa^* to Formosa. ^..As far as I'm
concerned, they can keep on guessin&.. .6"
65. Hie Quemoy Island group constitutes an area of some 56
square miles, and has 57 miles of broad, sandy beaches,
most of which back up onto uiud flats. Bi>;; Quemoy is less
than three miles away from the nearest points of Communist
held territory. Matsu is ten miles fi ie mainland, is
a barren, rocky, hilly area of seven square rnile3.
66. New York Times , August 23, 1958.
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Throughout the rapid buildup of events after the
unprecedented mainland barrage began, the world guessed
and waited with baited breath. The Communist batteries so
dominated the approaches to the Island of Quemoy as to effect
a ticiht blockade preventing the arrival of logistic support
from Taiwan. ' The convergence of United States military
forces began as the Communist press methodically followed the
progress of Kaval units transferred from the Lebanon and Hawaii
areas. Air units from the United States mainland, and Marine
units from Japan and Okinawa. They duly noted name, date,
and number. Moscow ultimately reported that the United States
had the greatest concentration of forces in the Western
Pacific since World War II.
By early September, the most Immediate problem
appeared to center about the supply of the offshore garrisons.
The mainland radio had been broadcasting messages to the
Nationalist leaders on the offshore islands^ since the
bombardment started.
To Wu Lien, Commander of the Quemoy forces: Your water
routes to Taiwan have been blockaded by us, and yfl
have not the slightest hope of holding the island, of
be in,:, reinforced, or foein^ able to withdraw* «, , rnr
fate has entered the most critical stage, you should
give orders to surrender or should lead your soldiers
in a revolt at once if you care about yourselves ....
If you will only contribute to the fatherland the people
will excise you in accordance with our fixed policy. «$
67. The Quemoy garrison is entirely dependent on Taiwan for
food, ammuniuion, and all military materials. (New York
Times , September 5, 1958.)
Moscow Radio (Tass), September 5,
. This is in contrast with the 1954-1955 crisis when the
"last calls to the faithful" were directed mainly to
Taiwan (see above).
70. ftadio Peking, August 2b, 195S (in Mandarin).
K '-
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.September 4th , i-lai announced that his sovamatnt
considered -\rritorial latere to extend twelve miles
from the coaat _ xt the United states
d most of I .em world) recognized. If the United
gtat— observed this, the^ would have been completely
isolated from the lorn wfel ha Communist ahore batterlea
were keeping sterile of Nationalist supply vessels.
. the ease time. President Elsenhower and .secretary
of otate guiles were meeting In Newport, ithode Island in
itation over the ofrsnore predicament. »* late in
$ day If September 4th, Mr. Dulles made a statement which
definitively said It more than what Press Secretary
Hagerty had said earlier. He noted the treaty obli^ati
to defend Taiwan, and I ntin^enciea of interpretation
spelled out In the Formoaa Keaolution, He did emphasise
the offsnore islands { increasing importance in relation to
the defense of Taiwan.
?
d
On the next day. Ma© Tae-tung, Liu s ao-chi, Chou
fcn-lai, Font; Teh-huai (Minister of Defense), et al. , met
in Peking at the "Fifteenth otate Conference" and accepted
a motion to offer to resume talks with the United States at
the ambassadorial level in Warsaw (the United states had
offered to meet at this site four times within the previous
nine days).
71. Moscow ftadlo (lass), September 4, 195&. The broadcast
noted that the United States press considered their forth-
..ision the most important since the start of the
.r.
72. New York Times, September 5# 195
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I the 7th, the Moscow press repeated a New York Times
report that at a United states National Security Council
•••ting it had been decided to ignore the Peking twelve mile
territorial waters limit and that U.S. Naval units would
escort nationalist supply ships to the proximity of Quemoy
on the basis of the traditional three mile provision.^
Such a procedure did in fact start on that same date, and
the mainland artillery avoided the sector in which four
U.S. ships "violated Chinese Territorial waters," and the
first of what was to become hundreds of serious warnings'*
was Issued by Peking. '*
A measure?^ of logistic support to the Nationalist
offshore garrison was thus set in motion, as both Chinese
Communist and United .States military elements exercised
••ticulous care to avoid direct clashes. Sbroushottt the
rest of September, the delicate balance was held as the
continuing United States military buildup was covered by the
Communist press. Hike-Hercules (defensive) installations of
Taiwan were given heavy coverage, the movement of some 1J>5
am howitzers (capable of firing cither conventional or
nuclear warheads) to Quemoy, reiatl ... On September
24th, a new era of fighter tactics was introduced in the
spc: National! amunist air battles over the mainland
73. Moscow Radio (Tass), September 7,
74. itadio Pekin,, (NCNa), .September '{ t
75. On ths 17th of September, Chiang Kai-shek was reported to
believe that the efforts to break the blockade were
futile; only by bombing mainland installations could
Queaoy be relieved. (Washington Post and Times Herald,
S*pt«*ber 17, 1958.) ~" ~
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coast when the Nationalist planes scored several kills with
the United States -furnished infra-red homing missile,
Sidewinder. .\t a press conference on September 30th,
Secret up ite iXilles reviewed tne United to position
with regard to the offshore islands.
The situation is that we do not have any legal constit-
uent to defend t. ffi {«• islands, to not want to
make any such commitment, we do not have It today.,..
The Unite. !-es did not feel that 1 ^and to
sake the major commitment of force to t. -*reas th
the Chine~ -'eminent wish that
it was rather foolish to put them there, and as 1 say,
..are were a cease fire it would be our judgment,
military Judgment even, that it would not be wise or
prudent to keep the* there.* 6
>ur d- -r, the railitary tension still aountin,
Peking Minister ... ..onai defense Peng suddenly . ocedi
*n. certainly come when the Americans will
abandon you. ...2fte clue is already there in the statement
made Oj Pttllto ^ptember 30....
considerations, I have ordered the bombardment to be
jponded on the Fuklen Pro. . .v seven
from October 6th. 77
The cessation of the bombardment was made conditional on the
requirement that Nationalist supply vessels not be escorted
by the United 3tates Navy. \& appointed date the shore
batteries were silent, and the Nati 1 c*d
re-supply in quantii, . I tima: .ssued another state-
ment, extending the cease fire for two weeks,
...so .as to see what the opposite aide is
and to enabi uap&t. aetaoy, both milIts
76. depart titer, t t Bui; ober 2C, 1958, p. 6C2.
77. iildlo Tekln^ (SOU, er 5* l^o.
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and civilian , to got sufficient supplies, includi
food and military equipment, to strengthen their
entrenchment
,
On the eve of a visit to Taipei by Secretary of State iXtllea,
Feng announced the breaking; of the cease fire under the
ise of their permanent excuse, violation of the twelve
mile limit by United States forces. Shelling must.. .be
resumed as a measure of punishment."'^ After the secretary
of State's visit, Minister of Defense Feng issued a fourth
statement
:
1 have already ordered our troops at the Fukien Front
not to shell the airfield in Queraoy and the wharf
,
beach, and ships at Llaolo Bay on even dates /so tiat
you can replenish t0 facilitate your entrenchment for
a long time to come. If there is lack of anything,
just say it and we will give it to you. c
After early October, the Communists clearly did not
want the offshore islands, As one traces through the history
of the previous weeks, there is reason to doubt that they
ever wanted them.
In the first place, they took great pains to avoid
utilizing any element of surprise. A steady buildup of
threatening remarks had alarmed the United States by mid-
summer. Even before the bombardment had started, the tension
had prompted a well-publicized Inquiry regarding United
States policy in the brewing offshore problem from the Chair-
man of a congressional committee to the Secretary of State.®*
78. Ibid., October 12, 1958.
. 1513 ., October 20,
80. IpTdU , October *b, 195&.
81- department of State Bulletin, September 6, lj*>9, p. 37.-.
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Mot only did they not strike when world attention was focused
on the Middle £aat, but they waited to apply maximum pressure
or United States military units from all over the world
(including the Mediterranean) had been assembled in the
Taiwan area*
Secondly, knowing full well the fact that the only
basis of United States opposition would stem from the idea
that Taiwan was threatened as a result of their offshore
efforts, during the propaganda buildup before the bombardment
and throughout the crisis, one is hard pressed to find a
single Peking quotation which does not take pains to specify
that their operations in the offshore Island area were in
the nature of a preparation for an attack on Taiwan. 31nce
before the bombardment started, the United 3tates had taken
official cognizance of this and had published warnings on
that basis. 82
Third, in every case where the cross purposes of pacify-
ing Chiang Kai-shek and the American public, while at the
62. The connection was repeatedly noted and made public by
the United states State Department. In a press release
of August 28, 1 the Department of state "took note"
of a specific broadcast of the Fukien Coiumand of the
Chinese Communist Armies of August 27th, which had said
"The Chinese People's Liberation Army has determined to
liberate Taiwan, a territory of the fatherland, as well
as the offshore islands,** and that a landin ,,, on Quemoy
was imminent. (Department of State Bulletin , septe&ber
15 > 19564 , p. 415.) The case was reviewed by ex-President
Eisenhower in a television interview of December, 19611
"...the thing that always made the decision easy, in
anticipation, at least, was that the Red Chinese constant-
/ said: "We are not interested in Quemoy and Matsu,
we*re going to take Formosa." (Time Ma&aalne , December
1, a ;>. 14.)
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time tiivlng the Chinese Communists a credible threat
or open >r accommodation called for m subtle, inten-
tionally ambiguous statement from the United States , the
Communists always quickly chose the interpretation which was
least favorable to offshore island aspirations. When at the
height of tr^e crisis Secretary of State Guiles released his
statement of September 4th, the most "threatening" remark
of which was that Quemoy and Hatau "have increasingly become
related to the defense of Taiwan, 3 Chou 3h-lai answered on
the 6th: ":>n September 4th, 19^0 the United Statea Secretary
of State Dulles, under the authorisation of U.S. President
Elsenhower, issued a statement openly threatening to expand
aggression against the People* s Republic of China."®* Pravda
echoed s "In this bellicose declaration, Mr, Bullae, on
behalf of the President, threateningly declares that the
United states will not hesitate to use arms to defend, as he
puts it, Quemoy and Hatsu." The paper also spoke of
"Eisenhower's decision to send American armed forces to the
offshore islands. ^ In the press conference of September
30th, Mr. Dulles said "If there were a cease-fire in the
area which seemed to be reasonably dependable, I think it
would be foolish to keep those large forces on these Islands.'™
S3. Hew York Times , September 5*
84. HaaioTeking (HCNA), September 6,
85. Koscow Radio (Soviet South Asian Service), September 8,
58.
86 • department of state Bulletin, October 20, 1958, p. 603.

close reading of the entire statement does not exclude
an lnterpretu *hich would see the garrisons reduced, but
the islands not abandoned.) On the next day* Moscow
published a resume by Klkolai Andreyev and Alexander Petrov.
"^Secretary Dulles sald|7 that if the Chinese Communist
Government ceased fire, the United States would also agree
to make certain concessions # as far as I can tell, Mr.
Dulles said yesterday that the concession would be that the
Chiang Kai-shek forces, most of whom are concentrated in the
offshore islands, would be withdrawn.""' The idea of evacua-
tion of the islands at the price of a "cease fire" was
described as unfair to the Chinese people.^®
Fourth, the Chinese Communists' military decisions
never indicated that a landing on the offshore islands was
beinfc seriously planned. ^ They were operating at the wrc
time of the year for amphibious operations; late August,
67. Moscow Radio (Soviet North American Service), October 1,
68. The idea of a cease fire and the evacuation of the offshore
islands had corae up during the 1954-1955 crisis, and
according to Moscow, had the support ox" the British
CovernBient. A spokesman for the British Sorei. flee
was quoted on January 27 > 1955
«
J Poking govern-
ment be reader to cease military operations on l i basis
/cease fire/. • .having in view the repudiation by I
Chinese People's Republic of the national territory of
Taiwan and the Pescadores— then Britain would have to
support the a ineae People's Republic's claims to the
coastal islands of Tachen, Matau, and Quemoy, which have
been Chinese 1 time immemorial . (Moscow
Radio (Soviet Home Service), February 2C, 1955.) Peking
was not interested.
89. The Chinese Nationalists apparently did B ink a land-
ing was planned, on the day the bombardment started, the
nationalist Defense Ministry said trey thought it was to
be a "fatigue bombardment." (Mew York Times , August 24,
, P. 3.)

er, and v«r sea atu oo hi >r
amphibious operations, even in the three ails open water
atrip to (feMNNgf, Ml Um crisis on September
5th, a IjFphSMI str. i*ait.-;U ftuemoy and Mates were
never eubJested to bombing, aa the Tac nad been in 1955.
H»t unti- tber 3 o deep-penet* neila used
>,u the mainland against the Nationalist gun wplaomiisilti
.
There waa never any Jlrtleatloa af the aasea»s^ if amphibious
craft or even a fleet or junks j nor was Were a utilisation
of troops in the liiMHtal areas. -'•~ in suowai toe Chinese
MUB&tta upeke of BOBfNrt i* probably didn't have
enough troops ast to take Queasy, ami didn't even
mobilise the;.-,.
M scans the record Tor & watershed point at which a
previous declsi invade the offshore inlands was cancelled,
in vain. If the statement of American intentions is sought
as the reason for a change of mind, Mr, dalles was never more
specific than in his public reply to Pettysessional inquiry,
when he noted that "ties between these ^ffshore/ islands and
Formosa have beco&e closer and their interdependence has
increased... it would be hi&hly hazardous for anyone to assume
90, When the typhoon hit. Vice Ac . ... Beakley, CosEiander oV
m Seventh Fleet, was reported to have said that he felt
vent amphibious 2a .ttesipts.




aaes Herald , September iS, 1
saahd^ :*erces Pacific ,~ Ad Felt was reported
have said that the I realist shore battery effective*
neaa was "nil." (New Yoi September 28, 1959.)
,
New York Tioes, ,

.-i-
lent was released on .at 23rd, the
-he boafcardaaent op. If OHI I th©
-a 6l a ivtfiding
. -j ipt, the Coaieruniat pre©* had re d to a nuclear
of I venth Fleet aiid the pw ^r
gulfed sis. -a
started. 9*
This is not to say that there were absolutely no
j&encies i. olution. A I of
I .uses sight have tumbled to i ,. First* the- jffshor*
garrison;* si&ht have defected early in t; ..ie. It is
dotab at before the Cossunista issued the United States
escort vessels their first "serious warning" and 1 ic
support started g*tt into Quesioy, the saainland radio was
soliciting on Q\iamoyt
...the Goo mill., m people have continual
demanded the liberation of Taiwan, Quesoy and Matsu....
The United St set
oar territory of Taiwan. . . .Quesoy and Mat- /e become
as less as a pair of turtles Entrapped in a flask.
If they do not .-.;rr©nder they will be tot:. .
The Chinese pees will v .
on, direct blow to the U, ,3or 1 ^
as they did dux dar^.. .Kill the
advisers and defect to our side, 95
This would probab; m been mental, not physical extort*
Quoffljj was re ; r*ea © en
jptember 3, 1 p. 37
. -i Culture ,
ly!
, Radio Peking, August 89, 1958 (in Mandarin).
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the crisis started. '° It is hard to believe, in view of the
history o£ the Nationalist -Communist conflict for the previous
nine years, that Peking placed much hope on this.
second windfall item mi£ht have beer; accrued if the
United states had been enticed to silence the mainland
batteries by force. The plot is hard to piece together, here,
because there were so many possible courses of actions. This
mi&ht have oeen done by &ivin& the Nationalists conventional
bombs and permission to hit ground targets on the mainland.
It probably could have been done by American air power using
conventional bombs, it surely could have been done with
nuclear weapons. All three methods involved some risk of
escalation of the conflict, and Peking probably anticipated
Moscow assistance at some level.
The nuclear aspects of the crisis deserve special
mention. There is a history of evidence of Communist China's
attempts to get nuclear weapons from Russia. In November,
1^57* Marshal Feng led a Chinese party of military experts
to Russia, and the resulting quotations indicated that one of
the primary purposes of the trip was to plead for tactical
nuclear weapons.-" Chinese Communist military Journals were
among the first in the Communist world to comment on the
United states • interest in filling out their spectrum of
deterrent capability by having weapons of intermediate potency.
-
New York Tiroes , august 24, j Christian Science Monitor ,
September 3> l-j^l Washington Poat and Times Herald,
tober 21, 1958.
. Zagoria, og. cit
. , p. 37.
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The idea behind stoat of the C. inese article* was that all
big military powers must be able to reply in Rind, and that
tactical nuclear weapons were pertinent to the Taiwan Strait
issue.- rtfter Deng's mission returned empty handed, the
Chinese Communist articles shifted to a line that might be
interpreted as resentment. By the spring of _ they
had resumed their argument of the early l>^C's, stress!;,
the idea that nuclear weapons were not important, and that
in due course their "workers" would produce them, etc.
This analysis fits hand in &love with Russian-Chinese press
response to the idea of the establishment of a nuclear and
rocket weapon -free "peace zone* in Asia. This idea had taken
the form of a declaration of the kfro-Asian Solidarity
Conference in Cairo early in 1958. (There was a Soviet
representative at the conference). The Moscow papers heavily
endorsed the planj the Peking press ignored it.
^fter the start of the offshore island crisis of 195
one of the few notable differences between the Moscow and
Peking press releases was the marked preponderance of Russian
emphasis he nuclear capability of the United states forces.
£xcept for two brief periods, one starting about September
16th (near the time the 155 ram &uns were taken to Quemoy),
and the other after the Sidewinder was used, the Chinese
Communists portrayed the United States as a conventional
power. Even in the two exceptional periods they did not
•
*'frid




relate n .r weapons to oy and Matsu. The addition
of a new neap T any capability merely appeared to prompt
a brier flurry of general nuclear comments.
jn the other hand, reading the Moscow news leaves one
with the impression that nuclear reprisal was bein& threatened
daily by the United states. (Mention or hint of nuclear
weapons was notably missing from official U.S. statements.)
-ptember 5th, a Fravda article by Observer" wrote that
the American military "adventurers" were ''resorting to
brazen, provocative blackmail by threatening China with
atomic war" and quoted a UF1 story that had said that certain
developments might require "small atomic bombs against
points."100 On September 7th, when the United States Navy
commenced escorting Nationalist supply vessels without opposi-
tion, the probability of the United States attempting to
silence the shore batteries was concurrently reduced. On the
same date, Khrushchev sent a communication to President
Eisenhower, his first since the bombardment started:
It is needless to say that the attempts to frighten other
nations by atomic blackmail are utterly hopeless in the
present circumstances with United States possession of
the monopoly of atomic arms long lost.... One can say with
-fidence that threats and blackmail cannot intimi-
date the Chinese people. .. .The Chinese people will give
worthy rebuff to the a&&ressor. . . .an attack on the
Chinese People ' s Republic, which is a great Friend , ally
or of our country, is an attack on the Soviet
Union.
. .
.whether this region wTlleontinueTo remaTrT a"
dangerous hotbed of war will depend fully on the further
action of the government of the U.S.A. .. .All we want to
do is c*ll your attention to the situation which no one
wouXcf be"lTble to get out oIT ne ither you , nor we, should
war break out inthe Far £ast7±^i"
. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home Service), September 5, 1
1C1. Ibid
. (Tass), September J, 2 (XtttliOfl lno«rto4«)
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Moscow editorials were heavily laced with references
to United States news releases which tended to emphasize the
possibility of United states reliance on nuclear weapons in
case of a spreading conflict. Hanson Baldwin had written,
NUse of nuclear weapons would reduce the number of sorties
required— for bombing mainland airfields— by a factor of
perhaps 100C." 102 On September ilth, the New York Times
had reported U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Felt as
saying "his forces had only a limited supply of conventional
high-energy explosives. . .and would be compelled to use
nuclear ammunition at an early stage." On September 13th,
Moscow Radio said that tactical U.S. Air Force units with
nuclear weapons had arrived on Taiwan. 10^ Within the next
few days , the 15p ma howitzers were taken to ^ueaoy. iG^
I September i6th, the U.S.3.R. sent a diplomatic
note to Japan concerning United States military activity
there, with special emphasis on nuclear weapons. The note
suggested that a situation mi&ht be arising 'wherein Japan
might become, will or unwillingly, an accessory to...
a situation that constitutes a grave threat to peace in the
Par aast and thro s the world.
"
l0
^ On the 19th of
102. New York Times, September 7, 1^58.
;. Moscow Radio (Soviet Home service), September 15, IX
104. Hanson W. Baldwin, -ited war," Atlantic Monthly , May
1959. t'fo*. Baldwin places great importance on the
delivery of these guns, and likens them to a modern day
"fleet in bein ." This analysis does not lead to that
conclusion. It would seem that they arrived after the
fact, if the fact ever existed at all, and tnat they
perhaps served merely to sweat another letter out of
rashche
105. Moscow ftadlo (Tasa), September 16, 1938. Two Soviet
diplomatic notes on the same subject had been sent to
Japan in June, 1956.
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September, Khrushchev sent President Elsenhower a second
letter, this one so abusive (as presented in the press) that
It was returned unopened:
1 must tell you outright, Mr. President, that atomic
blackmail with regard to the People 'a Republic of
China will intimidate neither us nor the People's
Republic of China. Those who harbor plans of an
atomic attack on the People's Hepublic of China should
not forget that the other side too h&a -torn it; inu
hydrogen weapons and the appropriate means to deliver
them and, if the People's Republic of Jhina falls
victim to such an attack, the aggressor will at once
get rebuff by the same means. 1^
The subject of nuclear weapons and Khrushchev's
hypersensitivity to the threat of escalation of conflict
in the Taiwan Strait permits the drawing of some tentative
conclusions. First, it was established that at the Peking
meeting In early August, Communist China appeared to be in
line for some concessions. The visible evidence of meaning-
ful concessions was missing. The facts thus far make it
possible to believe that Khrushchev was willing to buy the
Chinese Communist plan of action in the Taiwan 3trait, and
offered support in "kind" 10? in case the United States
attacked the mainland, provided that the United States struck
the first blow. If pressed, this would have been a feasible
risk for Khrushchev to take. It required confidence in
106. Moscow Radio (Tass), September 19,
107 • Humors, believed planted b;, Chinese Communists, circu-
lated in Kastern Europe In aid-August, after the meet-
ing; they said that Khrushchev had promised Mao Tse-
tung nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. (New York
Times, August 31* 195c.) Russian commentaries (Turing
the "cri3ls often cited Moscow's backing of Faking in
terms implying a prior obligations "If they ^the United
States/ count on a repetition of the tragedy of Munich
they are sadly mistaken." (Moscow Radio (Soviet European
Service), September 12, 195o.)
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President Eisenhowers cool headedness, and he had good
presedent for that. 1^ second, it is completely possible to
believe that Khrushchev was totally alarmed at the possibility
of the spreading of the conflict, once he reflected on the
•any variables of individual human Judgment involved10^ and
made the scurrilous statements to President Eisenhower to
try to warn the United States of his commitments to Mao Tse-
tung. The price of this warning had to be public confirma-
tion of a commitment formerly obscured in the wily "Japan"
clause of the treaty. This was a costly precedent to set,
in view of his many peripheral allies j an even more costly
move would evidently have been to publicly commit himself
to mainland China before he was assured that they were
willing to relieve pressure on the supplying of Quemoy
(possibly in accordance with their prior agreement). It Is
also noteworthy that Peking had volunteered to conduct
diplomatic talks with the United States by the time he sent
108. It was widely reported that President Elsenhower person-
ally turned down a proposal that communication lines in
mainland China be bombed in the event of an attack on
Quemoy in 195^. This was reportedly done at a National
Security Council meeting on September 12, 195^.
(Washington Post, November 8, 195^; Manchester Guardian
,
November >, 1954j purvey , 1>34 , oj>. cit., p. 107) Early
in the 1^5o crisis, Moscow Radio quoted President
Eisenhower as saying that nuclear weapons could not be
used "except with the specific authority of the
President. (Moscow Radio (Tass), August 28, 195&.)
lC.y. A possible Russian "second thought" that strikes the
writer as humorous 1 it was reported that the Nationalists
were goin^ to paint Communist markings on their aircraft
and attack U.S. ships to establish a provocation.
(Moscow ttadio (Tass), September 3* 1^5B.)
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the first letter. 110 The chances of the United as' will-
ful enlargement of the crisis were slight before September
7th, after that date, nil.
Khrushchev 1 * public and liberal interpretation of the
1950 ciir let treaty will be arbitrarily scored as a
special bonus for Peking, but not as a rationale for their
3 tart ing the bombardment. If anything, the Chinese Communists
were trying to play down the dangers of escalation of the
crisis into the nuclear phase; they were meticulously playing
a conservative game from the standpoint of both physical
contact with the U.S. forces and total war propaganda.
Moscow had become alarmed at the possible results of what
was now probably considered an ill-advised Chinese idea. It
is true that the Chinese Communists* apparent commitment to
the creation of a static tension might have been modified by
the Chinese Nationalists or the United States. The Nationalists
on Quemoy could have defected, or the United States ml^ht have
attacked the mainland before attempting to escort the National-
ist supply ships, but both of these "windfall" contingencies
110. Yugoslav officials said that Khrushchev's all-out support
for Peking reflected confidence that the Chinese
Communists did not intend to bring on a conflict with
the United States, (New York Times , September 18, 1959.)
The London Times' Richard Harris: The moment Mr.
Khrushchev salcFhe stood entirely by China's side over
Quemoy, we might deduce that the Chinese were not going
to— and had certainly been told not to— precipitate
anything that could become a world war." ("China and
the World," International Affairs, Vol. 35 , No. 2,
April, 1959, P. lo7.)

If.
appear to have had a low probability of occurrence. The
pel I Inc 61 inese Communist Inducement must have been one
which had validity in a standoff bombardment . On this basis,
motives are suggested.
The crisis occurred at a time when a high level of
domestic loyalty was needed. It coincided with the high
point of organi-in^ the commune system; this was the heyday
of the "Great Leap Forward." Mass demonstrations of indigna-
tion against the United States were staged (at least 302
million were claimed to have participated), ix and articles
often combined the description of these gatherings wi
claims of progress in communization, 12 (It was also duri
the hei&ht of the offshore crisis that claims were made that
were later reportedly resented in Moscow. The September 1st
Red Flag reported that the Chinese could already see the first
buds of communism, 11^ and the People's
.Dallff of September 13th
implied that Mao Tae-tung was the ideological leader of the
world Communist movement.) 11^ It is extremely hard to judge
how heavily Peking weighed the beneficial effects o£ reminding
111. Radio Peking (NCNA), September 16, 1958,
112. "...^12 million have demonstrated thus far/ The people's
communes are developing at a much quicker rate. In iron
and steel and agricultural production, the people are
working round-the-clock with tremendous energy."
(Radio Peking (NCNA), September 13, 1958.)
113. FaIcioneIil,lqc. cit.
114. John Bradbury, "Sino-Soviet Competition in N \>rth Korea,"
China Quarterly , April -June, liol, p. 15 (footnote).
This is a continuing point of Sino-Soviet friction. In
i960, a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party wrote of Mao Tae-tun& as "the greatest





the people of an outside hlle incorporating their
communes. It is not believed I e been the controlling
factor in the instigation of the crisis.
Some feel that the breaking off of the U.S. -Chinese
Communiet ambassadorial talks in Geneva in December 1957
weighed heavily on the Peking decision to start the bombard-
ment. 11^ ,\x time, United stales ambassador Alexis
hnson mm transferred to Bangkok, after sixteen months of
talks, during which time the two sides could not even agree
on an agenda. 11" The Chinese Communist representative would
not meet with the First Secretary left in his place. On
June 30th, a Peking government statement covered the well
known s**ound about the United States typing to confuse
domestic and international issues, and declared that "The
United States occupation of China's territory of Taiwan
created tension in the Taiwan area. This is a naked act of
aggression against China, and the Chinese people have the full
ri&ht to take...measures to repulse it." 11^ On this occasion,
Peking issued an ultimatums the Chinese Communist government
would call off the talks unless the United States government
designated a representative at the ambassadorial level within
fifteen days.
115. "...the offshore crisis was an oriental expression of
the communist leaders' willingness to begin negotiation,"
(John Scott, "The Case for Two Chinas," The i*ew Leader,
October 6, lyfjb, P. 5.)
116. Sdmond 0. Clubb, Formosa and the Offshore Islands in
American Policy, 1950-1995*" Political science Quarterly ,
Vol. 7k, No. 4, December, 1959^ p. ^26.
117. Radio Peking, (NCNA), July 1, 1951

In early July, botu Moscow ark. spurted that
Secretar, ilia* .nnwunceu At a presa conic
• tha- m considering continuing the talks with the
African Ambassador in Warsaw. ° The United otatea did not
formally reply I Itlmatum. On July 28th, Washin&t^n
>*jed that the talks be resumed in Warsaw; they repeated
the offer three times before September pth. Warsaw
*mbassador Jacob Beam even tried to set a date on September
Hh« At the high state meeting in Peking on the $th it
was decided that the Communists would offer to resume negotia«
tions; Chou fecial advanced the proposal formally , and the
United States accepted on the 7th. Tne maratnon talks began
again in Poland on September l^th.
There is a measure of Chinese face-saving in this
sequence, but it is considerably diluted by the intervening
United states offers. The Chinese had recalled their repre-
sentative for instructions before September 3th
j
1 *-* tiiere
was little doubt that the renewal of the talks was imminent,
with or without the bombardment. It is easy to refute the
idea that they brought the United States to its knees to
negotiate by starting the bombardment; this is probably why
they never tried to present this interpretation with any
degree of conviction.
The theory has been advanced that the crisis was timed
to effect United States domestic Congressional elections.
116. Moscow Radio (Tass), July 1, 1958j Kadio Peking (NCNA),
July 3, 1956.
13->« Ibid . (Chinese Home Service), September 10, 195&.
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This idea is not convincing, if only because there is reason
to question which political party is identified with Crina
policies Peking dislikes more (see later). In the case of
the crisis, some notable Democrats heavily backed the
Administration (ax-President Truman, Senator Paul H. Douglas).
With regard to election results, the Democrats did make gains
in the House, senate, and Governorships, but such factors as
the Sherman Adams case, economic recession, Sputnik, and the
Middle rast heavily diluted any China inputs.
It has been said that the crisis was planned to
invoke greater sympathy in the United Nations when the
question of Chinese membership was brought up. 120 Results,
at least do not speak well for this as a motive. The voting
on the proposal to keep China representation off the General
Assembly agenda had been reflecting a gradual change in
favor of discussing the issue for years. The "percentage"
rate continued to show the same trend as before with no
discontinuity at the year 1956. Each side had a new positive
vote (those wanting it kept off the agenda, South Africa, and
those wanting it on the agenda, Iraq— hardly surprising after
the revolution). Austria, Greece, Iceland and Libya moved
to the "abstain" column to keep the rate at about its norm.
In further refutation of the idea of the United Nations
session being a crisis motive was the easily predictable
120. New York Times, September 24, 1958 (editorial). On
August 11, 195&* the U.S. Department of State had issued
a paper entitled "Policy in Relation to the Nonrecogni-
tion of the Chinese Communist Ke&lme" which was heavily





result of a resurgence of the charge that Peking was "trying
to shoot her way into the United Nations." The phrase was
heavily used that fall. 12*
The more one studies the incongruities, the more
obscure the plot becomes, Stewart Alsop has written:
There la little significance in the inner history of
the 1936 crisis, simply because the basic decisions
had already been made in 1><5^ and 1955. The only really
new decision was the decision not to permit Chiang to
use his air force over the mainland even against the
Chinese Communist batteries which were shelling Quemoy,
as she had been permitted to do in 195^-lb>55. 122
exception is taken to this statement. The 1^65 crisis gave
every indication of being a close thing; by comparison, the
jQ crisis was a ''canned" problem. In 1995 j ^P to some
point near the time the ships of the Seventh Fleet approached
the Tachens, there were about three and a half variables in
the tactical equation 1 The People's Republic of China, the
U.S. 3.K., the United States, and to some extent, the Republic
of China. Moscow-Peking arrangements were not firm, and the
participants were involved in "gamesmanship" with second
and third actors. The chance of escalation under these
complicated relationships was great. In 1938, although
•gain the eruption occurred when Russia was the "debtor" in
121. There was some discussion about bringing the Taiwan
Strait crisis before the United Nations. Russia was
against it from the start, saying that the U.N. had no
right to discuss the question, since it would be inter-
ference in China's domestic affairs. (Moscow Radio
(South Asian service), September 27* 1956.) The
contrast with ij 1^ is noteworthy.
122. Stewart Alsop, "The Story Behind quemoy: How We
Drifted Close to War, ' Saturday Evening Post, December
13, 195b, p. 68.
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the cycle ol' oino-Soviet give and take, Moscow and Peking
appeared to be operating from some common point of ground
rule reference. China had evidently extracted a more
conservative promise that Russia felt obliged to keep.
United States' opposition was given every encouragement,
and every pressure was relieved when the approach of a
crucial decision was even hinted. In 195^* the Chinese
Communists thrust the crisis on the primary actors and let
its limits and course be shaped by the pragmatic turn of events;
the 1958 affair followed a path which a political bookmaker
would have predicted with heavy odds, had he been given the
nature of the Chinese intentions on the eve of the bombard-
ment. In short, there was another important difference in
the 1958 crisis. Chinese Communist motivation was different.
If not territory, what was Peking's primary goal?
after all, the costs of the episode to Communist China were
not insignificant. One expense was apparently the high usage
of adrenalin in Moscow. Good will is probably a highly
valued commodity in the Slno-Soviet bloc, and Jhlna clearly
cashed the bonus check that was due in the autumn of 193
Secondly, she perpetuated the 'mad dog" image she established
in much of the Western world during the Korean War. Third,
she strengthened Chiang Kai-shek. Haterial in the form of
armaments, a few functional small ships, and aircraft were add-
ed to his Inventory through the exigencies of immediate need.
By early September, the United states 1 aid to Taipei had
exceeded the 1958 quota, 12^ and thereafter they had to pull




If one adds a snail value for the unlikely "windfall"
Items, the domestic enthusiasm during communication, the
warsaw talks, and maybe a little for U.S. politics and the
United Nations, the ledger still doesn't balance. Peking's
predominant motivation is still missing. It is believed that
their basic rationale stemmed from the thou&ht behind the
remarks of Mao Tse-tung when he took the podium at the
Supreme State Conference on September 8th, the day after
Khrushchev's first letter to President Eisenhower. He
didn't mention the offshore islands, but said;
The present situation is favorable for the people all
over the world who are fighting for peace.,,. The general
trend is that of the east wind prevailing over the
west wind. .. .China's territory of Taiwan...and all
United States military bases in foreign countries are
all nooses around the neck of United States imperialism.
Nobody but the Americans themselves have made those
nooses, put them around their own necks, and handed
one end of the rope to the Chinese people... 124
HYPOTHESIS VIII
The primary purpose of Communist China's creation of
tension in the Taiwan Strait In 1956 was to strengthen
their future claim to Taiwan by erecting an impediment
to "Two China" solutions.
The Chinese Communists were attempting to weaken the
legal structure of the United States' support of the National
1st cause by creating the image of a bridge of United States
protection, grafting the two Chinas together, the western
124. Radio Peking (NCNA), September 8, 1^8.
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extremity of the bridge resting on the marshy ground of
precedent of the offshore islands. 12^
A "Two China" solution to the Taiwan dilemma refers
to any of several possible arrangements whereby the inter-
national community would recognize, not necessarily in the
diplomatic sense, the existence of two separate and distinct
states— Mainland China and Taiwan China, a prevalent
corollary of the idea is that some sort or ouiside guarantee
should be given to preserve the status quo in China today
and prevent military assaults by either of the "Chinas"
against the other. There are many suggested forms that
this could take. (The present Taiwan government could be
established as sovereign over Taiwan and the Pescadores; i2"
a Taiwan plebiscite might be held in order that they might
choose a government for home rule, colonial status, United
Nations trusteeship of Taiwan, etc.) The issue would pre-
sumably be closed, and the tension which has existed since
1949 would disappear in due course.
125. The British Foreign Secretary in a written reply to the
House of Commons on his governments opinion of the
legal status of the offshore islands in February, 1955 >
said that they 'undoubtedly" formed "part of the terri-
tory of the People's Republic of China." Since the
Japanese Peace Treaty, Taiwan and the Pescadores have
been held to be in an "indefinite" legal status. Legal-
ly, the Nationalists recaain on the basis of a duly author-
ised post World war 11 military occupation, pendlr
further arrangements ( survey , 1^55-1^6, op. cit. , p. 10.)
126. On February 8, 1955* before ratification or the~T?.3.-
Nationallat China Mutual juefense Treaty, three reserva-
tions were placed on the agreement by the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. One reservation specified
that the treaty did not imply Chinese nationalist
,verei^ity" over Taiwan and the } -lores. This con-
forms to the legal limbo in which the Japanese Peace




It is hardly surprising that the idea has wide appeal
outside the Communist world. Authorities on oriental affairs
almost universally agree that the people of Taiwan do not
127
want to be ruled b;y the present Peking regime. ' Although
to subscribe to the policy mi^t imply skepticism oC Chiang
Kai-shek's eventual control of the mainland, it does not
require a conviction that the present Communist regime
free of the threat of internal revolt. By the same token,
many (particularly among the "neutralists") who accept the
Pekin ; government as a permanent fixture in the wave of the
future in *sia— yet do not like the continual exposure to an
explosive situation in the strait— endorse the plan in one
of its forms.
The two most adamant opponents of the idea are the
present governments of Taipei and Peking. In international
affairs, their arguments and claims are almost identical;
the problem arises by virtue of the fact that the claims of
each encompass tfrw *hole of those of the other. To them,
"Two China" policies include the complete scope of the broad
definition set forth above, and in addition branch out into
fringe areas which almost encompass acknowledgement of tne
127. "There is not the slightest question that the vast
majority of the inhabitants of the island— Taiwanese as
well as Chinese ftp he mainland— are opposed in-
jecting Taiwan to the rule of the Communists." (Eustace
oeligman, "A Two-Chinas Proposal," The New Republic,
lober 16, 1961, p. 13.) "...It is certain tt<at a
majorit more than 900 would say that Formosa should
not be united with the mainland under the present
communist regime." (Michael Lindsay, "The Future
Foraosa," The New Republic, October 6, 1998, p. 8.)
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existence of the 'other China.'' 1
In the latter context, before the j rials, a Two
China policy have been perceived to be larking over
the horizon at the very source of American leadership. Presi-
dent anhower had once indicated that a Two China policy
was under study. 12is! Secretary of state Dulles had said that
the "United States would not oppose forever'* the entry at
Communist China into the United Nations, 1^ and that "the
United States will negotiate, or even recognize, Communist
China any time it will serve the Interests of the United
States. wl3* open support of a Two China policy for the
United States had been voiced by Senator Langer (R-North
Dakota), 1-^ Senator Morse ( D~Oregon ) , *33 senator Sparkman
(JJ-Alabaoa), 1^ senator Kefauver (a-Tenneasee), 1^ supreme
.. China Post article, Taipei, 1?5** "it is difficult,
It seems to us, to argue that to sit at a conference
table with the Peiping regime to discuss the situations
in Korea and Indo-China 3hould not in any way be inter-
preted as constituting any degree of de facto recogni-
tion. To so ar&ue is to draw a very fine legal distinc-
tion indeed. Not being the proud possessor of as fine
a legal mind as secretary of State John Foster Dulles . .
.
/we find it7 an impossibility to follow such a line of
legal argument." (ftadio Taipei (Hadio Free China),
February 23, 195**.) After spending five weeks in
Communist China in lyj?6, during which time discussions
were held with top government officials, French states-
man Bdgar Faure concluded that "the main headache to
the Chinese leaders is to avoid the "second China," to
reject every plan, to frustrate every manoeuvre intended
to perpetuate the existence of "two Chinas," the China
of Peking and the China of Taipei." (Faure, o£. cit.
,
P. 19.)
i29. jjew York Times , January 21, 1955.
1^°' IBTd i., Kovemfeer 11, 1953.W- 2BTor., January 17, 19S*
13«2. Congressional Record , Senate, June 30, 1956.
133. *tew York Times , January 24, 1^55.
*35. IoTol771anuary 30, 1^53.
135. Ibid ., April 3, 1^55.
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art Justice Douglas,"^ Adlai Stevenson, 1-^ and Korean
truce negotiator Arthur Dean. ^ American scholarly articles
frequently advocated the idea, and members of the ADA were
its perennial supporters. In the summer of , Radio
Peking reported that the National Committee of the 9«ft«
Democratic Party advocated a "Two China" policy. ^39
ade the United States, the idea was widely
endorsed. Prime Minister Attlee is usually credited with
initially endorsing the concept In December, 195C, lif0 and it
had received wide British support ever since. Canada's
Minister for sterna! Affairs Lester Pearson and New Zealand
Prime Minister Walter Nash had favored it,^*1 as had Japanese
statesmen Shigemltsu and Kishl. " India, constant supporter
of Chinese Communist United Nations membership and opposed to
United States action in the Strait, favored representation of
the Taipei government at talks on the Strait (natter, and
evidenced Interest in easing tension via the "Two China**
route. ^3 jn ahort, the movement could become formidable;
as Taiwan grew in wealth and tradition as a separate entity.
136. W. 0. Douglas* North from Malaya (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1954) > p. 36ll
'""
137. New York Times, April 8, 1955*
13&. Dean, "V.S. Policy and Formosa," 0£. cit. , p. 3&1.
13^. Hadio Peking, June l£, 1^5& (in Mandarin to Taiwan).
140. Truman, op. cit., pp. 402-4c3.
141. New York~Times, February b, 1.36; Ibid., September 13 #
142. Ibid., February 23> 1955* Hadio Peking (NCNA), July 7,
143. Donald ~>. ^a^oi-ia, The sino-aoylet Conflict I^6-l-j6l
(Princeton, N, J.: Princeton University Press, 1^62 )
,
p. 176.
144. In li/62, Taiwan's real increase in gross national pro-
duct was reported as o$ per year; per capita income was
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and the world &rew weary or the Communist arguments and
incessant tension, it could have been expected to &ain
momentum. In looking ahead, Peking saw that it must try to
dilute u>e pressure that could be brought to bear. Uhe best
answer to this was to try to woo the people on Taiwan and to
discredit the United states' position.
At first glance it would appear that if discredit:-
the United states were to be attempted by emphasizing Chiang's
military dependence upon them (the rationale taitjht progress:
foreign power in the Jiast is bad, Seventh Fleet is bad,
Seventh Fleet separates two Chinas, therefore Two Chinas is
bad), tnat this, and a policy oC wooing Chiang's forces on
Taiwan would be mutually exclusive. It is here that one must
apply the 'Oriental concepts" mentioned above, and attempt to
think in terms of patience,
Friends in Taiwan: There are flames of war between us.
They should be stopped and extinguished . To achieve this,
talks are needed. Of course, it would not matter so
much even If the flghtlnf;; would continue for another
thirty years . It is, however, better to secure, an early
peaceful settlement. The choice is up to you. 1^
dialectics,
The more reactionary their enemies become, the greater
revolutionary fervor the people will acquire and the
faster their enemies will go to their doom. .. .struggle,
increasing at $$> per year. Industrial output had mor®
than doubled in the past eight years. Land reform legis-
lation had prohibited buying individual plots of more
than 7.5 acres; only 14# of the agricultural families
were tenant farmers. Tbe living standard was reported
to be exceeded in Asia only by Malaya and Japan.
(Robert P. Martin, "The China That's Prospering,"
*• Newa end World Report, January 1, 1^62.)




failure, struggle again, failure again, and finally





.a cease fire ... in effect means asking the Chinese
people to recognize the "legality" of United States
ropation of Chinese territory, Taiwan. It uieana
asking the Chinese people to admit that the United
States can invade China and to recognise the moves of





,../^rhe U.S. lay7 attempting under the name of a
ease fire" to poke its nose into Quemoy and Matsu
and to freeze the split of China so as to facilitate
the realization of its plot of creating "Two Chinas."
...The Chinese people absolutely will not allow this
plot to succeed....They will never allow the U.S. to ^distort China's matter into an international dispute. 1***
The "revisionist si&" that started at the Bandit
Conference fit hand in glove with the wooing of the Taiwan
forces* A change in Peking propaganda line could be noted
{
the "Kuomintang and Unite ..tea reactionaries" became "the
oppressed people of China beln# manipulated by the United
States." At an address to the National People's Congress on
June 28, 195$ Chou 3n-lai proclaimed i
We have consistently stood for national solidarity and
united resistance against external enemies. In the
interest of our threat motherland and our people, the
Chinese Communist and the Kuosnintan*, members have twice
fought shoulder to shoulder against Imperialism. . . .We
can still link arms again and unite... .Now on behalf of
the Government, I formally state: We are willing to
negotiate with the Taiwan authorities on specific steps
and terms for the peaceful liberation of Taiwan, and we
146. Red Flaa , August 16, I95S (Mao Tee-tun^ quoted).
147. 'uaTio"Teking (NCKA), January 19, 1955 (Italics inserted).
l4o. Ibid., October 7, 1958 (italics inserted).

171
hope that the Taiwan authorities will send their repre-
sent »e other appropriate place,
at a time they consider appropriate, to begin these
ta . us. 14 ->
More surprii ot, it has been 'widely reported that in
November, 1956, Cbou jui-lai offered Chiang Kai-shek a? place
the Communist Oovernaent as part of the solution. In
December, lj sj6 he added that he considered a Minister 1a
pest Hoo la* for tho Generalissimo, and su&^ested the
t *WlTmhl1 PffF life.W jn napoh, 1956 in a speech
che National Committee of trie Feoplo**. U Consulta-
tive Conference, Chou in-lal remarked;
All decent Chinese should unite as patriotic members
of one big fatally and together fight against &**&-.,
the schemes of United jtates liMpOlslI—U**3,
In May, 1956, moba in Taipei demonstrated against the United
States in protest against alleged judicial lenience tfei an
As»rican soldier who had shot a native "peeping Tom.'* By
the summer of ly$6, llttwmgto their pleas had elicited no
response fro® the national pvemment, some observers felt
that the mainland attempts to incite subversion on Taiw
were becoming reasonably successful,*» but the image of Mao
Tae-tun&'s soft exterior soon paled as the Peking governments
dissatisfaction with the internal (Hundred Flowers) and inter-
national (aast European revolt) developments were followed by
the "dogmatic sag."
**9« Current Background Ho. 395* July 5, 19$6«
• Sow
'
TorK Times, 6ctober o, 1958 (quotes from Pnompenh,
Caaibodia).
151. Current Background No. 43j, March 8, 1957.
152. Lindsay, *The Future of Formosa," oj>, cit., p. ]

spring and summer or 1-yjo, Chi as
alternate! ztrayed as an "out and out traitor and faithful
fin imperialism" 1^ and as a victim of a
Unltou 8 overthrow tela, In my case, the
ultimate goal of Un^ foreign policy was said to
be the ejcecution of aotae neX'ariouu suheme, whether it be
United Nations trusteeship or a local plebiscite, whereby
iina" was to be permanently split, *inro. fet the "people"
of Tai* mainland's sympathy, for in any event,
Taiwan was to be an outpost of "U.5. imperialism. '
Oaou ijn-iai addressed the National People's -as
on February 19, 1956. He char&ea the United states, iiritain,
and Japan with plotting a "Two China scheme/' and his closing
remarks or a ion& speech wares "We will never allow a state
fwo Cnlnas" to arise in any international organization,
conference, or occasion/' 1^ In the spring o .*..>, Chou
singled out a British Member of Parliament on tour and
assured him tiiat the Peki: /emment would never accept
what he described as "Washington *s Two China policy."1^ ?he
mainland press closely followed the developments of Taiwan
"independence 11 movements. They cited the "Free Taiwan Move-
ment" o£ Chen .Shih-haiun^, the "Provisional Government of the
Taiwan Republic" of Liao Wen-1, arid the "Taiwan Independence
League." Samples of editorial comment includes
Mandarin to Taiwan).
154, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1712 « February 13 >
ashlngton Poat and Times Herald, August 31 , 1958*
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Anybody who launches an intrigue to divide China by
means of the Taiwan problem will ultimately certainly
realize that this is mere wishful thinking. 156
Washington clamores for "Trusteeship" of Taiwan , and
maneuvers for the creation of "Two Chinas."157
Traitor Liao Wen-i and his lot are sinister pawns
held ready by the U.S. for the continued division of
China in case Chiang Kai-shek becomes useless. 1^
The latter argument was developed at length:
The U.S. scheme, if realised, would not only harm the
people of China, but also the Chiang Kai-shek clique.
To accomplish this scheme, the U.S. has conducted a
series of activities in the past few years ...it merged
the U.S. command on Taiwan with the MAAG. ...Meanwhile,
the U.S. forced Chiang Kai-shek to cut his armed forces
in order to bring Chiang Kai-shek under its control....
Politically, the U.S. has fostered the pro-American and
anti-Chiang Kai-shek elements inside and outside Taiwan
by means of which they could control Chiang Kai-shek
and pave the way for his possible resignation ....
Furthermore, the U.S. has tried to persuade the
Kuomintang members who are disgusted with Chiang Kai-
shek to join its projected opposition party to strengthen
the anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign. 159
Throughout the 1958 Strait crisis, the multiplicity
of arguments (Chiang is a warmonger, Chiang is being put upon
by the United states, the United States' aim is the establish-
ment of a permanent imperialistic base under a "Two China
guise) permeated all propaganda and policy pronouncements.
The Chiang Kai-shek clique has been strengthening war
preparations.. ..On the other hand, the U.S. imperialists
are rather cool to the Chiang Kai-shek Clique*s demand
for more military aid, despite all the favors and
flattery the clique uses. Being the masters, the American
imperialists can do anything they wish.. ..Of course the
U.S. imperialists are still using Chiang Kai-shek and
have not yet kicked him out of office. They have found
156. Radio Peking (NCM), June 13, 1958.
157. Ibid., June a, 195©
.
156. IBT2T.
15>>. HaaTo Peking, July 11, 1936 (in Mandarin to Taiwan).
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that Chiang Kai-shek is not as useful as before. That
is why the U.o. is following a policy of not letting
Chiang Kai-shek down but not giving him sufficient aid,
either. All members of the Chiang Kai-shek clique
should wake up if they want to keep their self respect.
'^ie Punitive military operations taken by the Chinese
people asainat Chiang Kai-shek's troops entrenched on
-
v*oy and Matsu are therefore completely proper and
necessary. 1©1
The "cease fire" idea pressed by the U.S. at Warsaw
is nothing but a "Two China" scheme in disguise, J-62
The whole Chinese Communist strategy, what has been
described as their "dialectics of warfare > "1°3 waa embodied
in the four speeches of Marshal Peng announcing the restric-
tions of offshore bombardment. In his second, he explained!
16C. Ibid,, August 24, 195^*
161. SaoTo Peking (KCWA), September 20, 1958 (address by Chen
I) (italics inserted).
162. Ibid.* September 25, 195o, The earlier U.S. -Communist
China negotiations at Geneva had been utilised in Peking
propaganda to imply that the United States was trying
to interest them in a "deal" to create Two Chinas and
thereby scuttle the Nationalists. (Philip t« Mosely,
"The Moscow-Peking Axis in World Politics," in Moscow-
Peking Axis , Council on Foreign Relations (New Vork:
Harper and Brothers, 1957)* p. 202.)
163. Anna Louise Strong claims that Marshal Peng was a key
architect of this complex rationale. She writes of
having been at a social gathering with Peng in late
September 1958 where his "attempts" to take the offshore
islands were discussed as a standing joke. In her words:
"It Is clear to anyone in China that Peking could have
taken Quemoy by warfare or got it by bargaining with
Dulles." She expressed the opinion that Chiang Kai-shek's
ainland drive was a known factor which lent itself to
aanipulation. "If... Chiang Kai-shek is their ^Peking*®/
greatest enemy, he is also their greatest friend.'
(Anna Louise Strong, "Chinese Strategy in the Taiwan
Strait," Mew Times (Moscow), Vol. 46, November, 195&.)
It is interesting to note that Marshal Peng was arrested
in September, Ijyj as a rightist in a procedure that at
one point had Mao Tse-tung In tears. (David A. Charles,
"The Dismissal of Marshal Peng Teh-huai," China Quarterly ,
October-December, 1961, pp. 63~6>.)
.
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oe Communists may not yet understand this for the
time being. »,you will understand after a while .... Among
the Chinese in in, Fen^hu, -^uernoy and Matsu, the
majority are patriots; only a few are traitors. .. .The
intang in Taiwan has not yet entered into peaceful
negotiations with us and a reasonable solution has not
been worked out.... If you are not willing to hold peace
talks, fighting, is unavoidable....We are forced to fi&ht
when we want to fight and stop when we want to atop. 1***
When after his speech, Chiang Kai-shek, in response to United
States pressure, ^ had renounced the use of force to recover
the mm.inland, w Feng <save evidence o£ trying to modulate the
timing of his "dialectic process" and insure continuing
Nationalist pressure to the westward. In his fourth speech
to the Nationalists
:
Chinese problems roust be settled by us Chinese alone.
American political broker Dulles likes to mind other
people *s business; he wants to take a hand in the
matter of lon& standing dispute between the Kuomintang
and the Chinese Peopled Republic, and order Chinese
to do this or that, to hurt the interests of the
Chinese and to serve the interests of the Americans....
Dulles said that he saw a China of the Communists; that,
this country being actually in existence, he was Willi.
to deal with it, and so on.,
.
.Compelled by circumstances,
the Americans have changed their policy and treated you
as a *de facto political unit,'* that is to say, in fact,
not as a country. Such a "de facto political unit" is
still needed by the Americans at the Initial stage
starting from the present time. That means isolating
Taiwan. At the second stage, Taiwan is going to be
placed under Trusteeship. .. .There is only one Crina,
not two in the world. On this we agree.... we are not
advising you to break with the Americans rlgKt away .
~
That would be an unrealistic idea". iGy
'
164. Radio Peking (NCNA), October 12, 1958.
163. In his press conference of September 3k, 1955 Secretary
of state Dulles said that the idea of Chiang return!
to the mainland was "bigftily hypothetical." "I don't
think that just by their own steam they are goin& to get
there," "No force will be used from the treaty areas
except in agreement between U3." (apartment of atate
Bulletin , October 20, 1958, p. 603.J
166. Mew York Times , October 24, 19;
167. Ha5ioTekints (NCNA), October 23, 1958 (italics inserted).
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It is possible to dismiss this complicated rationale
as merely a Chinese Ciwuillit justification of a milltct-
position with which they could not cope. This, however,
would be an unrealistic over-simplification. United States
deterrent power was assembled quickly and in great strength,
but this was predictable— even solicited. To purposely put
yourself in a position in which you cannot fulfill your
avowed commitments is certainly unorthodox, but the explana-
tion can be traced, is reasonably well documented, and
explains many otherwise unaccountable discontinuities in
Chinese Communist actions.^b The idea had already occurred
to Edgar Faure during his visit to Peking in lj$6 .
Should one not ^o so far as to think that China does
not want the status quo to come to an end— even in the
form most honourable to her— within the limited rela-
tions of a single country? Does not China find it to
her advantage to be placed in the most absurd position
possible in regard to as much of the world as possible,
until she receives her "restitutio in inte^rum ? 4'-1^
THE 1^58 CRISIS AND SINO-SOVTKT RELATIONS
The interpretation of evidence just presented shows
the 1958 strait crisis as a Chinese Communist evolution planned
within the framework of Kusaian acquiescence, such acquiescence
belnc, in response to pressure for concessions which were felt
due. In the course of events, Peking was able to make two
•••tDingly innocuous points which may have increased Russian
168. Mao Tse-tungs "The path of revolution, like the road of
every activity in the world, is always tortuous, never
straight." (/extract from selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,
New York Times , June k, lj6l»)
169. Faure , 0£. clt . , p. 20.
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apprehension of the relationship between the two countries.
The first was Khrushchev's public interpretation of
his obligation under the 1j5C treaty to ^ive military assist-
ance to the People's Republic of China in case the mainland
was attacked by the United otates, even though United States
alliance with Japan in such a venture was a moot point. In
the months that followed there was an effort in the Moscow
press to gradually play down Khrushchev's more virulent
remarks on this point. '^
The second was possibly the more insidious. It con-
ted of Peking's emphatic documentation of the fact that
in spite of the chan^in^ world situation and Moscow's new
aster strategy of victory through economic, rather than
total war means, the Taiwan issue was not going to be allowed
to die or to be absorbed in some sort of a quid pro qjuo, no
matter what the West, or the Hussians for that matter, might
suggest as a handsome repayment for the relaxation of tension.
On this issue, Communist China was ' j^oin^ for broke." Jidgar
Faure noted this attitude in Peking before the crisis.
Settlement on Formosa, diplomatic recognition, return to
the United Nations, the security Council, "the Big Five,"
international prestige, Asiatic leadership— all these
interlock. .. .The whole operation must work without •
hitch. Care must be taken lest the least grain oC sand
get into the works, such as a clumsy and premature
recognition, even if well intentioned. above ail, there
aust not be, there must not be even a hint of , a second
China. a71
17C Khrushchev's more mild statement of October 6, 1956—
not his letters of September 7th and 19th— were cited as
the action which "aerved the cause of peace and averted
outbreak of war." (Moscow &idio (Soviet Home Service),
j^ecenber 22, 1256.)
171. Faure, o£. cit
, , p. 21.

It ia possible to make Interest i njeeture about
itusaian policy re^ardin^ a Two China solution. In their
press, it is mentioned infrequently, and only when necessary
xn the course of a routine backing of Pekin , Before 1958 »
during the annual autuam resurgence of the C. lnese representa-
tion issue in the United Nations, the Kussian representatives
implied their disfavor of "Two Chinas' 5 but definitive quota-
tions could not be found. At the discussion during the
crisis, in 1j5&, Gromyko dismissed the idea as "impossible. m1?2
A study of the Chinese and Kussian press releases during the
summer of 195& (as the crisis was approaching) reveals
Russia's almost complete avoidance of this facet of the issue.
This is possibly the single notable discrepancy in the two
coverages during the build-up period, 2>uring the crisis,
the Kussian press occasionally referred to their abhorrence
of the idea (indeed in Khrushchev's unopened letter to
President Elsenhower of September 19th, he referred to the
United States 1 "undisguised attempt to create a 'Two Chinas'
situation"), 1^ hut it could hardly be i&nored since it was
Peking's primary propaganda line.
If popular interpretations of the broad differences
between Russian and Chinese Communist foreign policies are
correct, it stands to reason that Russia would prefer a more
flexible Peking stand, at least amenable to compromise when
it was desirable to relax international tension. Since one
172. New York Times , September 24, ly^S.
173. Moscow Radio (Tass), September 19,
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rarely finds reference to Huasia f e position on "Two Chinas,"
common sense might be a reliable guide.
The Soviet leadership has no pressing territorial ambi-
tions, except for it3 continuing phobia about West
Berlin, while Communist China has many appetities.
Because of what it regards as Soviet "pacifism," it
is farther than ever from overrunning. Taiwan and thus
ending once and for all the civil war. It may even
fear that Moscow could accommodate itself in practice,
though not in so many words, to a "Two CI inas solu-
tion.W
17^. Philip £• Mosely, "Khrushchev's Farty Congress," Foreign




If this "distinctive pattern" fashioned of the "objec-
tive unique events" of 3ino-3oviet relations regarding the
Taiwan issue has added any new dimension to the equation of
world politics, it is that there is a distinct possibility
that there is a long standing animosity beneath the surface
which has not been relieved. Indeed it is not likely to be
relieved by the present leadership in Peking on any grounds
but total compensation. 1 This deduction suggests a review
of United states foreign policy alternatives in 1962. Implic-
it in the conclusion is the admonition that we (I) do not
imagine options which we probably do not have, and (2) do
not undersell the advantages of our present position.
The option which we very probably do not have concerns
the perennially-debated issue of the admission of Communist
China to the United Nations. The non-Communist schools of
thought of how to handle the future of the Nationalist
Chinese vary in decreasing order of sympathy from the United
ite3, to Britain, to the "neutralists" for whom India may
1. "...for Mao, the revolution will not be completed until
the five-starred Communist flag flies over the Winistry
of Defense in Taipei..." (Claude A. Buss, The Arc of






be assumed spokesman. It Is doubtful that even the latter
J. i uondone opening the flood gates and letting Peking
deal as they chose with the eleven million people of Taiwan.
Realistically, what re: *ould define as a "Two China" solu-
tion Is the only current option, from the maze oC procedural
and legal complexities, four possible accommodations oC
Increasing advantage to the Chinese Communists have been
suggested: Taipei in the security Council, Peking In the
General Assembly; both Chinese governments in the General
Assembly, India in the security Council* Feking in the
Security Council, Taipei in the General Assembly; Peking in
both Security Council and General assembly, Taipei in the
General Assembly as a new nation. 2 If the unbelievable
should happen, and the United states should sponsor the fourth
alternative, 3 there is little reason to believe that we should
not take Peking at its word to reject the offer outright.
2. William w. Boyer and Neylan Akra, "The United States and
the Admission of Communist China, " Political Science
Quarterly , Vol. LXJCVI, No. 3, September, 1961, pp7333-
3. "In 1^56, an election year, a Democratic -sponsored resolu-
tion, reaffirming support of the Republic of China and
opposing the seating of Hed China in the United Nations,
passed the House by a vote of 391 to ana 06 to in t
Senate. Not a single Congressman or Senator of either
party was willing to vote against this resolution. This
is a phenomenon unprecedented in American political
history.. . .It is now being stated in certain quarters
that we have a MTwo-China': policy, we do not have a Two-
China policy any more than we have a Two-Korean policy,
a TwoVietnam policy, or a Two-German policy.** ( Congres -
sional Record , House of Representatives, 1959* p. A3383
— text of address by Assistant Secretary of State (Par
tostern Affairs) Robertson, March 13, 1959.) Changes of
policy under the current Democratic administration are
negligible. Prospective Secretary of State Rusk at the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on his

Aa Sdgar Faure observed:
The People* 3 China cannot conceive bein
,
put on a
similar footing with Formosa; she cannot consider
recognition concurrently with Formosa. She will never
agree to take part in a parallel system, to share
plenipotentiaries or accept credentials drawn up for
both Chinas.... Bather than find herself "paired with
Taipei in some sort of diplomatic mesh, Pekir
prefers the status quo from which, after all, she in
no way 3uffera . **
Many predict that the United states will be forced
into socte sort of accommodating proposal to the Chinese
Communists as a result of the gradual shift of General
assembly attitude. It has been suggested that at some
point the United States should become non-committal, or even
heavily sponsor an offer which Peking would presumably turn
down, and thereby lose "face."* The United Nations problem
is dynamic and will have to be played "by ear" as the diplo-
matic winds shift the sandy terrain. There will probably
nomination: "I see no prospect at the present time that
normal relations could be established with the author-
ities of Peipin^ because they seem to feel that the
abandonment of the government and people on Formosa
would be a prerequisite to any s ch normal relations."
( Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations ,
U.S. Senate; 67th Congress, January 127 ly61, U.S.
Government Printing Office, lj6l.)
4. Paure, op. cit.
, p. 1
5. This would seem to be a rather inane concept. It may
become necessary, but it appears doubtful that Peking's
aplomb would be shaken b;y such a "clever" maneuver.
There are many precedents on which to predict their
response to subtle offers of rapprochement; e.g.,
secretary of state Dulles' guarded words of September 3C,
concerning a possible reduction of forces in the
offshore islands in return for a cease fire were picked
up by the Communists as an outrl g) t offer to completely
/e the islands to Peking, and this was haughtily re-
jected without any apparent embarrassment.

1<
be Important hurdles to cross on this matter In the years
to come, but In broad perspective It would appear that the
debates about Chinese membership In the United Nations that
are continually conducted In the United States are essential-
ly an Intramural sport.
the Canadian Club in Qttowa on March 13, 195
Assistant Secretary of otate Kobertson observed that "lift—
19$C, the difference In basic China policy between former
President Truman and President Eisenhower is the difference
between tweedle-dum and tweedle*dee. It could now be added
that President Kennedy has followed suit. This can be
explained by the simple fact that throughout the period,
there have been few realistic alternatives. It la not the
purpose here to suggest errors in American foreign policy!
quite the opposite, a critical analysis only points out that
even the practical opportunities for an alteration of course
were minimal.'
6. C -onal Re. House of Representatives, Ij'-JS,
7. A review of learned articles on the subject of United
states China policy over the x*ecent years rji&ht tend to
refute this statement. The key word is "practical." In
the words of writer and lecturer Hans J. Mor&enthau,
University of CMoftflOl "It is, however, not self evident
...that an intellectual Ml .ows how to lecture and
write books knows by definition albx ban to stake foreign
policy. The intellectual does not need to have, andl is
frequently devoid of, that quality which is inueupensible
to the statesman— practical wisdom... In ti.v world oi' the
intellectual, ideas meet with ideas, and anything goes
that is presented cleverly and with assurance. In the
political world, ideas meet with ffctta which make mince-
meat of the wr leas and throw the pieces in the ash*
can of history. * (Hans J. Morgenthau, Kennedy's
reign Policy, Failure and Challenge," The New Leader
,
July 3 and 10, lS;6l, p. 5.)

:annot be d aed unless one's
-Ives are defined. This is not d ult; it is a
prooc which i Ion attempts to Maintain its national
ex:. d that means safeguarding national secur.it
It Mtsta no reflection on the well-established hl&h purposes
of the United es to admit that our government, in carry-
out the people* s will, seeks to accelerate the demise of
Coranunist imperialism or that the name of the game is power
itics. That one objective of this game should be to
select policy alternatives (under conditions where all else
remains equal, at least) that will tend to accentuate
Communist bloc differences is admitted by the complete
spectrum of political bent within the consensus of the United
States Congress." There are two routes to splitting China
and Russia. J In 1950, the United States was on the fence
j
. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Robertson in
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(May 11, 1953)!
Humphrey (D-Minnesota) (questioning the wisdom
U.3. Far East policy):
MIt seems to me our policies are forcing these people
/'J list China and the Soviet Unionj7 to adhere even
more rigorously to each other. 1 don't have at
specific answer, but I am doubious as to whether we
are proniotin^ the ends which you and I both fcfeii
we ou^ht to promote, M
Secretary Robertson t
"You read it all the time— that we ought to be making
up to the Red Chinese because that would alienate
them from the Russians, I think that is Just about
as unrealistic a theory as any that could possibly be
advanced.
Senator Humphrey:
"I think so, too."
(Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations ,
U.S. Senate, iibth 'Congress; U.S . Governmen t Print:
Office, 1959.)
9. A steady debilitating and eroding tension between the two
may be preferable to an open rupture at this time. (Zbigniew
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Prime Minister Att lee, speaking for the British Government,
favored wooing China from Russia. President Truman recalls
a conversation with Mr. Attlee in December of that year.
In his opinion, the Chinese Communists were potentially-
ripe for "Titoism." He could not consider that China
was completely in the hands of Russia, and therefore the
aim ought to be to divide the Russians and the Chinese—
who are natural rivals in the Far &aat. He said "...all
of us should try to keep the Chinese from thinking that
Russia is their only friend. I want the Chinese to part
company with Russia. 1 want them to become a counter-
poise to Russia in the Par East. If we dor.*t accept
this theory, if we Just treat the Chinese as Soviet
Satellites, we are playing the Russian game .'10
It is submitted that by the time these remarks were
made, the United States was already caught up in the sweep
of historic events (triggered by Stalin) which by 1962 has
carried the situation so far in the opposite direction as to
reverse the more likely route of eventual rapprochement IBO
degrees. 11 "Being caught in the sweep of history" does not
refer to a situation in which the United States let herself
get into a position of relatively less control of her own
destiny than did the other primary actors. The net has
caught us all, and rather than grasp for some hopeless
K. Brzesinskl, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics
(New York: Frederick a.Traeger, I§6F7) This subject
deserves continuing study.
10. Truman, o£. cit
. , p. 4C2.
11. This is currently argued both ways:
"I expect to see the U.S. Ctovemraent give lend-lease aid
to the Soviet Union against China, and my actuarial life
expectance is thirty-odd years." (scott, "The Case for
Two Chinas," loc. cit.)
"Let us &et the perspective straight on the relative
danger to us from Russia and from China. China is only
the auxiliary; Russia is the real power. Let us not
waste on China the energy which should be reserved for
Russia." (Buss, The Arc of Crisis , o£. cit., p. 337.)
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objective, it ia better that we re-evaluate our relative
position in the waiting game into which the whole world la
forced
.
It is sometimes said that time is not on our side.
This is not necessarily true in the Taiwan situation. With
the passage of time, internal conditions on Taiwan are get-
ting steadily better, not worse. Even by 1958, Michael
Lindsay (who by no stretch of the imagination could be
labeled a member of the so-called "China Lobby"),12 observed
i
Up to a few years ai;o many foreign observers considered
that, if the Formosans had been able to express their
preferences in a free election, the order of choice
would have been (1) independence, (2) return to Japan,
(3) continuance of Kuoraintang rule, and (4) unification
with the mainland under communism.. ..It is quite pos-
sible that a solution which left Formosa as an inde-
pendent State under United Nations protection would
have secured majority support in Formosa some years
ago, but much of today's discussion of the Formosa
problem ignores the changes which have been taking place
during the past nine years. Today . .
.
the present govern -
ment would very likely win the election
. .. .Excluding
Japan, Formosa may be quite well the best administered
country in Asia. . ..Corruption still exists and will be
hard to eliminate so long as public service is so badly
paid, but here again Formosa could probably compare
favorably with most other Asian countries. ±3
12. Lord Lindsay of Birker, as a British official, lived in
the Chinese Communist areas during World War II, and in
1955 wrote j "In most of the war-time disputes with the
Kuomintang the Communists seemed to be in the right on
the merits of the case, and in the complicated three-
sided negotiations from 1„>44 to 1946 the Communists
seemed to show greater good faith than either the Kuomln-
tang or the Americans, though they were often very inept
in handling their case." (Lindsay, China and the Cold
Wur, op_. clt.
, p. 3.) He is a former tutorTri~¥enching
University, Peking (1938-1941), a lecturer at Harvard
and Yale after World War II, and is currently Chairman
of the Jar Kast Program at The American University,
Washington, D. C.
13. Lindsay, "The Future of Formosa," op_. cit




The United states policy of mainland Isolation and
non-recognition has certainly had purposes beyond ulsapproval
of Peking's conduct; the complications which would emerge in
many non-Communist Asian countries with hlgta overseas Chinese
populations would be extensive once a Peking embassy was set
up. Of course this policy has had Its price, but In the
intervening years the world has grown used to it and has made
adjustments accordingly. A sudden change could be expected
to arouse some adverse comment even from our allies to whom
Ikit was originally so objectionable.
Possibly the most important consideration in evaluating
our present position, is the complication of an Increasingly
conservative Russia, getting more and more out of step with
her relatively backward stepchild, China, very probably feel-
ing the strain of Chinese pressure rising from a multiplicity
of contingencies in the Taiwan issue. A sudden overt change
of policy, simply in the name of "relieving tension 1 ' should
be examined carefully in the context of past indications as
well as present events to see Just what tension is being
relieved, and from whom. Richard Hughes, of the Jjondon Times
spent the years 1945-1961 in the Far East. He wrote an
article for the New York Times in 1961 in which he said:
14. The British Chief Minister of Singapore told author and
publisher John Scott in 195& that a sudden change in
U.S. recognition policy would create havoc. Mr. 3cott
observed: "I was rather amused to find high British
officials on the ambassadorial level read:' to admit
quietly that in effect U.S. China policy supported Her
Majesty's Government 's interests in Southeast Asia.''
( Scott, loc. cix.)

astern reporter who isas worked in both Moscow and
Peiping has the slightest doubt that the Soviet Union,
despite fraternal ind .. >n in public about Western
discrimination, is secretly delighted that its difficult
ally is not in the United Nations. 15
In X96X, reward Crankshaw came into possession of Husai
and Chinese Communist circulars (dated 21 June, and
September, i960, respectively), "hitherto secret corre-
spondence....from a satellite source.*' They Hated recent
Sin ^ievances, among them China's condemnation of
Russian policy which had prevented the establishment of a
unified oino-^oviot Pacific Naval Cobmmuv. "Moscow, it
seems, was afraid that the Chinese would draw the Soviet
Union into a . ver Formosa.'
The purpose of these concluding observations is not
suggest a China solution, but to emphasize the importance
of taking note of changing conditions as tin waiting gang-
is played. The development of sound political po: like
the parametric form of scientific generalIzation, depends
a continual re-examination of th v% hypotheses on the
lis of current observation. Like science, there is no
absolute truth and no final goal, but if the trends are
extrapolated honestly, and the historic perspective is raised
above the episodic sequence of the immediate past and viewed
on the plane of dynamic flow, the focus will be less blurred
when e in the road is approached. Our image* must be
15. "iihould ited China be Admitted?" New York Times, September
17 j 196:
16. wiward Crankshaw, The Observer (London), February 1
Si.

shed when they no longer correlate with reality.
There in no foreseeable solution to the Taiwan dilemma;
moreover, thoughts of new policy commitments are for the
moment unrealistic. From the United states 1 viewpoint, the
situation is not necessarily deteriorating. We might be
thankful that time can pass before we must commit ourselves
to a step. When the time comes, let us hope that our ration*
ale is up to date and that our position vis a vis both Russia
and China is more clear. As their interests diverge their
problems increase.
It is tempting to suggest that in a very real sense
the advent of the Bolsheviks to power spelled the
en^ of Marxist ideology. 17
17. iirne3t J. Simmons, Continuity and Change in Russian and
Soviet Thought ( Cambridge , Mass • : "Harvaz^TUnlveraity
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